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ABSTRACT
LIVING POLITICS BY AWAKENING HISTORY: A CRITICAL APPROACH
TO WALTER BENJAMIN THROUGH SIGMUND FREUD
FEBRUARY 2006
ALEX BETANCOURT-SERRANO, B.A., UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
The first and second chapters of this dissertation focus on the theoretical relation
between di earns, history, and politics in the writings of Walter Benjamin, paying
particular attention to The Arcades Project. These chapters are an intervention in
contemporary debates whose main concern is the articulation of a historiography that
takes into consideration the political climate of its discursive field. Chapters three and
four aim at presenting two self-understood leftists approaches to politics. In these
chapters I present the limitations of these contemporary approaches when compared to
the possibilities that a Benjaminian project offers. More generally, the dissertation seeks
to formulate a politics that is attentive and responsive to silenced voices insofar as these
can be articulated historically. Hence, in order for such historical articulation to take
place the dissertation proposes a philosophy of history that encompasses marginalized
subjects. This attempts if is to provide such philosophy of history it has to respect
difference critically, and if it aims to provide a political openness to depoliticized
subjects, it must do so outside the parameters of liberalism. Hence, I argue only a
dialectical approach to the articulation of history and politics can sustain a critical history
vi
attentive to historical otherness and a leftist politics that remains outside the sphere of
liberalism.
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CHAPTER 1
ANALOGIES OF DREAMS: DREAM INTERPRETATION IN FREUD AND
BENJAMIN
I defended the position that the true ‘mediation’
between society and psychology was to be found
not in the family, but rather in the commodity
and fetish character itself, that the phenomenon
of fetishism is the authentic correlate of
reification. You find yourself here, perhaps
without being aware of the fact, in the most
profound agreement with Freud; there is
certainly much to be thought about in this
connection
.
1
Theodor W. Adorno to Walter Benjamin
Beginnings
A few years ago, when I first began to delineate the contours of this project, I
spoke of the idea of working on the relationship between Walter Benjamin and Sigmund
Freud to a well known anthropologist. He received my enthusiasm with a lot of
skepticism adding as an objection that even though Benjamin had read Freud, by
Benjamin's own admission, he had been more interested in Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of
My Nervous Illness than in Freud’s interpretations of them . 2 I recall this incident because
it points to a possible skepticism that the reader may be inclined to share. However, in the
last few years there has been an increasing interest in the relation between Benjamin and
Freud. Hence I begin this chapter by reviewing briefly analyses on the Freud/Benjamin
1
Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno, The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, ed. Henri Lonitz,
trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 93.
2
1 figured his opinion was based on Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin: The Story ofa Friendship, trans,
Harry Zohn (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1981) Here Scholem recounts that
during the period 1918-1919 “Benjamin attended Paul Haberlin’s seminar on Freud and produced a
detailed paper on Freud’s libido theory, arriving at a negative judgment. Among the books he was reading
connection with this seminar was Daniel Paul Schreber’s... which appealed to him far more than Freud’s
essay on it.”, 57.
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couple. After this review I will refer to the reasons dreams reveal a dialectical character.
The chapter will continue with a discussion of Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams
concentrating on the most important theory: the dreamwork
.
3
I will discuss the sources of
dreams and the dream-work as the principal mechanism in the Freudian psychology of
dreams. This will be followed by a discussion of the four mechanisms of the
interpretation of dreams: condensation, displacement, representability, and secondary
revision. After this discussion I will bring Benjamin into the picture and explore the
theoretical intersection of dreaming and awakening in Benjamin and how they not only
play an analogous role with Freud’s categories, but more importantly how Benjamin in
his always idiosyncratic way pushes forward Freud's theory of dream interpretation and
places it in the realm of historical materialism from a dialectical perspective. We will see
that dreaming and awakening are neither external to one another nor progressive from
one to the other (sleep-dream-awakening) but they function dialectically as two aspects of
the same matrix, as two moments of the same articulation. Finally, after my proposed
reading of Freud and Benjamin I will conclude with some remarks on the historical
character of dreams in order to open the discussion for the next chapter. In order to
compare the relationship between dreams in Freud and in Benjamin we must always have
in mind the underlying analogy of this dissertation: the analyst is to Freud what the
historian is to Benjamin. One of the purposes of this project is to push the boundaries of
this relation and see how far, in the philosophy of history, we can get.
3 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation ofDreams, trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1998).
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Tracing a Relation
In her recent piece, Sara Ley Roffto tries to relate Benjamin to psychoanalysis as
a movement. 4 The author's attempt to read the issue of reading Benjamin and Freud
together is predicated on the belief the question of influence should be replaced by the
perspective of mtertexuality. For instance she sees the Arcades Project as a “work
stamped by a call for the liberation of desires and affects characteristic of both Freudo-
Marxism and Surrealism.”5 The fact that in 1931 Alexander Mette reviewed Benjamin’s
The Origin of German tragic Drama for the psychoanalytic journal Imago
,
which was
edited by Freud, says something about the psychoanalytic affinities in the work of
Benjamin. As Roff points out regarding the book review, “proposing, in effect, that
history [The Thirty years war and the Counter-Reformation] made the same kind of
imprint on baroque literature as infantile experience did on a person who was mentally
ill, Mette thought Benjamin had revealed baroque stylistic peculiarities to be
fundamentally pathological symptoms.”6 Roff, however, approaches the relation of
Benjamin to psychoanalysis in general as an intellectual movement. She does not explore
the particularities of Freudian psychoanalytic theory in relation to Benjamin’s thought.
4
Sarah Ley Roff, “Benjamin and Psychoanalysis” in The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed.
David S. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 115-133.
5 Sarah Ley Roff, “Benjamin and Psychoanalysis”, 131
.
6
Sarah Ley Roff, “Benjamin and Psychoanalysis”, 122.
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Rainer Nagele has taken the issue of the relationship between Freud and Benjamin
a little further. Nagele articulates the relation between Freud and Benjamin through the
coda of modernity and the problem of epistemology. The connection between Freud's
remarks and Benjamin's thought are posited by Nagele when he argues that “In this
positioning of the singular in psychoanalysis as the potential microcosm of all that can be
known, Freud’s epistemology intersects with that of Benjamin. From the center of
modernity, both point back to a prebourgeois world of Baroque cosmological
correspondences and emblematic hieroglyphs .”8 It is in the field of epistemology where
Nagele sees a commonality between Freud and Benjamin. And on this ground
Benjamin s approach to the youth movement was very telling. Benjamin's critique of the
student movement’s approach to otherness, most notably the poor as other, was against
the movement’s notion of empathy. The movement’s solidarity with the poor basically
relied on a patronizing attitude that was unconscious of its political elitism and in which
the other was devoid of self-reliant autonomy. Nagele argues that “Einfuhlung [empathy]
appears as a refusal to acknowledge otherness and the stakes of conflict. Where it
becomes the basis of social and political action, it becomes a terrorist phantasmagoria
that turns violently against the incorporated other as soon as the traces of otherness in the
other emerge .”
9
Another affinity that Nagele sees between Freud and Benjamin comes
from the theory of the unconscious. For him “Benjamin’s history is based on the mapping
of the effects of a memory radically different from conscious memory. It is on this level
See Rainer Nagele, “Beyond Psychology: Freud, Benjamin, and the Articulation of Modernity” in.
Theater, Theory
,
Speculation: Walter Benjamin and the Scenes ofModernity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991).
s
Rainer Nagele, “Beyond Psychology”, 69-70.
4
Rainer Nagele, “Beyond Psychology”, 66.
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that Benjamin s work intersects with Freud's mapping of the effects of the
unconscious." 10 Finally, Nagele refers to Freud's case study of the wolfman and how one
case can become the foundation of a general approach of a whole science. On this flank
Nagele quotes Freud: “Of course a single case does not teach us everything that we
would like to know." And as Nagele points out Freud qualifies the remark: “More
precisely, it could teach everything if one only were capable of grasping everything and
it one were not compelled by a lack of perceptive exercise to be satisfied with little.” 11
Here we can see how Benjamin’s methodology and the epistemological basis of it can
relate to Freud’s.
These scholars have thought deep and hard about the relation between Freud and
Benjamin, but none of them tell us how they thought about this relation in the first place.
That is, how they came to start thinking on it. I would like to say something brief in this
regard before moving to the discussion per se. The origin of this chapter comes from a
most uncanny experience. I have been a student of psychoanalysis for some years now,
and some of my textual readings have been influenced by psychoanalytic interpretation.
Nevertheless, it was not with a psychoanalytic framework for interpretation I thought of
Freud when reading Benjamin. This idea came to me otherwise. When The Arcades
Project first appeared in English translation in 1999 I immediately delved into the book.
As anyone who has read The Arcades Project would tell, this is a fascinating book both
in structure and content. The book is vintage Benjamin: aphoristic, a montage in itself,
10
Rainer Nagele, “Beyond Psychology”, 56.
11 Quoted by Rainer Nagele, “Beyond Psychology”, 69. Another important contribution to this topic is that
of Winfried Mennenghaus, “Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Myth,” in Gary Smith, ed. On Walter Benjamin:
Critical essays and Recollections (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991). I will discuss Mennenghaus’
approach later in the chapter.
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against the grain of received knowledge and with deeply insightful snapshots of history.
Hence, structurally speaking the book has nothing to do with Freud's writing style'
formal, highly structured with a clear prose delivered in essay form. This is not to say, of
course, that Benjamin does not write in that fashion too. He did it well in many essays. I
point to the difference in style of The Arcades Project from Freud’s usual writing style
just to show why, while reading Benjamin, Freud kept coming to mind. The experience
was particularly strong when Benjamin writes about dreams and history: the topic of this
dissertation.
Freudian Dreams as Dialectical experience
As we stand in the midst of a black hole, in that hypnotic state we call sleep either
worried about the next hour or anxious that it does not come, Freud tells us that one of
the basic functions of dreams is to protect our sleep. While asleep, thoughts, memories,
images, fears, insights, and particularly the past emerge protecting our sleep but also
interrupting it frequently. Hence, dreams are paradoxical to say the least. In the same way
in which dreams can fulfill the wish to sleep, in the realm of desire, they may also fulfill
some other unconscious drive, and interrupt the same sleep that they initially set out to
protect. Dreaming then exists in a kind of conundrum. It responds to the ego's demand to
sleep. It thus suppresses those things that may cause excitation and perturb our sleep. But
it also offers at the same time the opportunity for a repressed drive to satisfy itself under a
hallucinatory realization of desire. Thus, this double function of the dream points to
something Freud said once about the dream: a dream is the beginning of awakening. In
this sense dreams can be said to be dialectical. They are part of an experience that goes
6
beyond itself, beyond dreaming as a protection of one’s sleep and at the same time they
mark
,
as Freud points out, the beginning of awakening. What happens in between these
two extremes is complex, fascinating and, I would argue, dialectical. Moreover, contrary
to what common sense about dreams may tell us, dreams are also very much material:
one of their common sources is our everyday life experiences.
When one sleeps and dreams one is looking forward not only to a much needed
repose from an agitated day or from the boredom of everyday life but also to a new
beginning; to starting afresh, to new experiences, expectations and desires. From this
perspective awakening, rather than been the opposite of dreaming, stands dialectically at
its heart. This first chapter is a discussion of this precise moment and how it unfolds in
my articulation of the relation between Benjamin and Freud.
Freudian Interpretation
Over a century ago, troubled by his famous dream of Irma’s injection, Freud
produced what was to become his magnum opus: The Interpretation of Dreams. Freud
opens his work with the following assertion: “In the pages that follow I shall bring
forward proof that there is a psychological technique which makes it possible to interpret
dreams, and that, if that procedure is employed every dream reveals itself as a psychical
structure which has meaning and which can be inserted at an assignable point in the
mental activities of waking life.”
12
It is this psychological technique what 1 want to
discuss in this chapter. Later on I will argue that we can find an analogous mechanism in
the theory of Walter Benjamin that makes it possible to interpret the dreams of history.
12 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 35.
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That is, those collective aspirations towards an emancipated future that have been
frustrated by the ideology of progress
.
13
However, before I can get to that, let me first
discuss Freud's theory so I can later in the chapter show how we can read Benjamin’s
Arcades Project along side it.
The first and most simple characteristic Freud attributes to dreams is that dreams
are wish fulfillments. This characteristic is not, of course, as simple as it appears at first
sight. Freud was not unaware of the many objections, ranging from the most complex to
the simplistic ones, which his idea was to confront. He preempted some of the objections
and went on to provide important clarifications. These clarifications would in turn
become theoretical substance in themselves. Firstly, we would have to ask, how can we
say that dreams are wish fulfillments when sometimes we have such horrible dreams
about the death of a loved one and of so many other distressing emotions in life?
Furthermore, the literature on dreams reviewed by Freud was filled with facts and data on
the preponderance of unpleasant dreams. All the clues seemed to point to the conclusion
13
It should be noted from the beginning that throughout this dissertation I will be using the concepts of
collective consciousness and unconscious and also that of collective memory. These are very problematic
concepts if used without any cautionary note. Hence, a few things should be said about them. I will also
talk about this issue throughout the dissertation. However, the reader should keep in mind that when I used
the term collective consciousness or unconsciousness, I distance myself completely from the Jungian
notion of these terms. Images, wishes, goals, and dreams that are said to be collective do not and cannot
represent Jungian archetypes. Nor are they collective psychic expressions of a social unconscious in the
precise and purely psychological sense. They are essentially social categories: culturally, materially and
historically specific with a political import that will be discussed here. In this sense, when I talk about the
collective unconscious, I mean and refer to representations of such phenomena. These representations can
be artistic, anthropological, historical, social, and political among other kinds. But they nevertheless ought
to be treated as embodying a psychological aspect that is socially produced. The point here is to
dialectically mediate between categories that are a product and produce historic and political
understanding. We are dealing here with a multilayered problematic. What I am proposing is not to use
psychoanalytic interpretation of individual phenomena, which pertains exclusively to that realm, and apply
them unreflexively to social collectivities. I want to propose a dialectical mediation between these issues:
the collective dreams of any given society are to be understood in terms of social categories, but insofar as
they are dreams they also embody repressed historical possibilities. That relation, I argue, can and should
be approached from a psychoanalytic perspective that will shed light on the predicament of such a society,
its historic and political exclusions, the social malaises it produces and the reasons behind it. I hope this
relation becomes clearer as the argument unfolds.
8
that if oui dreams were wish-fulfillments, then most of us would be very wicked
individuals. Taking into consideration what seems a dreadful conclusion, Freud makes a
fundamental clarification for the understanding of his theory. The theory of dream
interpretation is not based on the manifest content of dreams but on their latent content
.
14
The distinction between the manifest content and the latent content of dreams is one of
the most important matrixes for understanding Freud’s theory. The manifest content of a
dream is the narrative of the dreamer, i.e., the dream as the person who dreamt it recounts
it. The manifest content of a dream will stay as such so long as it is not analyzed. The
process of analysis is what brings up the latent content. The meaning of a dream as a
wish-fulfillment is known only when the dream has been analyzed. It is then that the
‘complete’ latent content of the dream can be apprehended . 15 I use the word ‘complete’,
which is not used by Freud, to clarify the possible objection to my presentation of the
latent content as what the end of the analysis of a dream brings. In the process of
analyzing a dream, the discoveries are made gradually, and these discoveries are also
latent content. The immediate question that arises to such distinction will serve us not
only to understand Freud’s theory but to later see its relation to Benjamin.
Why do we dream something furnished with a false appearance and how does this
happen? Freud sustains the distinction by introducing what he calls the “phenomenon of
distortion in dreams .” 16 The distortion of dreams is basically a transformation of the
latent content of a dream into the manifest content. That is, the transformation of that
14 The latent content is also referred to as the ‘dream-thoughts’ or ‘latent dream-thoughts’.
15
It should be noted that the act of telling the dream, as well as that of interpreting it, are not only
psychoanalytical acts, but also narrative acts. As such, the narration, along with its lapses, exclusions and
remembrance are part of the analytic process. This characteristic is an important trait that will form part of
the historiographic proposal I argue we can construct with Freud and Benjamin.
16 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 169.
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which comes from the unconscious to that which one effectively dreams of. The
distortion takes place because there is a resistance to the latent content. The wish is
unable to express itself because of a defense against that wish; therefore the only way to
express itself and avoid resistance is in a distorted manner. The shape of a dream is the
result of the operation of two psychical forces; one of the forces “constructs the wish
which is expressed by the dream, while the other exercises a censorship upon this wish-
dream and, by the use of that censorship, forcibly brings about a distortion in the
expression of the wish .’' 17 This psychical operation is the result of what Freud calls the
‘dream-work’. Freud, in one of his later works describes the relation of the dream-work
and distortion in very concise terms:
We have our distinction between the manifest content of a dream and the latent dream-
thoughts. The process that produces the former out of the latter is described as the dream-
work. The study of the dream-work teaches us by an excellent example the way in which
unconscious material from the id (originally unconscious and repressed unconscious
alike) forces its way into the ego, becomes preconscious and, as the result of the ego’s
opposition, undergoes the changes which we know as dream-distortion
,
18
The basic operation of the dream-work consists in transforming the material of the
dream into manifest content. Thus, the dream-work is the fundamental concept at work in
the logic of Freudian dream interpretation. I want to devote a few sentences to the
characteristics of memory in dreams and to their material sources since later on they will
17 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation
,
177.
18 Sigmund Freud, “An Outline of Psycho-Analysis,” Standard Edition ofthe Complete Psychological
Works ofSigmund Freud XXIII, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1981), 165.
10
serve to shed light to the concept of the dream-work and to my interpretation of The
Arcades Project.
In his discussion of the sources of dream material Freud identifies three
characteristics of memory in dreams:
(1) Dreams show a clear preference for the impressions of the immediately
preceding days
. .
. (2) They make their selection upon different principles from
our waking memory, since they do not recall what is essential and important but
what is subsidiary and unnoticed ... (3) They have at their disposal the earliest
impressions of our childhood and even bring up details from that period of our life
which, once again, strike us as trivial and which in our waking state we believe to
have been long since forgotten. 14
Freud calls the first characteristic the ‘dream-day’, i.e., the day preceding the
dream. Every dream will always be connected to a recent impression, and this includes a
train of thought or a memory during the dream-day. There is always a point of contact,
direct or indirect, with the experience of the dream-day. The fact that sometimes we
dream of past periods of our lives does not contradict the latter. For Freud “Dreams can
select their material from any part of the dreamer’s life, provided only that there is a train
of thought linking the experience of the dream-day (the ‘recent’ impressions) with the
earlier ones.”" Hence, Freud’s theory of dream interpretation has as one of its material
bases an experience that will prove central in Benjamin: everyday life. Thus, the second
characteristic follows with equal importance. Dreams “make their selection upon
19 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation
,
197.
20 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 202.
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different principles from our waking memory, since they do not recall what is essential
and important but what is subsidiary and unnoticed .”21
Certain questions must be asked here. Firstly, why would we dream of
unimportant recollections of our memory in the waking state? More importantly, the fact
that these indifferent recollections are psychically significant appears to be bogus.
Secondly, why would my psyche care about trivialities from the dream-day when there
are probably a lot of other things to be worried about? Freud was not oblivious to
objections like these. He acknowledges that “a psychological process by which,
according to our account, indifferent experiences take the place of psychically significant
ones, cannot fail to arouse suspicion and bewilderment .”22 According to Freud, the reason
for this process comes from the work of the distortion in dreams and one of its
mechanisms. The mechanism that works specifically in this kind of process is called
‘displacement’. The process by which we choose indifferent material from awake life
“seem[s] to be something in the nature of a ‘displacement’ -of psychical emphasis shall
we say?- by means of intermediate links; in this way, ideas which originally had only a
weak charge of intensity take over the charge from ideas which were originally intensely
cathected and at last attain enough strength to enable them to force an entry into
'YX
consciousness.” That is to say, there is a resistance from our conscious processes that
does not allow latent thoughts to enter and the only way these thought can slide into
consciousness is by camouflaging themselves with trivialities. Hence, the supposedly
indifferent material ends up playing a crucial role in allowing latent thoughts to enter
21 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation
,
197. We will see later how for Benjamin the 'seemingly unimportant
plays a crucial role in history.
22 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 209.
23 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 209-210.
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consciousness as manifest content. The bottom line is that whatever we dream, it is
always psychically significant, it means something, it can be understood and
psychoanalysis gives us a sound and complex theoretical framework to understand how
the 'dream-works’.
In the sixth chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams we find an intense
elaboration of the 'dream-work’. As we pointed out earlier the dream-work consists
essentially of the transformation of the latent dream thoughts into manifest content. To be
sure the dream-work is the gist of Freud’s theory of dream interpretation; therefore an
explanation of how this psychic mechanism operates is in order.
The dream-work is composed of four mechanisms. These are condensation,
displacement, representability, and secondary revision. Thus all these mechanisms are at
work in the transformation of the latent dream thoughts into the manifest content of a
dream. I will argue later that these mechanisms also work analogically in Benjamin’s The
Arcades Project.
Freud tells us that “the first thing that becomes clear to anyone who compares the
dream-content with the dream-thoughts is that a work of condensation on a large scale
has been carried out .”24 The first and most obvious fact that shows that the process of
condensation takes place in every dream is the simple experience of relating the dream.
The first thing to be pointed out by Freud is the difference in the amount of material
when we compare the dream itself, what is narrated, to the content that lies behind it, i.e.,
the dream-thoughts. As the analysis of a dream takes place we discover that the amount
of material that is brought up by the analysis immensely surpasses the manifest content of
24 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation
,
312.
25 Hayden White, Tropics ofDiscourse (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
13
the dream. There are two main objections raised to the process of condensation with
which Freud deals. The first is that our narration of a dream consists of very little
material because we can hardly remember the whole dream. If so, then the narration is
fragmentary and we dreamt much more than what we can remember. The second
objection is that the thoughts that come up during analysis were not necessarily active
when we were sleeping. This objection targets the associative character of the method of
interpretation. Fieud handles the first objection quite easily because it does not present
any real problem at any level to the notion of condensation. There is no problem in
acknowledging that we might not give a complete account of the dream because we have
forgotten something in the lapse of time between the dream and its narration. The
analysis of a dream reveals that there are many dream-thoughts to a specific instance of
the narration of the dream, i.e., of the manifest content. The fact that there might be more
things to the dream that those we remember just tells us that these things conceal more
dream-thoughts and not that the dream is not condensed. Thus if for any reason during
the analysis of a dream the person who dreamt it can remember unrevealed details this
would give more material to the analysis and would conduce to the discovery of more
dream-thoughts.
The second objection is considered more important. Freud asks rhetorically if “is
it not more probable that new trains of thought have arisen in the course of the analysis
which had no share in forming the dream?” This question, at a general level, represents
a rupture with the understanding that psychoanalytical theory has of the psychical
importance of associations. The connections that a patient gives to the analyst are always
26 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 314.
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important and of interest to analysis. Hence, psychoanalysis posits that the associations
occurring under analysis always have, in one way or another, a link with deeper layers of
unconscious material. Psychoanalytic interpretation requires such acknowledgement of
the importance ot the patients associations in order to have a well-grounded grasp of
his/her state and functioning of the psychic apparatus. Thus, we can say that it is a matter
of paradigmatic assumption to see that the revealed dream-thoughts under analysis were
active in the formation of the dream. In Freud’s words: “It must be allowed that the great
bulk of the thoughts which are revealed in analysis were already active during the process
of forming the dream; for, after working through a string of thoughts which seem to have
no connection with the formation of a dream, one suddenly comes upon one which is
represented in its content and is indispensable for its interpretation, but which could not
have been reached except by this particular line of approach”. 2 ' Hence the importance of
the work of condensation for the interpretation of a dream in particular, and for the theory
of psychoanalytic interpretation in general. We shall see that a similar mechanism of
‘condensation* is at work in Benjamin's notion of history as dream. For now I will
discuss the second mechanism of the dream-work: displacement.
Freud calls to our attention the fact that “the elements which stand out as the
principal components of the manifest content of the dream are far from playing the same
part in the dream-thoughts .”
28
This characteristic is the result of displacement. What
happens in the displacement of a dream is that the manifest content has almost no
resemblance to the latent content. The manifest content is what Freud calls “a distortion
21 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation
,
314.
2X Sigmund Freud, Interpretation
,
340.
15
of the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious .”29 The distortion is required because
a force is imposed by a psychic defense that does not want the wish to enter
consciousness. This censorship then produces the work of a displacement. The principle
that underlies the work of displacement is that the intensity of an idea or wish has the
capacity to be detached from it and be passed into another idea of less intensity. The
passage of detached energy from one idea into another is displacement proper. However,
there must be a connection between the high-intensity idea and the low one and this
connection is what allows the analyst to get to the original thought which was distorted.
This connection is uncovered by way of associations, hence the importance of the
method. Through displacement a wish (or dream-thought) is able to escape censorship
and make its way into the dream; fulfilling a condition necessary for a dream-thought to
make its way into the dream . 30
The third requirement of the dream-work, which will help in the transformation of
the dream-thoughts into manifest content, is representability. The first thing to note here
is that the categories that we understand as forming part of our waking life, such as
causality and contradictions, do not take place in dreams . 31 We know that thoughts are
usually represented as images in dreams. Images in dreams can represent abstract ideas or
characteristics of things or people. Later on we will see the importance of the dream-
image in Benjamin.
We can argue that when we dream a whole complex of relations take place and
that we can see causal relations in them. I can have a dream where someone cuts my arm
2V Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 343.
30 The other condition is overdetermination.
31
It is also important to note that the dictates of morality have no place in dreams. See Sigmund Freud,
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with a knife and I see my arm bleeding. This is a perfect causal relation. However, in the
method of dream interpretation this is seen from a different perspective. In the Freudian
interpretation there are of course ‘‘dreams in which the most complicated intellectual
operations take place, statements are contradicted or confirmed, ridiculed or compared,
just as they are in waking thought. But here again appearances are deceitful. If we go into
the interpretation of dreams such as these, we find that the whole of this is part of the
material of the dream-thoughts and is not a representation of intellectual work performed
during the dream itself 5,32 The point that we have to stress here is that there is no specific
activity of symbolization which will arrange a given dream-thought with a specific
representation.
33
The use of one image or the other to represent a dream-thought has no
necessary relation to the thought per-se, but to the fulfillment of two independent
conditions. Therefore, “dreams make use of any symbolizations which are already
present in unconscious thinking, because they [1] fit in better with the requirements of
dream construction on account of their representability and [2] also because as a rule they
escape censorship.”
34
The fourth and last component of the dream-work is secondary revision. The
function of secondary revision is to make a dream intelligible. It arranges the elements of
the dream with the purpose of giving the dream a coherent structure. Freud identifies this
psychical function with mental processes that take place during our waking state. He
argues that “it is the nature of our waking thought to establish order in material of that
kind, to set up relations in it and to make it conform to our expectations of an intelligible
32 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation , 347-348.
33
This is one of the fundamental differences between Freud’s theory and Carl Jung’s.
34 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation , 385.
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whole .” 35 The function of secondary revision is exactly the same, but towards the content
of dreams. It eliminates absurdities and incoherence, reorganizes the elements of dreams
to establish an intelligible order and adds material where gaps exist.
However, we should not understand these functions as producing thoughts that
were not present in the unconscious. Nor should we think of secondary revision as a
mechanism that works after condensation, displacement and representability have taken
place. They work simultaneously and the requirements of secondary revision are present
with all the others at once during dreams. Freud tells us that we must bear in mind “that
from the very first the demands of this second factor constitute one of the conditions
which the dream must satisfy and that this condition, like those laid down by
condensation, the censorship imposed by resistance, and representability, operates
simultaneously in a conducive and selective sense upon the mass of material present in
the dream-thoughts .”36
One must admit that despite their universality dreams are uncanny phenomena.
We are most familiar with them; since childhood they have been with us and will be until
one’s last day. But still there is certain strangeness because something that is so familiar
and quotidian can still ignite unexpected, pleasurable and unpleasant feelings. There is
also something to be said regarding a common understanding of dreams. According to the
Oxford English Dictionaiy a dream is “a train of thoughts, images, or fancies passing
through the mind during sleep.” A dream is also, figuratively, “a vision ol the tancy
voluntarily” induced when one is awake. Freud did not consider this acceptation with the
theoretical and meta-psychological force and insight with which he considered dreams
35 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 537.
36 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 537.
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during sleep. However, we will see that Benjamin does consider this kind of dream. The
OED also defines dream as an ideal or aspiration... a national aspiration or ambition; a
way of life considered to be ideal by a particular nation or group of people .”37 This
connotation is also present in Benjamin particularly regarding his concept of generations.
Hence, Benjamin refers to the sources of dreams both individually and collectively
.
38
Benjaminian Dreams
In The Arcades Project39 Benjamin finds expression for the arising of dreams in
one of his always-keen allegories. The allegory he tells brings to the forefront ancient
Greece as a source of dreams. This ancient source enjoys a plethora of hidden powers that
fill our imagination and illuminates our understanding. In the same way in which Freud
found many of his words in the tragedy of Oedipus, Benjamin also searches in the
labyrinths of the Greek mythic world. Benjamin reminds us that although dreams can
come from different places those coming from what the Greeks thought of as the
underworld have a special quality to them. He argues, “one knew of places in ancient
Greece where the way led down into the underworld. Our waking existence likewise is a
land which, at certain hidden points, leads down into the underworld- a land full of
inconspicuous places from which dreams arise .”40 These ‘hidden points’ also captured
Freud's attention in his investigation of the sources of dreams. Freud’s search led him to
37
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an underworld of forgotten (and repressed) infantile experiences and to the
inconspicuousness ol the indifferent details of one s day. In Benjamin as in Freud the
experiences of waking life, the indifference of everyday phenomena and the richness of
childhood, all lead down into the underworld. But the underworld here has a dimension
beyond being the abode of the departed
. The underworld is also ua sphere or region
lying or considered to lie below the ordinary one. Hence also a lower, or the lowest,
stratum of society .”41 We have layers of meaning that embrace different possibilities for
understanding the metaphoric language used in reference to the sources of dream. I want
to suggest the aforementioned two possibilities. On the one hand we have the Greek
connotation as a complex world referring to that which takes place in Hades. Hades,
although a place where there is a continuity of being, for the living constitutes an
experience in another world and hence does not participate in the continuity of the living
world. On the other hand, there is the connotation of referring to the lower stratum of
society. Both instances can be understood in terms of otherness: of the dead and of the
‘living dead’ as those who do not participate in the progress of history. There is the
allegorical underworld where a recollection of past experiences takes place and where
these experiences become a source for the present, our dreams and eventually our future.
The second entails a contemporary class element to the underworld. It is the real world of
the excluded, the marginalized; a place mostly fit for the ‘Other’.
The discussion above regarding one of the metaphors Benjamin uses discussing
dreams ties him to Freud at various levels. And the knot that ties them is that of the
41
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dream. For Freud and Benjamin the sources of dreams are intimately connected to that
which is excluded, that which seems unimportant or quotidian, and that which is
repressed.
For Freud it was an indisputable fact that “all the material making up the
content of a dream is in some way derived from experience, that is to say, has been
reproduced or remembered in the dream ...”42 But what is the relation of this material
and its seemingly inconsequential character. The relation between the dream and its
meaning has enjoyed an important status for both Freud and Benjamin. The analyst in
Freud and the historian in Benjamin go through great pains in order to bring that meaning
to light, and to interpret it. As I showed earlier, for Freud the seemingly inconsequential
is the result of displacement in dreams. When Freud presented his hypothesis regarding
the day-dream many thought that the psychical significance of indifferent recollections
was a bogus thesis. We already know Freud's response. In the mechanism of
displacement “ideas which originally had only a weak charge of intensity take over the
charge from ideas which were originally intensely cathected and at last attain enough
strength to enable them to force an entry' into consciousness .”
43
The seemingly irrelevant
is taken over by the unconscious latent content and is transformed into manifest content
to bypass one’s defenses and enter the realm of consciousness. We see the same trope
operating in Benjamin. A particularly important instance of this mechanism can be seen
when Benjamin refers to the minutiae of the day, to the experience of the everyday life.
Benjamin points out “All day long, suspecting nothing, we pass them by, but no sooner
has sleep come than we are eagerly groping our way back to lose ourselves in the dark
42 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation , 44.
43 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation, 209-210.
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corridors. By day, the labyrinth of urban dwellings resembles consciousness; the arcades
(which are galleries leading into the city’s past) issue unremarked onto the streets. At
night, however, under the tenebrous mass of the houses, their denser darkness protrudes
like a threat, and the nocturnal pedestrian hurries past- unless, that is, we have
emboldened him to turn into the narrow lane .”44 The Benjaminian dweller suspects
nothing; he does not realize that the arcades are “galleries leading into the city’s past.”
His day whether relaxed or distressed, whether he thinks the city is beautiful or ugly,
whether he should embark in a new life or be content with his predicament, i.e., just
dwelling in the city for the sake of it or bewildered by the panorama of his life, the
surroundings are just the ambiance where his life is taking place. Little does he know
that at night the city’s “denser darkness [will] protrude like a threat.” Here we can see
how the play of metaphor as well as the sense of experience mediates both discourses to
make the Benjaminian dweller and the Freudian dreamer one subject. For if the
Benjamin’s dweller is unaware of the threat of the city, Freud's dreamer suspects nothing
of what lies ahead. Those dark corridors, the cause of beautiful fantasies as well as
horrible nightmares, can come in Freud as dream material from Benjamin’s ‘labyrinth of
urban dwellings.’ Waking life provides for much of the manifest content of dreams.
Benjamin's labyrinth of urban dwellings is, following the thread I have been weaving,
Freud’s dream-day.
Benjamin’s dream “is the earth in which the find is made that testifies to the
primal history of the nineteenth century .”
45
The materiality of the ’earth’ here serves to
bring together the supposedly externality of the waking life and the psychic intemality of
44
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the dream experience. The relation of exteriority and interiority is dialectically worked-
out in both Freud and Benjamin. Whereas Benjamin collapses the distinction with his
metaphorical language, later infused with political commentary, Freud does it through the
theory of dream interpretation; a theory that will show through analysis the mediation and
unfolding of the latent content of dreams. A content that once subjected to interpretation
emerges out of the tensions between the conscious and the unconscious. What in
Benjamin grows out of the dream as earth in Freud is manifest content. As I mentioned
earlier, the dream-work in Freud consists of transforming latent content into manifest
content. While in Freud the individual recounts his dream as he remembers it, as
manifest content, in Benjamin we see a working-out of remembrance not in the language
of manifest content but in the metaphor of boredom.
Benjamin tell us that “boredom is a warm gray fabric lined on the inside with the
most lustrous and colorful of silks. In this fabric we wrap ourselves when we dream. We
are at home then in the arabesques of its lining. But the sleeper looks bored and gray
within his sheaths. And when the later wakes and wants to tell what he dreamed, he
communicates by and large only his boredom. For who would be able at one stroke to
turn the lining of time to the outside? Yet to narrate dreams signifies nothing else .”
46
To
narrate the dream is trying to show the colorful inside of a pale gray outside appearance.
To narrate is to work out a condensed relationship not only between the told and the
untold but more importantly between the silence of that which is been told and the
unheard noise of the untold. What comes out of that narration will necessarily have to go
back to itself and emerge again as another voice or rather, as the voice of an-other. This is
46
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project , 106.
23
essentially a dialectical movement that while sometimes relating to different phenomena
(but not in the dream, which is our concern) in Benjamin and Freud share essential
features foi its delivery: narration, analysis, interpretation and working-out among others.
Instead of expressing the “arabesques of its lining,” instead of revealing our latent
thoughts, we only communicate the boredom of the dream, the manifest content that
overcame our defense. And yet “who would be able at one stroke to turn the lining of
time to the outside?” Hence, eventually the arabesques will reveal themselves and
overcome the narration of mere boredom. Latent content will be discovered, revealed: the
colorful inside of a gray pale outside will be turned inside-out not once but many times
until we see the constitutive tension, the colorfulness of the gray and the grayness of
color, but cannot take a hold of it. The dialectic of it escapes us, it is no longer at a
standstill, but we go back to it, from another perspective: this motion is philosophically
eternal, only politically we can take a hold of it.
4
In Benjamin it is the collector, or
A O
rather, the historian as collector, as chiffonnier who can turn the lining outside. hi
Freud the analyst performs such labor.
Collecting and the collector enjoy a salient role in the The Arcades Project.
Furthermore, we argue that what is involved theoretically in the labor of collecting in
Benjamin is the same operation involved in displacement and condensation in Freud's
dream-work. Thus the historian as a collector shares a correspondence with the analyst
as a ‘rag picker’ of dreams. Let us explore this relation.
47
This point will be discussed in the third chapter.
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For Benjamin “What is decisive in collecting is that the object is detached from
all its original functions ...” Thus, the object will have, rather than a function, a
meaning for the endeavor of the collector. A new meaning will be developed for the
object, a meaning that will have historical determination in the sense of what it comes to
be a part of. Along the same line we see that for Freud what is decisive in the dream is
that the images we took from the day’s experiences are detached from their original
function and take a whole new meaning. Here the Freudian dream-image and the
Benjaminian collected object share the same theoretical place for understanding their
respective enterprises. For Benjamin, the collector detaches the object from its original
function so the object can “enter into the closest conceivable relation to things of the
same kind.” For Freud, dream images enter the unconscious and form a relation that is
detached from the original function that the now-image had in waking life. The relation
of the dream images takes a meaning in the realm of latent thoughts, thoughts that
apparently have no relation to these images. It is at the level of the dreams’ manifest
content that the dream ‘makes sense' i.e., seems to be associated with things of the same
kind. This passage of the dream image from latent thoughts to manifest content is the
result of displacement and condensation in Freud. Benjamin shows that in collecting an
object is displaced out of its original context, not for the mere sake of decontextualization
and the formation of a new meaning, but for the sake of understanding a larger and more
important meaning regarding a particular object. One should not be thrown off by the
thought that the collection in Benjamin might be of anything (toys, cards), the important
point here is the theoretical proposition we get from the relation Benjamin sees between
collecting, the object, meaning and history.
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Regarding the relation between the objects and things of the same kind Benjamin
tells us “this relation is the diametric opposite of any utility and falls into the peculiar
category of completeness. What is this completeness? It is a grand attempt to overcome
the wholly irrational character of the object's mere presence at hand through its
integration into a new, expressly devised historical system: the collection .”49 The
psychoanalytic process as a whole shares the same logic as seen in The Interpretation of
Dreams. The dream images related by the analysand initially express a distinctive
irrational character. One of the interpretation's aims is to reveal the latent content of the
dream. As such, this revelation has an integrative purpose in the analytic process. Here
the “expressly devised historical system” is not the collection but its metaphoric other,
the logic of psychoanalytic knowledge: analysis. The collector is to his object what the
analyst is to a dream. The work of psychoanalysis is repeated by Benjamin as the logic of
historical knowledge . 50
Both the collector as well as the analyst is not only taken by objects and dreams
but with understanding and knowledge of their objects. Their phenomena are at the end
constitutive of knowledge. Benjamin posits that “for the true collector, every single thing
in this system becomes an encyclopedia of all the knowledge of the epoch, the landscape,
the industry, and the owner from which it comes .”51 For the analyst, every element of the
dream is material for interpretation and it provides him with knowledge. As the collector
sees every single thing as part of his system, the analyst also sees every dream and all the
‘mistakes’ the analysand makes and tells as part of analysis. For Benjamin all we find in
49
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our epoch, from the minutiae of our lives to the cultural production, is material for the
historian, whose labor consists of interpreting it as a dream of the collective. In this
interpretation, the historian s most important task is to get from the 1 manifest content’ of
our landscape to the ‘latent content' of our experience. The position of the analyst is that
of the subject-supposed-to-know. His knowledge comes from the things
-images,
dreams, objects, slips- and its place is in the transferential relation. The historian has to
become a subject-supposed-to know, he does not depart from the standpoint. The process
of acquiring that knowledge begins with his ‘flanerie’ with everyday life and ends with
his interpretation of the dream of history; an interpretation that never ceases. Benjamin
believes that “It is the deepest enchantment of the collector to enclose the particular item
within a magic circle...” The collector is enchanted and looks forward to the eventual
completion of his magic circle. However, this completion is understood as a “grand
attempt to overcome the wholly irrational character of the objects’ mere presence.”
Hence, Benjamin’s magic circle should not be understood as an enclosed totality but a
fluid enterprise. In an allegorical fashion, the analytical process is a source not of
“enchantment” but of “jouissance”, the analyst’s work is not to enclose but analogically
to interpret the significance of an “item” for his “magic circle” of interpretation.
For Benjamin “this is the way things are for the great collector. They strike him.
How he himself pursues and encounters them, what changes in the ensemble of items are
effected by a newly supervening item-all this shows him his affairs in constant flux.”
Isn’t the work of interpretation in constant flux? Isn’t the historian's work as an
interpreter of dreams in constant flux? If we go back for a second to Freud's
52
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interpretation of Irma's dreams we clearly see that interpretation changes, takes on new
meanings with the emergence of “new items.” The analyst also “pursues and encounters”
new images, new dreams, new material which bring a turn to analysis. The more material
comes out the more the fluidity with which analysis proceeds. Isn’t this also the logic of
the historian? Moreover, for Benjamin “At bottom, we may say, the collector lives a
piece of dream life. For in the dream, too, the rhythm of perception and experience is
altered in such a way that everything- even the seemingly most neutral- comes to strike
us; everything concerns us .”53 The ‘seemingly most neutral' concerns the analyst and the
historian. Many times that which is considered trivial, that which would not arouse
suspicion to the mechanisms of defense is precisely the material that the dream-work uses
to condense and express that which the ego would deem unacceptable.
In a wonderful and reveling passage, Benjamin indicates, “The collector
actualizes latent archaic representations of property. These representations may in fact be
connected with taboo ...”54 Doesn’t the analyst actualize the latent content of dreams?
Aren’t many of our childhood-repressed memories, particularly those of a sexual nature,
“connected with taboo”? Isn't the Oedipus complex the quintessential “latent archaic
representation of property”? Isn’t the child’s object of desire the sole “property” of the
father? This is precisely what Freud's metaphor points to . 55 If we follow Benjamin's
quote further we can see how telling he is in this respect. He says that it is “certain that
taboo is the primitive form of property. At first emotively and ‘sincerely,’ then as a
53
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routine legal process, declaring something taboo would have constituted a title.”56 Aren’t
in Lacanesse the "Law of the Father” and in Freudian terms the “Castrator”
psychoanalytic titles? At first impression, the bearer of these titles’ words come out as
words of love or, “emotively” and ’sincerely" as Benjamin says. However, these loving
words of prohibition, Freud discovered early, were to become a fundamental psychic
"legal process.” Many of the laws of the unconscious as developed and described by
Freud emerged out of the observations of apparently insignificant everyday occurrences.
These presumably “neutral” everyday phenomena belonged to a profound and
meaningful psychopathology. Everyday occurrences were in many respects attempts at
wish fulfillment when understood in the language and works of the unconscious.
Benjamin’s initial emphasis on perception serving as the primary source of
dreams constrained him to move more smoothly towards his dialectical explosion.
However, he moves beyond it as did Freud. Although physical stimulus is one of the
sources of dreams among others, by itself it does not allow one to interpret the dream. In
the same fashion in Benjamin, the historian has to look for sources of dreams that go
beyond these bodily stimuli. Dreams “gather around the framework of physiological
processes” in the same way that “artistic architectures gather” around the “role of bodily
processes.”
57
However, we should point out that the formation of dreams comes from
deeper places and their interpretation requires from the historian more than iron requires
from the architect.
As a way of concluding this chapter and opening the questions of dreams to
history I want to finish with some comments on a short piece published in 1927 and
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entitled Dream Kitsch: Gloss on Surrealism.’ In this piece Benjamin touches on some
points that are also very much present in The Arcades Project. Benjamin begins by
pointing out that “dreaming has a share in history.”59 The point he tries to make about the
relation between dreams and history is not only regarding the historicization of dreaming
but more importantly of history itself as dream. He thought that “the history of the dream
remains to be written," but such history would bring with it transformative consequences
to historiography altogether. Benjamin thought that “opening up a perspective on this
subject would mean decisively overcoming the superstitious belief in natural necessity by
means of historical illumination.”60 For him, dreams also connote a historical dimension
specifically tied to the experience of war. Dream is aspiration, possibility, collective goal,
but as IT1 argue in the next chapter, dream is also unconscious historicized phenomena.
Dreaming may give pleasure but it also may “strech beyond the pleasures of the
anecdotal landscape into the barrenness of a battlefield.” For Benjamin if the history of
dreams is to be written, an account of the dreamworlds that a century have produced and
of the historical acting-out of such dreamworlds must accompany such narrative. For the
dreams of a generation “have started wars, and wars, from the very earliest times, have
determined the propriety and impropriety- indeed, the range- of dreams.” A generation
may have the dreams it may want to have but this is not a limitless sleep. If war can
indeed determine the range of dreams, then there is necessarily a historical limit to a
dreamworld. Dreams and history here constitute each other as dreams as history. They
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lely and constraint the range of their possibilities. Contrary to the romantic notion, for
Benjamin “no longer does the dream reveal a blue horizon. The dream has grown gray.
The gray coating of dust on things is its best part. Dreams are now a shortcut to
banality .”
61
But there are two levels to this shortcut. On the one hand there is what we
can consider Benjamin's problematic in this short text: kitsch and the poverty of
experience of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie. On the other hand we see Benjamin
reclaiming what the adult considers banal as experienced differently in childhood. The
mediating factor between the two dimensions is surrealism. But for our purposes we are
more interested in the conception of the dream not as kitsch but as ‘childlike’ experience.
The dream as dream-image was first approached by Benjamin through psychoanalysis:
“picture puzzles, as schemata of the dreamwork were long ago discovered by
psychoanalysis.” “ I hope to have provided the reader a productive encounter between the
Freudian interpretation of dreams and the Benjaminian conception. Now I want to take
this relation a step further and explore the dialectical experience of history with the
understanding of dream as history sustained by Benjamin in The Arcades Project.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DREAM OF HISTORY: THEARCADES PROJECT IN AN
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSTELLATION OF HISTORY
Making Sense
How does one make sense of history? This is a question that if one is in a position
ot power may seem unproblematic. Something to which from such a perspective not
much thought should be given. But, as much of what we hear nowadays, it is a question
that sparks a light ot interest when seen from the perspective of those who have nothing
to make sense out of. This is the underside of the question and at the same time the side
that should matter it anything meaningful is to be grasped from the precariousness of our
predicament. It is certainly not a new problematic but we can definitely color it in
different way. Not to turn it upside down, but to show the constitutive character of the
victor's story. The claim of victory in history does not come with the acquisition of a
right to tell it. Neither does it come as one part of the treasures of the conqueror. The real
claim of victory comes with a power that encompasses so much allure that nobody cares
about the rags left behind. It is a power that blind-sides the public to such an extent that
even if the underside of history is yelled out loud and clearly, justly, wholeheartedly and
even with righteousness, such a claim is only perceived as noise.
The claim of the powerless has been taken up by many congruent voices. Even by
people with certain kind of power. The kind that exudes credibility and is sometimes
heard as an echo from the bell of liberty. These are worthy voices. They speak up as
conscientious individuals and institutions. They also believe in the possibility of a
different state of affairs. One may even dare to call some of them utopian. The University
32
nurtures many of these voices in all kinds of academic departments; although we have to
accept that most of them camp in the humanities and the social sciences. And here I do
not mean to be cynical. We all have heard some of these voices coming from respected
critical minds. But many times there is a danger of which we also have been advised. The
danger that in trying to carry around the claims from the peoples without history one
dispossesses them of the very thing that gave them agency in the first place. In this
situation the successful communication of a message that had gone unheard until then
may in fact become a pyrrhic victory. Part of a story went through; it got some the
required attention. But the political import disappeared. The claim goes straight ahead to
the dustbin of mainstream causes. And with it any hope for an actual political effect that
would render such history meaningful in terms of the structural causalities of an unjust
predicament. This is the road through which the liberal mind always takes us and the fate
of its political consequences.
Hence, the point is not to speak for the other. For trying to express something that
is not one’s own is always a risky business. Not risky because of the fate one may
encounter, but because one may end up swallowing the other. Nor is the point either to
chastise those who truly, conscientiously and with the best intentions work and speak for
the betterment of those left behind. To scrutinize and reveal the unconscious but perverse
logic of those full of good intentions is part of what a critical intellectual must do. That is,
it is part of the point but not the point. As analytical philosophy would have it: it is a
necessary condition but not sufficient. What suffices I believe, in so far as history goes,
takes a step beyond the latter. It goes back to where I started: the constitutive character
the rags of history have in the structural conditions that perpetuate the contemporary
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predicament of the allocation of power, resources and history. It is here where the labor
of the negative, as Hegel famously remarked, needs to begin its work. And it is towards
this end where I hope this work take us. The essential character of this enterprise is
dialectical. Certainly not because it is trendy in some circles or outmoded in others. It is
neither an aesthetic exercise nor is it one in rhetorical futility. It is a philosophical and
political necessity. Moreover, it is engrained within the same problematic we are
exploring because the dialectic is part and parcel of history and the politics and
epistemology of approaching it. Along these philosophical and political lines is where I
find Walter Benjamin's thought. I am not alone in this enterprise since much has been
written on Benjamin's philosophy of history. But as I argued in the first chapter;
Sigmund Freud accompanies us in our search for that awakening of history Benjamin so
fiercely championed.
Historical Benjamin
I started with the simple question of making sense of history. And to give
precision to such an endeavor I ask now not only about history, but about the philosophy,
or rather, the epistemology of history. With Benjamin this becomes an exciting and- I
trust- rewarding theoretical expedition. The work of the German intellectual is one of the
most exciting and promising oeuvre to have come from the tradition of western Marxism.
It has captured the attention of almost every discipline in the social sciences, the liberal
arts and the humanities. And in the humanities the discipline of history has began to
catch-up with the other fields of knowledge. Historians, a guild which has known heated
and controversial battles in the last four decades, are beginning to acknowledge the
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importance of Benjamin’s thought to the epistemological foundation on which much of
the discipline has rested. This has been so to the extent that the American Historical
Review published an important essay when The Arcades Project was translated into
English . 1 The text has been referred to as an 'organized chaos.’ But it is one that offers
the reader a “history of capitalism, with an emphasis on the transformation from a culture
of production to one of consumption .”2 The discipline of history has also seen the value
in Benjamin s critique ol historicism. This is a historicism of the Rankean lineage which
buried for many years the historical enterprise into the graveyard of positivism. The
Benjaminian critique of historicism now offers “a starting point for an aphoristic
materialist history as an encounter between past and present that is articulated as a rapidly
emergent image- a flash .” 3 And this view presents us with the possibility of approaching
the relation between culture and the economy from a dialectical perspective, rather than a
deterministic one. A determinism that clouded and sometimes froze some of the most
interesting insights of Marxist analysis is left behind by Benjamin's unorthodox Marxist
perspective and instead we encounter a playful Marxism. This playfulness leaves nothing
behind of the rigorous character of Marxist analysis. On the contrary, it energizes
historical materialism and the dialectical approach with the promise and delivery of an
adventure into the possibilities of an awakened twenty-first century. Marshall Berman
may have given us the best term one can find to describe what Walter Benjamin left for
every one to play with and dream of: adventures in Marxism . 4
1
Vanessa R. Schwartz, “Walter Benjamin for Historians,” American Historical Review, 105, no. 5 (2001):
1721-1743.
2
Vanessa R. Schwartz, “Walter Benjamin for Historians”, 1727.
3 Vanessa R. Schwartz, “Walter Benjamin for Historians”, 1724.
4
Marshall Berman, Adventures in Marxism (New York: Verso, 1999)
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The time has come, thus, to immerse oneself in one of those adventures. It was
with great enthusiasm that I read Vanessa Schwartz essay. Schwartz saw in The Arcades
Project something others have also seen but that I want to further explore and adventure
into. Scholars have argued that for Benjamin the nineteenth century was more apt to
Benjamin’s endeavor because “the nineteenth century’s pace, its enshrinement of novelty,
and its insistent rupture with tradition made awakening more likely .”5 Schwartz is able to
draw some interesting insights into The Arcades Project. For instance, I would agree with
her when she argues that for Benjamin “capitalism endowed objects with means to
express collective dreams .”6 But this is as far as the historian would go in exploring such
Benjaminian adventure. Precisely at this point I want to take these Benjamiman codas
and go along with them, and this is what I want to do in this chapter. However, there is
something troublesome about the historian’s take. As if there is always something of the
old guild that she cannot let go. I am referring to a sense of pragmatic enterprise for the
discipline of history as such. I find quite un-benjaminian a tone present in the historian’s
interpretation. She argues “we are thus incapable of showing ‘how things really were’ but
instead create a dialogue between the past and the present that establishes a usable
version of history.” Utility for whom? For what? We find a bitter aftertaste, but
fortunately it’s not something that takes over the author's generosity with Benjamin. For
at the end we do see a Benjamin presented by the historian as an author who has much to
contribute to the discipline of history. As someone who can provide new perspectives on
the epistemology of history. For what reason does one tries to make sense of history?
This is another question worth pondering even if briefly. I would immediately say for the
5 Vanessa R. Schwartz, “Walter Benjamin for Historians”, 1729.
6 Vanessa R. Schwartz, “Walter Benjamin for Historians”, 1728.
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political. However, before undertaking this important aspect, there is other worth
glancing at tor a moment. It historicism was one of Benjamin’s targets that’s because one
of the reasons, beyond those already mentioned, was a lack of urgency
.
7
Urgency
Historicism lacked urgency because it reflected on a presumably self-evident
truth: the facts. The 'fact
,
as the historicist object of desire which was reified into the
fetishism of objectivity, made history a calm enterprise. The fact is out there, lying
calmly, uncontested, and frivolous, waiting to be discovered. All that the historian has to
do is to lay-off the attention deficit and grasp what has always been there, waiting to be
unveiled, loved and pondered over. It is just a matter of time before the Rankean lover
comes to claim its beloved fact. As opposed to historical materialism, there is no urgency
in historicism.
For the historical materialist the love affair is a wholy different matter. There are
certain things in common: time, events, memory. But these are of a very different kind.
Contrary to the time experienced by historicism as uninterrupted contiguous time, in
Benjamin time is disrupted, broken, non-linear. The events are also of a different kind.
There is no obsession with the big, tremendous moments of an epoch by themselves. Not
that they do not matter, on the contrary, that their function as dialectically constitutive of
a particular philosophy of history is left unexplored if one does not see the other side of
the event: the non-event. The latter which is not in order for the big 'IT’ to be. Those who
claim that for Benjamin the minutiae of the everyday life has historical value for its own
7
See Ronald Beiner, “Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy of History”, Political Theory, 12, no. 3 (1984): 423-
434.
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sake are missing Benjamin’s dialectical sense. The minutiae of the everyday are
extremely important in Benjamin as are in the same fashion the slips of the tongue in
Freud. But their importance relies on the fact that they act as symptoms of something
larger than themselves. They are part and parcel of a bigger and we may say complicated
pathology of history. And contrary to histoncism, there is urgency in historical
materialism which arrests thought and captures the flashes of memory.
The sense of urgency that accompanies Benjamin's philosophy of history is
directly related to the disempowerment of those left behind by glorious history. And this
is not a question of the objectivity of historicism, but of the objectivity of truth. To be
objective does not mean to be neutral, but in Benjamin’s case it means to employ
constellational thinking. Constellational thinking is the perspective that can allow
knowing the truth of the object one is interested in. To shed light on it from angles
previously unexplored or deemed inconsequential is to stand with an open mind for the
truth of a moment that will illuminate the truth of a whole. As Terry Eagleton reminds us,
to be objective does not mean putting judgement aside but to place oneself in a position
that will allow you to know the situation. * It is not a question of neutrality but an issue of
positionality. Nevertheless, not any position will do. And the angle best suited for history
is the position of those to whom Franz Fanon referred as the wretched of the earth. Why
would the wretched of the earth provide any kind of epistemological privilege? Precisely
because objectivity is not neutrality. Neutrality only gives us an excuse to stand by and
let things go by the way they are and fosters the blindness of historicism; thus reinforcing
the structural conditions making possible the existing allocation of power, resources, and
history. Hence, as Eagleton has argued “the wretched of the earth... are likely to
x
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appreciate more of the truth of human history than their masters- not because they are
innately more perceptive, but because they can glean from their own everyday experience
that history for the vast majority of men and women has been largely a matter of despotic
power and fruitless toil ." 4 Here democracy is also an important contributor to this
perspective. It is both a democratic exercise and in the interest of democracy to champion
an experience-based epistemology that renders history the locus of the peoples without
history. And any sense of urgency comes precisely from this angle and no other.
The urgency Benjamin brings to history and which gives the power and will to
arrest thought is a democratic urgency. It is an urgency coming from those who suffer the
most and the worst, because they are the ones in greater need for this to change. For
“only those who know how calamitous things actually are can be sufficiently free of
illusion or vested interests to change them. You cannot change the situation effectively
unless you appreciate the depth of the problem; and to do that fully you need to be at the
stick end of it, or at least to have heard news from it.” 10 This is a democratic urgency for
democratic purposes. The constellation here involves the interest of the people’s history
and as such this perspective involves democratic historical urgency. The historicism
Benjamin scorned not only did not involve any of these preoccupations but necessarily
excluded them. This exclusion is based on a priori necessity of the victor’s historical
narrative. One that keeps out of its referential frame the negation of history because such
negation ultimately causes the failure of history itself as historicism would have it.
Moreover, here the historicist and the liberal are in complicit accordance with each other
and with the ruling order. Taken from the most basic point of view, that of common
9
Terry Eagleton, After Theory, 135-136.
10
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sense, the poor know better than their governors how it is with history. Objectivity and
partisanship are allies, not rivals. What is not conducive to objectivity on this score is the
judicious even-handedness of the liberal. It is the liberal who falls for the myth that you
can only see things aright if you don’t take sides. It is the industrial chaplain view of
reality. The liberal has difficulty with situations in which one side has a good deal more
of the truth than the other- which is to say, all the key political situations .” 11 Therefore, a
theory of history that opens the way for an epistemology that acknowledges and
empowers what the liberal and the histoncist try to bury is one of the key political
situations that Benjamin’s thought allows to discover. It is also my contention that such a
theory of history should be brought up together with a psychoanalytic perspective. A
perspective that sees, as Benjamin saw, a constellation where dialectics, psychoanalysis,
and historical materialism stand together to illuminate the dream of history. Such
constellation can be found in The Arcades Project as a nodal work read in conjunction
with other works where insights into Benjamin’s theory of history are present.
In her superb study of The Arcades Project
,
Susan Buck-Morss nicely describes
this text as a void.
1- By referring to Benjamin’s text as a void, Buck-Morss reminds us of
something we tend to forget: “that there is no Passagen-Werk” as such . 13 There is no
completed text presented, reviewed, and published as a finished study. This simple
reminder seemingly confronts with a methodological obstacle anyone with an interest in
writing and offering an analysis of the work. Insofar as The Arcades Project is mostly a
collection of quotes with accompanying commentary and elaboration by Benjamin, we
11
Terry Eagleton, After Theory, 136.
12 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics ofSeeing: Walter Benjamin and The Arcades Project (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 1991), 47.
13
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are not encountering an ordinary piece of scholarship with its usual characteristics: an
introductory chapter expressing its methodology, aims, sources and claims argued and
supported throughout the book; an argument or several theses developed throughout the
manuscript, and finally concluding remarks wrapping up the argument and usually
presenting some reflections for further research. The reader can appreciate two reasons
for the incomplete character of the project. On the one hand there is the sad reality of
Benjamin's untimely death. This is certainly an unfortunate reality that points to the
impossibility of completion. However, on the other hand, there is the methodological
proposal the uncompleted project presents. To be sure, Benjamin’s thought and mode of
exposition went against the grain of the aforementioned conception of scholarship. And
what is most important, as I have been pointing out, he argued against the underlying
historical assumption such an endeavor employed. His arguments against this form of
historicism and what it implied are part of what I have been exploring and will do further
along in this chapter. But moreover, how can we further develop and politicize his
historiographic and methodological proposals (as fragmentary as they are) is one of the
most important ends of this chapter. Delving into such an enterprise makes the
‘incomplete’, aphoristic, and fragmentary character of The Arcades Project a virtue of
Benjamin rather than a fault. In this sense we are not only dealing with The Arcades
Project as void, and trying to fill it, but rather I want to think about our own historical
and political void. If we can, in the spirit of Benjamin, find the coordinates of his
constellational thinking about history and politics then we will at the end be ready to
search and try giving an account of the w ur-history’ of our predicament. For if we learn
from psychoanalysis that a void or lack (as Lacan put it) is that around which the subject
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is constituted, such insight does not lead us to a paralysis of a disenchanted individual but
rather urges us to confront the symptoms and pathologies of our modem era and see if we
can articulate a project (historical, political and personal) that awakens us from the
injuries inflicted by a power presumably located so far beyond our reach. The point of
such a project is to change such a predicament. The parameters for this project, as I began
to argue in the first chapter, must encompass Benjamin, Freud and a radical democratic
imagination.
The Dream of History
It has become a commonplace opinion to argue that one of Benjamin’s goals
throughout his authorial life, as far as the epistemology of history he championed, was to
rescue the past. However, not every one is a generous reader of Benjamin and sometimes
we get a rather misplaced anger that obfuscates an author’s interpretation of a text. One
commentator has gone as far as saying, in the most vulgar and uncharitable of
interpretations, that Benjamin cared “more for the welfare of the dead than that of the
living .”
14
Furthermore, and while at it adding insult to injury, Bernstein has the audacity
of emploting Benjamin’s critique of the Social Democrats as proof of his obliviousness to
the menace and evil of the Nazi party. As a good old-fashioned liberal, Bernstein takes as
an affront to his possibilist sensibility Benjamin’s disdain for reformism. And to top it all
this commentator sees Benjamin’s rejection of social democratic policies, historicism and
the belief in progress as proof that “politics as part of daily, collective life was largely
14
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irrelevant to Benjamin’s theorizing .” 15 As if the latter accusations were not enough to test
the reader s patience and insult anyone who has taken seriously the study of Benjamin’s
thought, Bernstein invokes Ivan Karamazov’s famous speech on the suffering of a
tortured child as the litmus test for Benjamin’s redemptive language. Bernstein argues
that “if one traffics in the rhetoric of redemption as much as Benjamin, then at the same
point it becomes necessary to confront Ivan s question. 1(1 And as Bernstein sees it
Benjamin was never up for the task. The failure to confront the suffering of Ivan's
tortured child, Bernstein suggests, is symptomatic of Benjamin’s intuition regarding the
posterity of his own work. If Benjamin went “courting disaster with the surefooted
instinct of a somnambulist” it was because “he intuited that posterity would be more
fascinated by a writer whose life was marked by exemplary failures than by the
conventional academic successes of his friends and collaborators ...” 17 It is evident that
for Bernstein those of us interested in Benjamin’s thought are a bunch of sentimental
fools attracted to the tragedy of his life rather than to the brilliance of his thought.
Bernstein’s narrative emplotment is based on a very speculative rendering of Benjamin’s
life supported by decontextualized and sporadic quotes. There is not a single iota of
comprehensive textual evidence for his claims. Bernstein concludes his rant on Benjamin
by asserting that when it comes to the epistemology of history, Benjamin’s dialectical
images cannot “provide a coherent description of the evolving condition of any modem
i o
society or its culture.” The expectations Benjamin had for his own work are quite
different from what Bernstein ‘portrait’ them to be. Rather than just a rescue of the past,
15
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Benjamin saw The Arcades Project as a work that would “hopefully do less to galvanize
the past than to anticipate a worthier human future .” 19 To judge whether he met his own
expectations and experience the resilience of his theoretical undertaking the best way is
for us to go deep into the text.
In order to be taken by the lure of the text one must open Walter Benjamin’s The
A i cades Pi oject as naively as possible. This is not to say that one is to read it uncritically,
or unreflectively, but to suggest that there is an opening for the reception of a text. The
sense of this openness is accompanied by the possibility of wonderment; something one
sometimes loses in an intellectual and academic environment. This is a very quotidian
experience; one which we see all the time in our everyday life. I have in mind here the
sense of wonderment one can see in children. Hence, and at the risk of sounding foolish, I
want to read this text with the openness one perceives in a child in front a bewildering
experience. This reading is not unrelated to creative writing as Freud once remarked.
Children take their play, which is always surrounded by the creation of a world of
phantasy, very seriously. And Freud contended that the creative writer does the same. He
never gives up the pleasures that he experienced; rather, he exchanges them for other
things. Along the lines of this childish spirit, I want to read Benjamin in such a state of
reception that allows wonder. To read it like this is to let oneself be taken by the text, to
be open to any hope it may bring, to allow oneself to be dazzled by the evoked images,
vocabulary and its allegories.
19 Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, trans. Nicholas
Walker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 34.
20 Sigmund Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’’, in The Standard Edition ofthe Complete
Psychological Works ofSigmund Freud, Vol. IX, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1981)
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What compels me to immerse myself, even get lost as Benjamin’s flaneur did in
the city, is a certain kind of hope. The kind that Benjamin himself inscribed in the Theses,
which I will discuss later, and that is also present in the universe of history as dreaming 1
want explore in the following pages. It is a hope that is also urgent. As Michael Taussig
remarked '’there is something really terrible in the way that the universe of dream and
hope has been gutted, and it is a miserable state of affairs.”21 To this miserable state of
affairs Benjamin tried to respond more than six decades ago. The idea is to approach
Benjamin not looking for a specific methodology, or a political statement, for these will
emerge in time as the exploration unfolds, but in search of a sensibility that is both
historical and political and can give us a different, or at least differing, perspective.
With the first Expose of 1935, “Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century”, the
attitude is precisely to let oneself be exposed to it. Like the photo negative when exposed
to light, I believe one’s perspective changes when one lets oneself be exposed to
Benjamin. To read is also to shed light on a text, and following the photographic analogy,
the text also reacts to the gaze of the reader insofar as genealogies begin to get drawn and
meaning in the text explode. The textuality of this work, understood as the relation
between the state of reception and the richness of the text, promotes changes in classic
conceptions of history, of dreams and of images. In a sense. Benjamin’s opening thesis in
the first Expose reads something like ‘in the beginning was the material’, not 'the word'
as one may think. With this opening the tone of the text begins to take shape: a
materialism that will become more complex as one proceeds. Suddenly, in an abrupt
change of intellectual tactility the softness of a willing expectation is confronted with a
21 Mary Zournazi, “Carnival of the Senses: A Conversation with Michael Taussig", in Mary Zournazi,
Hope: New Philosophiesfor Change (New York: Routledge, 2002), 53.
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metallic thesis. A thesis announcing the possibilities of the Parisian arcades as well as the
road the author will be taking in his elucubrations. Thus, Benjamin plays his first card
and claims that the first two conditions for the beginning of the arcades were the
emergence of iron construction and the boom in textile trade. However, here the
materiality of iron is not its only quality; iron becomes more than matter, it becomes a
metaphor. Thus, if iron becomes a metaphor then its uses also change in function and
perspective. Therefore, iron construction as the fundamental use of this metal
unexpectedly becomes an ideology. Benjamin brings up the transformation by recalling a
historical figure in perilous times. For Benjamin argues that “just as Napoleon failed to
understand the functional nature of the state as an instrument of domination by the
bourgeois class, so the architects of his time failed to understand the functional nature of
iron...” The functional nature of iron construction becomes ideological insofar as such
function became the domination of architecture. This panorama would transfonn the way
one historicizes architecture since the underside of the object it makes its primordial
resource enjoys an ideological character. It is from this point on when the history of
architecture would begin to register radical developments, an acceleration of its speed
and a transformation of its nature. Furthermore, the function of this material and the role
it plays in the first Expose has a metaphoric character. For if it’s true that iron came to
dominate architecture when it emerged as building material, we should also turn our view
to its dream-like quality. Benjamin tells us that “for the first time in the history of
architecture, an artificial building material appears: iron. It undergoes an evolution whose
tempo will accelerate in the course of the century. This development enters a decisive
new phase when it becomes clear that the locomotive-on which experiments have been
22
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conducted since the end of the 1820s- is compatible only with iron tracks .”23 The
relation Benjamin establishes between the emergence of iron and the course that the
locomotive industry takes is telling, not in terms of eighteenth and nineteenth century
inventions, but on the theoretical insight that this relation as such provides. This insight
becomes clear because as soon as Benjamin presents the relation between iron and the
locomotive he immediately introduces a quote of Michelet: “Each epoch dreams the one
to follow.”-
4
Thus, I have brought up Benjamin's short discussion on the relation between
iron and architecture, because it sheds light on Michelet's quotation. For this quotation is
the entry point to the relation between dreams, history and politics that is present
throughout The Arcades Project. Michelet’s aphorism is charged with historical
continuity and discontinuity in its epochal reference, and with allegorical weight in its
oniric reference. This adventure of dreams, history, and as later we will see, politics is
something embedded in Benjamin's thought. The original way in which Benjamin begins
to weave this web of relations is very interesting and important for this discussion.
The notion of collective consciousness provides the nodal point of articulation
that Benjamin provides for the relation of dreams, history and politics. However, this is a
very problematic notion particularly because it is charged with Jungian acceptation.
Nevertheless, the way in which I understand the notion of collective consciousness in
Benjamin is far from the category that Jung championed. It may be helpful to see it as a
more nuanced and flexible notion: as anti-social imaginaries encompassing collective
23
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images and dreams 25 However, I want to clarify this idea of collective consciousness as
anti-social imaginary before exploring it directly in Benjamin’s work . 26
In a recent work Charles Taylor developed a notion of social imaginaries that can
serve us as a counter reference to what I think are the characteristics of this notion as I
read it in Benjamin. Taylor framed his notion of social imaginaries in the trope of
Western modernity as a realm of social practices enabled by a particular conception of
the moral order. In Taylor’s understanding of Western modernity, he argues that given
the contemporary discourses of multiple modernities one is able to make sense of
Western modernity only by acknowledging the inseparable character of Western
modernity with divergent social imaginaries. His argument relies on the idea that “central
to Western modernity is a new conception of the moral order of society. At first this
moral order was just an idea in the minds of some influential thinkers, but later it came to
shape the social imaginary of large strata, and then eventually whole societies. It has now
become so self-evident to us, we have trouble seeing it as one possible conception among
others. The mutation of this view of moral order into our social imaginary is the
development of certain forms that characterize Western modernity: the market economy,
the public sphere, the self-governing people, among others.” Taylor conceives as part of
eighteenth century social imaginary the idea that the economy is a whole system with
laws and regulations. And that the most important character of that social imaginary that
25
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remains with us to this day was “coming to see the most important purpose and agenda of
society as economic collaboration and exchange ...”29 But the idea of social imaginary for
Taylor goes beyond the specificity that the latter example can show. There is something
more popular to the concept as Taylor defines it. It has a general character not in the
theoretical sense but in the populist sense as common knowledge. Taylor wants to speak
of social imaginaries as “that common understanding that makes possible common
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.” In this sense social imaginaries are
politically complacent. They do not question or look critically at the political, economic,
social and cultural aspects of society but rather work upon their legitimation. But more
importantly, these social imaginaries do not constitute themselves, neither can they
emerge in a vacuum. They necessitate, share and promote a particular moral order. Taylor
understands the moral order as “a grasp of the norms underlying our social practice” and
the possibility of their realization
.
30
If Benjamin thought of history as a dream, for Taylor
any aspiration or hope (conscious or unconscious) seems to be relegated to the shelf of
impossibilities. Interestingly enough Taylor posits that “it ought to be clear from the
above that our images of moral order, although they make sense of some of our actions,
are by no means necessarily tilted towards the status quo. They may also infuse
revolutionary practice, as at Manila and Beijing, just as they may underwrite the
established order.” That is, in situations of extreme political repression, which would
presumably take place under illegitimate or authoritarian regimes, the moral order could
promote some kind of change. That it is morality what promotes change in such a
situation is a conservative statement to say the least; but this is not the main problem.
2y
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There is something more pervasive to this conception: it is the fact that the underlying
political and theoretical assumption of Taylor is contemporary liberalism. A liberalism
that is under attack, piecisely by the ‘moral majority’, but that is nonetheless a pervasive
and hegemonic political and economic set of practices and beliefs. Therefore, on the one
hand, if there is an extreme situation, the moral order may help to change it, but if we live
in a liberal society then the moral order will maintain all those set of principles that
presumably are the cornerstone of such morality in the first place. Taylor’s social
imaginary is a recipe for hegemonic practices of domination. These may or may not be
liberal in kind, but these are the preferred and assumed by Taylor.
Taylor's notion of social imaginaries, hence, can serve us well in dialectical
relation to what can be consider Benjamin’s anti-social imaginary: conscious and
unconscious . 31 Furthermore, one may even see it as a dialectical standpoint because it
pertains to our and Benjamin’s predicament; what he will call the awakening from
history. In this sense we can talk about an anti-social imaginary in dialectical terms.
We can think of two brief instances of Benjamin’s anti-social imaginary. The
image of the prostitute, to which Benjamin devoted some thought, is what one can called
an arrested image. Nevertheless, if we were to follow Taylor’s concept of social
imaginary, such an image would be a popular and standard idea of the prostitute. But if
one thinks of the prostitute as a social agent then one is referring to an imaginary that not
only is opposed to the hegemonic social imaginary but that is at the same time its
constitutive other. If we think of the prostitute this way, Susan Buck-Morss’ insightful
reading of this social subject in The Arcades Project illustrates both the constitutive
31
Let’s not forget that I am and will be talking about social and political representations of this category.
The point is not biological, but socio-historical.
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character of this emblemic figure as anti-social imaginary and its dialectical relation to
the political economy. Buck-Morss comments how “the prostitute is the ur-form of the
wage laborer, selling herself in order to survive. Prostitution is indeed an objective
emblem of capitalism, a hieroglyph of the true nature of social reality in the sense that the
Egyptian hieroglyphs were viewed by the Renaissance- and in Marx’s sense as well:
“Value transforms... every product of labor into a social hieroglyph. People then try to
decode the meaning of the hieroglyph in order to get behind the secret of their own social
product The image of the whore reveals this secret like a rebus. Whereas every
trace of the wage laborer who produced the commodity is extinguished when it is tom out
of context by its exhibition on display, in the prostitute, both moments remain visible. As
a dialectical image, she “synthesizes” the form of the commodity and its content: She is
“commodity and seller in one.””32 The prostitute reveals and conceals at the same time
the logic of consumption at a moment where object and subject are one and the same.
What was permissible and what wasn't in nineteenth century Paris, as is true today,
depended on the logic of the market and to some extent the taste of the bourgeoisie. As
one commentator reminds us, “professional prostitutes were licensed to set up shop in the
arcades where they promenaded the latest styles and found a niche for self-marketing.”
This, alas, did not last much longer, for “once fashion made a commodity of respectable
women, the professionals were banished from the arcades as if to conceal the traffic in
female eroticism.”
Another figure that merited Benjamin's attention was the city stroller or flaneur.
Nowadays, this figure would probably be understood by the modern citizen's 'social
32 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics ofSeeing, 184-185.
33 Dianne Chisholm, Queer Constellations: Subcultural Space in the Wake oj the City (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 40.
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imaginary" as the vagabond. In contemporary parlance, paying sociological attention to
this subject as a social agent, and embracing this figure in a ‘political’ vein means trying
to give a voice the this subject as other. This is the kind of discourse liberal academics,
postcolonial critics, and even compassionate social conservatives engage in all the time
But from an anti-social imaginary perspective the attempt is to uncover the importance of
the place the flaneur occupies in the larger social field and how she also serves as a
necessary but disposable other. Thus, the idea of the anti-social imaginary is not to serve
as a discourse of the Other, nor to simply point to the dimension that the hegemonic
imaginary does not want to include in its historical narrative, but to locate and unveil the
perverse and exclusionary nature of the social before its constitutive other. To put it in a
more exotic lingo, the problem is not only whether the ‘subaltern can speak’, but whether
someone is listening. The question then takes a turn towards the effects of the uncovering
I mentioned involved in an anti-social imaginary. I believe that the first effect is to
destabilize any hegemonic discourse that is based on the Taylorian social imaginary.
Such destabilization, of course, does not do much for the other. This kind of discourse is
becoming more accepted and important in the social sciences. And I believe this is a
positive step, such as the one taken by the groundbreaking work of Michel-Rolph
Trouillot .
34
It is necessary and significant to talk and reflect about the silences of the past,
and the destabilizing effect I see produced by anti-social imaginaries is part and parcel of
the historiography championed by Trouillot. But we need to take it a step further towards
the path of empowerment.
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Taking into consideration the above stated critique of Taylor, one cannot assume
that social imaginaries are to be overcome completely. We should remember that they are
the dialectical counterpart of what I have called anti-social imaginaries and as such they
also produce what Susan Buck-Morss, following Benjamin, calls dreamworlds with their
accompanying catastrophes. For it depends on the predicament upon which such
dreamworlds are built: Buck-Morss’ study of how both the East as well as the West
shared the belief in industrial modernization produced catastrophic results for both
worlds. This serves as an example of a social imaginary contained as the dark side of a
dreamworld. It is under the rubric of the latter discussion that I want to place Benjamin’s
representation of the collective unconscious: a dialectical social formation upon which
light can be shed with psychoanalytic categories.
The idea of the collective may sometimes appear as an ephemeral and even
mystic entity which seems to be hard to get a strong hold of. It is different from the idea
of the masses, which a quick glance at a newspaper photo, of say a music concert, brings
to mind. As has been pointed out by cultural and social theorists “mass society is a
twentieth-century phenomenon .'’ 35 The main distinction between what I consider the
collective and the masses is their different social character. The mass is essentially a
populist phenomenon while the collective is primarily a political one. Festivals belong to
the masses, revolutions to collectivities. And it is in this frame where we have to see this
conception of the collective as containing wish images.
Benjamin argues that we find wish images in the collective. These images are the
product of unconscious residues of past generations blended together with new images of
a young generation looking towards the future. There is a dialectical relation between the
35 Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, 134.
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wish images of past generations and those of the young generation with their gaze turned
towards the future. This is between that which was and that which we desire to be; a
teleology of hope struggling with the disappointment and disenchantment of the past. In
the midst of this elaboration Benjamin comes back again to a materialist issue. For these
images, these wish images, are not purely constructions of the intellect, desires of
thought, but they also correspond (in the Marxist sense of correspondence, that is an
intrinsic relation) to the “form of the new means of production .”36 However, insofar as
these images are 'wish images' they go beyond their correspondence to the means of
production. This beyond is a space of hope because it seeks to “overcome and to
transfigure the immaturity of the social product and the inadequacies in the social
organization of production.” Insofar as the wish images go beyond, there is an effort from
the collective aspiration to “distance oneself from all that is antiquated.” The aspirations
of past generations, mostly frustrated, neglected or forgotten, left some ashes scattered
around because the dream of a better tomorrow always leaves a political spark to be
rescued and re-lightened. But the fact that this is an 'antiquated’ spark is never forgotten.
This does not make the new generation condescending towards what has been done or
what others tried to do but failed. On the contrary, it speaks volumes to the necessity of
inflaming the desire to struggle with the new dreams of the present: the agency of the
collective comes from Benjamin's now-time, not from a nostalgic possibility of the past.
Moreover, this move from antiquity involves a dialectical movement, where the terms of
the old are to be confronted with the impetus of the new, from which the collective wish-
images derive its force.
36
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The dream image of the collective, which Benjamin following Baudelaire sees
contained in modernity as the epoch of the young generation, corresponds or manifests
itself through the ambiguity that is “peculiar to the social relations and products of their
epoch [modernity].” 37 Thus, “dialectics at a standstill” is the moment of ambiguity
between social relations and its products. The dream image as dialectical image has to be
understood as the wish dream (with always a possibility of actualization) to overcome
this particular moment by looking forward, in the spirit of Michelet, to the constitution of
new social relations and products presumably mature and adequate to the aspirations of
the new generation. Hence, when Benjamin quotes Michelet saying that 'each epoch
dreams the one to follow' I read him as expressing the possibility of a historical moment
where the young generation’s predicament (that is, its ambiguity and its corresponding
epochal status: the 'law of dialectics at a standstill') will move towards the new in order
to overcome the ‘immaturity’ of their epoch's social product and the ‘inadequacies’ of
their social organization. More importantly, in the dream image of the collective, the
image is also the thing: images are phenomena in themselves. Walter Benjamin’s
incessant recourse to images as phenomena in-themselves should not be seen as
metaphorical or allegorical but as part of the material itself the historian takes into
consideration for his/her narration. They are not “subjective impressions, but objective
expressions. The phenomena- buildings, human gestures, spatial arrangements- are real
as a language in which historically transient truth (and the truth of historical transiency) is
expressed concretely, and the city’s social formation becomes legible within perceived
17
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project
,
10.
55
experience .”38 Thus, the epochal movement to which Michelet refers involves the
dialectics of the dream image: this movement is the material for historians.
We cannot escape the question that arises when Benjamin attributes the impetus
of the dream image to the new: What is the new? Benjamin does not hesitate and answers
that the new is the essence of false consciousness and “newness is a quality independent
of the use value of the commodity .”39 In the nineteenth century the new, “novelty”,
became the cannon of dialectical image. If fashion is the agent of this false
consciousness then the art that emerges from the cry of novelty succumbs to the market
place. As a response “nonconformists rebel against consigning art to the market place”
and “they rally round the banner of / ’art pour l ’art ”40
In the nineteenth century, with the advent of art as commodity and its entrance to
the market, what once was the dream world of a generation became the ruins of another.
The “arcades and interieurs, the exhibition halls and panoramas... are residues of a dream
world .”41 These elements of a dreamworld became residues in the process of awakening.
As residues they are also an actualization of what once was a dreamworld. Their
realization is “the paradigm of dialectical thinking.” If dialectical thinking is the “organ
of historical awakening”, then this awakening provides us with a knowledge that is
conscious of both the significance of dream elements as present residues of an epoch and
the prospects of a current young generation and the dream world of their collective
consciousness. In short, the historian becomes a dream interpreter. The dialectical
character of history then pushes Michelet’s assertion that “each epoch dreams the one to
38 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics ofSeeing, 27.
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follow" to the Benjaminian assertion that, furthermore, “in dreaming, precipitates its
awakening". Hence, in a Hegelian speculative fashion, an epoch “bears its ends within
itself and unfolds it.”42
Among the images contained in the dream of the collective we find some of the
successors of this dreaming generation. The images of the succeeded generation, in the
dream of the collective, are “wedded to the elements of primal history... that is, to
elements ol a classless society”. These old elements emerged or appeared as images in
the dream of the collective because they were contained in the “unconscious of the
collective”. For Benjamin the unconscious material from past generations emerging as
images in a present generation “left its trace in a thousand configurations of life .”43
Benjamin points to a specific expression seeing in the worker in the panoramic literature
appearing “isolated from his class”; an element we can see as a trace of the classless
society of primal history. The arcades contain an expression of this trace. However, as we
learned from Freud, the unconscious material, in order to appear in dreams, resorts to
condensation and displacement; Benjamin also tell us that the impulse of the wish dream
of the new generation comes from the longing to overcome the things considered
antiquated (organization of social production, immaturity of the social product); that is, a
looking forward to the new. Nevertheless, insofar as the images are dialectical, a
condition for the movement towards the new is that traces of its past will always remain
in the dream image. It’s the labor of the historian as dream interpreter to illuminate these
traces and present them as dialectical articulations of dream elements. This labor is part
of what Benjamin calls awakening.
42
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The Historian and Dialectics
Throughout The Arcades Project Benjamin makes multiple references to what he
calls awakening. Within this multiplicity of references the most interesting definition of
awakening is the formulation that defines it in very general tenns as a “graduated process
that goes on in the life of the individual as in the life of generations .”44 By defining
awakening this way Benjamin effectively merges the individual experience and the
collective experience (in terms of generational experience) into the process of awakening.
Nevertheless, Benjamin wants to do justice to both kinds of experiences, thus avoiding
the risk of allowing that a general account would swallow the particularity of a life.
Rather than seeing awakening as an undifferentiating process between the particularity of
a life and the generality of a collectivity, Benjamin on the contrary, wants to present his
view as paying justice to the particularity of life. He is able to render this view
theoretically because his proposal is not the integration of particularity into generality but
the exposition of particular life in collective experience as a mark in a giant spot.
Another important trait characterizing awakening as an experience is Benjamin’s
notion that this process, insofar as is understood as a historical experience, is configured
as a dream. Benjamin posits that the experience of a young generation is very much like
the experience of a dream. This becomes for him particularly clear when the experience
of youth is compared to the understanding of a present generation. What Benjamin is
trying to do is to account for the understanding of historical experience through the
awakening of a generation’s self-understanding and their own expectation of what was to
become. To gain this generational understanding, insofar as it is experienced as a dream,
44
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is seen by Benjamin as a Proustian effort. For Benjamin, Marcel Proust emerged as “an
unprecedented phenomenon in his generation because “they had lost all bodily and
natural aids to remembrance”. 4 ' The effort of remembrance plays an important role in the
attempt at self-understanding of a generation. Moreover, remembrance in this context
although similar to memory goes beyond the mere recollection of a memory. To illustrate
this point one only has to consider the careful consideration the editors of The Arcades
Project gave to the translation of the passages concerned with this issue. We find an
important clarification regarding the words Benjamin used to distinguish between
remembrance and memory. Benjamin’s word for remembrance is not Erinnerung
(memory) but Eingedenken which is “Benjamin’s coinage from the preposition eingedenk
(“mindful of’) and the verb gedenken (“bear in mind”, “remember”). This verbal noun
has a more active sense than Erinnerung (“memory”).”46 Hence, remembrance, because it
goes beyond a recollected memory, is an active engagement towards a self-understanding
that will bring us closer to the awakening that Benjamin longs for. To illustrate the case
in point for this distinction we can point out that for Benjamin one modality of such
understanding was education through oral tradition. In the oral tradition the dreams of a
generation, as a form of education, were explained “in terms of tradition, of religious
doctrine .”
47
This oral tradition was an exercise of active engagement as remembrance in
search of awakening. Benjamin understood that this has been lost and the new
generations were “poorer than before”. Instead of remembrance, new generations are
45
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letting themselves "take possession of the worlds of childhood in merely an isolated,
scattered, and pathological way .”48
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish Benjamin’s notion of tradition from its
general acceptation and universalized conception. Although Benjamin’s notion is
certainly closely related to the general acceptation, there are idiosyncratic issues that
merit a brief distinction. According to the Oxford English Dictionary one of the most
accepted definitions of tradition is "the action of transmitting or ‘handing down’, of fact
of being handed down, from one to another, or from generation to generation;
transmission of statements, beliefs, rules, customs, or the like, esp. by word of mouth or
by practice without writing .”49 The generational component is important for Benjamin, as
one can see from the above quotation. But what is absent in Benjamin’s notion is the
sense of linearity and homogeneity in the transmission. This is particularly important
when one thinks about tradition articulated with Benjamin's philosophy of history. On
this point two important scholars agree. Terry Eagleton writes of tradition in Benjamin
that "tradition is not secreted within ‘history’ as the essence within the phenomenon. It is
not an alternative history which runs beneath the history of the exploiters, silently
ghosting it. If it were, it would be no more than another homogeneity which merely
denied or invented the first, as some corporatist historiography of the working class
would suggest. Tradition is nothing other than a series of spasms or crises within class
history itself, a particular set of articulations of that history, not the scattered letters of an
invisible word.”50 And along similar lines Giorgio Agamben has declared that in relation
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to tradition and history for Benjamin, “to redeem the past is not to restore its true dignity,
to transmit it anew as an inheritance for future generations” but what Agamben sees as
the essential point for Benjamin is “an interruption of tradition in which the past is
fulfilled and thereby brought to its end once and for all .”51 Following the latter
understandings of tradition in Benjamin one can see in clearer fashion what it was that
Benjamin longed for when he referred to the lost of tradition in new generations. It was
not the philosophical, historical or political ideas as such, but the fact of the engagement
with them. It is tiadition as such, the loss of an active effort that Benjamin missed. But
the significance of tradition is related to rupture rather than recovery, to transformation
rather than rescue. In this moment is where we have to inscribe the loss Benjamin felt
with tradition. What one mourns is not what has been, the old and past, but what was not,
something that can begin anew, that hasn’t take place but can. It is this dialectical
articulation we shall explore.
A precise moment in The Arcades Project where the latter articulation takes place
can be found in one of Benjamin’s aphoristic comments on childhood. Benjamin's
discussion of childhood presents us with a moment of dream-image formation in terms of
generational experience. Benjamin sees childhood as the most active epoch of dreaming,
it is a defining experience for the generations that will be formed from those dreaming
children. The following quote is very telling in this regard. The sentence can take us back
to the moment of an image of a future in the child’s mind: “...Who will be able to rest
his brow above the sill of a window where, as a youth, he would have formed those
waking dreams which are the grace of dawn within the long and somber servitude of
51
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life. Foi Benjamin this experience of youth is a time of an important and defining
dream-image. This image is not properly in the past; but it breaks the linear temporality
between past and future since the history that we create around it emerges not as a
longing for the ‘good old times' but as the recognition of the new once again. It is not a
melancholic act, but an act of active recovering and reconstruction, an act that looks
forward rather than backwards. It is also a dialectical experience breaking with the has
been but taking with it the absence of a promises’ realization to the forthcoming
tomorrow. Benjamin argues that “the fact that we were children during this time belongs
together with its objective image. It had to be this way in order to produce this
generation.” The moment of that dream was effectively a time-image of a better life, but
because it was a waking-dream it looked into the future. Still it is our dream, and if we
“seek a teleological moment in the context of dreams” it is because we think about its
realization. “The dream,” Benjamin tell us, “waits secretly for the awakening; the sleeper
surrenders himself to death only provisionally, waits for the second when he will
cunningly wrest himself from its clutches.” Teleology does not come out of progress but
out of the hope of awakening, the moment when we will break from the clutches of death.
We can see in childhood experience remembrance as a new understanding.
However, Benjamin argues that this understanding can only be achieved in a dialectical
manner. We have to look back and see that “what has been is to become the dialectical
reversal- the flash of awakened consciousness .”54 Therefore, we will attain historical
knowledge as awakened consciousness. The ‘reversal' is the look that we are going to
give to those historical facts; and its awakening represents not just the knowledge of a
52
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new meaning to those facts . 55 This would be what Eagleton and Agamben both refuse;
here the rupture is dialectically complete. This is clear once Benjamin tell us that these
facts will “become something that just now first happened to us .”56 For Benjamin “there
is a not-yet conscious knowledge of what has been: its advancement has the stmcture of
awakening ." 57 The past serves us well, insofar as we dialectically recover it for a future, a
future presented with the betrayed utopian promises of the past: but these anew . 58
We see that for Benjamin awakening is always a process, and in the individual as
well as in the collective where the group is understood as a generation, this process is
caught between two states. Awakening is the state between the sleep (where dreaming
occurs) and the awake where dreaming has stopped. The process of awakening is
rendered dialectical and hence this “new, dialectical method of doing history presents
itself as the act of experiencing the present as awaking world .”59 Between the past dream
and the future of falling asleep again, the present is a wake world, although not conscious
knowledge. Conscious knowledge emerges from what has been and is achieved “in
remembering the dream”. We can see the dialectic of this notion taking place throughout
Benjamin's writings, particularly in The Arcades Project.
To illustrate an important dialectical insight of Benjamin that has as its
background a comprehensive conception of history, let us turn our attention to a comment
on Lukacs. Benjamin notes that, “more universal is Lukacs’ remark that, from the
perspective of the philosophy of history, it is characteristic of the middle classes that their
new opponent, the proletariat, should have entered the arena at a moment when the old
55 Hayden White would refer to this as a new emplotment!
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adversary, feudalism, was not yet vanquished. And they would never quite have done
with feudalism.” 61 ’ ‘More universal’ than what, one may ask? Previous to his comment on
Lukacs, Benjamin was quoting Adolf Behne on the question of ‘distinction’ and how it
relates to social classes and their most seemingly coincidental arrangements of their
dwelling places. According to Behne meeting with the “propensity to situate objects at an
angle and diagonally in all the dwellings of all classes and social strata- as, in fact, we do-
“ is “no coincidence.” Furthermore, “arranging at an angle enforces a distinction” and
such distinction and arranging is to be explained by the “unconscious retention of a
posture of struggle and defense .”61 This logic of arrangement and distinction shows, and
this is what is important for Benjamin, the dialectical character of historical development.
This may not be clear right away, but it becomes evident when Benjamin brings Lukacs
into the picture. The relation is established by the transitional quote before Benjamin cites
Lukacs. According to Behne, following this a posture of distinction, “the gentleman who
could afford a villa wanted to mark their higher standing. What easier way than by
borrowing feudal forms?”62 It is after this quote when Benjamin then quotes Lukacs. The
point to remark here is that both examples, as different as they are thematically, share a
fundamental assumption. This assumption we can call, pace Amo Mayer, the persistence
of history. Behne’ s remark on the gentlemen of the villa points to the materialist
character of historical development; while his remarks on social strata and their logic of
<
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'distinction' points to the dialectical character of history. Lukacs account is, as Benjamin
notes, more universal’. It merges both characteristics of history into a more
comprehensive conception of the philosophy of history. What becomes more telling is
that Benjamin s montage of these two authors expresses his own take on history at two
interconnecting levels. We can see that at an evident level Benjamin embraces a
philosophy of history that is materialist and dialectical. This will also become clearer as
we will further discuss his thought. But the more succinct emplotment of his philosophy
of history takes place in the form itself in which Benjamin presents the argument. The
kernel of what Benjamin is conveying in this section of The Arcades unfolds, not only in
the content of what he is saying and the texts he is commenting upon, but on the form
itself of the narrative and the methodology it employs. He first presents a textual find
bringing to the issue of social distinction a very specific historical insight: furniture
arrangement of the nineteenth century bourgeois dwelling place. This peculiar preference
is then explained by historicizing it, at a larger scale, and dialectically: the way in which
things were arranged “also incorporates a setting apart-one that leads us back to the
knight .”
64
The text Benjamin carefully quotes gives us a reference to feudal knights right
at the heart of an unconscious expression of bourgeois class distinction. This is then
encompassed by a comprehensive theoretical insight from Western Marxism’s own
inaugural thinker who makes a class antagonism between the middle classes and the
proletariat the stage for the historical dialectical movement. This is the philosophy of
history, which is ‘more universal’, and that serves as the frame in which the particularity
of the previous insight takes places. These two levels are put forward by Benjamin, in a
constellational manner, to express in content, and they are presented in a fonn,
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methodologically inductive, to show that each one is both present and overcome in the
other. This is the heart of the dialectic in Benjamin’s thought. One should also notice the
dream-like quality of the situation in Benjamin's montage: the expression of bourgeois
class distinction is unconscious. Although as a particular historical expression Marxism
would locate, as Lukacs does, the phenomena within the larger social class struggle.
Benjamin points out how its expression has become embedded in what we may call the
bourgeoisie's historical unconscious or, their dream of history.
This brings me to a larger and very important argument. Benjamin is, as many
have noted before me, an observer of the everyday life, a lover of the minutiae of history,
a friend of the fragmentary, but this is not the end of the story. Rather, he is such, but
dialectically, and the ‘antithetical’ side of the formula is the larger comprehensive notion
of history that harbors in his thought. These two sides complement each other and make
of Benjamin’s philosophy of history one that is rich, complex, material and dialectical.
Nothing can be said or gam theoretically of the minutiae without attempting to place it,
constellationally, in a larger historical scheme: one that shows the constitutive character
of the seemingly unimportant, the left behind, and at the same time can pin-point the
exclusions, silences and messiness of history in the larger sense.
This latter point is furthermore illustrated by Benjamin’s short discussion of
nineteent century domestic interior, which follows Lukacs’ quotation. Benjamin presents
nineteenth century bourgeois domestic interior as a microscopic detail of a larger
historical lesson. This time Benjamin is referring to the middle classes. The space of
nineteenth century interior serves as a mask to the complicities and silences of the “self-
satisfied burgher” with official history, from which he derives much benefit. Nineteenth
66
century interior is a space that “disguises itself- puts on, like an alluring creature, the
costumes of moods. Regardless of the historical trauma and violence that may surround
the experiences and precise class accommodation of the ‘burgher’, in a self-
congratulatory exercise of consciousness, what ends up as important is the
representational image their position affords them. Even though they “should know
something of the feeling that the next room might have witnessed the coronation of
Charlemagne as well as the assassination of Henri IV, the signing of the Treaty of Verdun
as well as the wedding of Otto and Theophano”, Benjamin argues, “in the end, things are
merely mannequins, and even the great moments of world history are only costumes
beneath which they exchange glances of complicity with nothingness, with the petty and
the banal .”
65 When in power there is no need for historical consciousness, to know how
and why you are where you are and at whose expense (it is the need that is lacking
although not necessarily the knowledge). Instead, being higher-up in the social scale
brings a certain need for ignorance or stupidity. A need that, as Freud teaches us, comes
at great psychological expense. It takes a great deal of psychic energy to live obliviously
to the conditions of possibility of a comfortable life style.
6<>
The experience of living in
such mood provokes a nihilism that is “the innermost core of bourgeois coziness .”6 The
interior as space constituted from this experience is the metaphorical equivalent of having
“woven a dense fabric about oneself, to have secluded oneself within a spider's web, in
whose toils world events hang loosely suspended like so many insect bodies sucked
dry .”
68
It is the dryness of history trapped in the web of bourgeois coziness that Benjamin
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wants to shake loose. But this act does not come easily because “from this cavern, one
does not like to stir .”69 Hence Benjamin's bet is that his historiographical project is strong
enough to shake down the contentment that emerges from the coziness of the interior
The latter discussion of how Benjamin treats the objects under scrutiny and study
is exemplary of his keen dialectical view. He is concrete and theoretical at the same time,
and dialectically so at that. There has been some criticism regarding his Marxist
credentials. This preoccupation has usually come from Marxist orthodox conceptions of
the development of history and the precise view that that takes as its locus of reflection
the realm of production. In this sense it is true that Benjamin is not an orthodox Marxist,
nor did he ever intend to be one. Benjamin's sense of the political always relates to the
location of power and its possibilities or impossibilities insofar as its detached from
money. In this sense, as Susan Buck-Morss has argued, he could never be a Marxist. It is
in his approach to Moscow where we can get a better picture of Benjamin's sense
regarding the political in the democratic potential of the citizenry. For one thing there is
nothing like the liberal notion of neutrality as, following Eagleton, we mentioned earlier.
There is a keen sense of positionality. For Moscow “obliges everyone to choose his
standpoint.” And politics in this sense is closely related to truth for the question that the
intellectual must answer is “which reality is inwardly convergent with truth? Which truth
is inwardly preparing itself to converge with reality? Only he who clearly answers this
question is ‘objective.’ Not towards his contemporaries (which is unimportant) but
towards events (which is decisive). Only he who, by decision, has made its dialectical
peace with the world can grasp the concrete. But someone who wishes to decide 'on the
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basis of facts will find no basis in the facts.”
71 One problem Benjamin saw with Europe,
as opposed to Moscow, was the strong articulation between money and power already in
place in this continent. This of course is today’s citizen-consumer: politically passive and
economically eager. Winter of 1926-27 in Moscow presented possibilities without
guarantees. The state of things was promising to say the least. As Buck-Morss points out
“commodities here as elsewhere... store the fantasy energy for social transformation in
reified form. But the exigencies of socialist accumulation demand that this energy be
displaced onto production, while consumption is indefinitely postponed.” 72 The problem
is that while socialism’ goal was a classless society, and while it also operated (at least
discursively) against the current of bourgeois ideology in Europe, it nonetheless shared
with the West a belief in the promise of industrialization. 73 A promise of which Benjamin
was always aware of its catastrophic consequences. Nevertheless, the bottom line of the
situation in Moscow as Benjamin saw it was that in the Soviet Union the economic
always took precedence over the political and the cultural. Hence the possibilities the
party (or the state for that matter) presented were meager for the alternatives were “power
without freedom, or freedom without power.”74 And as Benjamin knew, and we all now
know, a revolutionary change has to be one that provides the two. Today this is what we
mean by
,
pace Sheldon Wolin and C. Lummis, radical democracy. The Arcades Project
may not seem to contemporary political theorists as the most coherent enterprise for such
an endeavor. However one must agree that “what saves the project from arbitrariness is
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Benjamin s political concern that provided the overriding orientation for every
constellation. Indeed, if the attempt to interpret this massive assembly of research
material is justified, it is due not to any intrinsic value in adding to the hagiography that
has come to surround Benjamin's name, but to the fact that this overriding concern is still
very much our own ." 75 The reason behind this conception has to do with Benjamin’s
notion of the primacy of politics, as shown in The Arcades Project.
I believe the most interesting and politically productive thesis in Benjamin is that
in this dialectical experience ‘’politics takes primacy over history.” The dialectical
understanding of history brings a truly political experience. In our dreams, we expound
our century “as the outcome of its generation’s dream visions.” This positing of politics
over history is due to what Benjamin calls the “Copemican revolution in historical
perception.”
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According to Benjamin the common-held belief of history was that “a
fixed point had been found in what has been and one saw the present engaged in
tentatively concentrating the forces of knowledge on this ground.” For Benjamin this
relation “is to be overturned, and what has been is to become the dialectical reversal- the
flash of awakened consciousness .”77 Hence, there is no longer that external reality of
facts of the past that the historian aims to know. The historian, as dreamer, is implicated
in the construction of what has been and subjective experience becomes a fact of
knowledge. However, the dialectical shift is more than a process of implication. In good
Hegelian fashion the particular experience of subjectivity colors the universality of
history. If politics takes primacy over history it is because the coloring of universality is
no longer a fixed point to be known but an open social field to struggle over. It is this
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struggle what marks the primacy of politics. The result of that struggle is the version of
universality’ that will prevail in that particular time.
Benjamin’s dialectical method requires from the historian more than a materialist
approach to his object of study. That is to say, it must go beyond the “concrete historical
situation ol its object .’’ 78 This beyond of the concrete moves the historian from the realm
of history to an intersection with politics. This intersection is found in the search of the
"interest taken in the object .'" 79 For Benjamin the interest in the object is always
preformed and since the interest constitutes in itself a situation of prioritization of a
particular object rather than any other, it creates at the same time the feeling that the
object is concretized in itself, that it has an immanent worth (fetishistic as it is). Hence
the object is “upraised from its former being into the higher concretion of now-being
<Jetztsein> (waking being !).’’80 For Benjamin then the important question that we must
ask is the way in which this higher concretion of the object took place. He writes that
“this question... can be entertained by the dialectical method only within the purview of a
historical perception that at all points has overcome the ideology of progress .”81
Therefore, we can see that it is the political question of the interest in the object that
begins to move the historical perception away from the ideology of progress. At this
point we see once again how Benjamin develops what, as we mentioned earlier, he calls
the “Copemican revolution in historical perspective.” The historical perception (without
ideology may we say?) looks at reality ‘in the face’. In Benjamin’s words that is to say
“in regard to such perception, one could speak of the increasing concentration
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(integration) of reality, such that everything past (in its time) can acquire a higher grade
of actuality than it had in the moment of its existing .”82 The dialectical method that goes
beyond the concrete historical circumstances of the object to the political interest in it
“puts the truth of all present action to the test.” It reveals the struggle of interests in the
object, the battle, as we said, to color the object with universality giving it historical
importance. For Benjamin this method “serves to ignite the explosive materials that are
latent in what has been
” 83
Politics takes primacy over history because “to approach, in
this way, ‘what has been’ means to treat it not historiographically, as heretofore, but
politically, in political categories .”
84 And with this in mind I want to discuss Benjamin’s
most controversial, versatile and insightful piece which has produced more commentary
than any other piece he ever wrote. I am referring, of course to his “Theses on the
Philosophy of History.”
Integrating the “Theses”
Of all of Benjamin’s writings none has received the attention that the “Theses on
Of
the Philosophy of History” have. ' The ink that has been spilled over these creative,
intense and insightful theses can fill innumerable bottles. And yet, among the most well-
known commentators there has been a certain agreement, particularly regarding the
character of the ninth thesis. Many interpreters have identified the angel of history with
82
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Benjamin, and as such have declared Benjamin to be a melancholy character. Others,
although not identifying Benjamin with the angel, nonetheless have claimed from the
same source the characteristic of melancholy. Scholem saw the theses as been inscribed
exclusively in Jewish messsianism and any traces of Marxism were ascribed to exterior
influences to the immanence of Benjamin’s thought. Some interpreters have taken the
exact opposite route claiming that Benjamin was essentially a Marxist and that his
messianic language came either the incidental influence of some of his friends and also
from Benjamin’s own material conditions of existence. That is, his need to please figures
like Scholem in order to obtain financial support. There are others who claim that the
religious and theological character is incompatible with the Marxism, creating thus an
irreconcilable moment in Benjamin’s thought.
The reading I have been giving Benjamin throughout and want to follow with his
theses is dialectical. Not only was Benjamin essentially a dialectical thinker as I have
argued, but the approach one must take with his text must conform to this tradition of
thought
To begin with, Benjamin conceives the revolution as neither a natural nor an
inevitable result of economic or technological progress. Nor does he adhere to the
classical Marxist interpretation between the forces and relations of production. Benjamin
proposes a kind of active pessimism:
...nowhere do these two—metaphor and image—collide so drastically and
so irreconcilably as in politics. For to organize pessimism means nothing other
than to expel moral metaphor from politics and to discover in political action a
sphere reserved one hundred percent for images. This image sphere, however, can
no longer be measured out by contemplation. It is the double task of the
revolutionary intelligentsia to overthrow the intellectual predominance of the
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bourgeoisie and to make contact with the proletarian masses, the intelligentsia has
failed almost entirely in the second part of this task.
. ,
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Benjamin's option for the proletariat does not come from the certainty of the Marxist
historiographic teleology, but is rather a bet on a possibility of emancipation that while
not historically necessary, is just and possible. Rather than an orthodox Marxism,
Benjamin’s Marxism is surreal or gothic. 8 " Benjamin's alleged “melancholy” has been
constructed without taking into consideration that when he referred to images of the past
(classless society), his desire was not of going back nor did he ever mean to construct a
past that never existed. His point is to articulate an impulse, to assert the moment of the
possibility into the present, and looking towards the future. Melancholy as such, has
nothing to do with this optic.
In the second thesis, the redemption of the past is not melancholy per se. It is not
the rescue of something that was but of something that can be. The redemption of the
past relies in the realization of the possibilities we still deem worthy along with the hopes
of a new generation. Why must we still cling to the past? Among the variety of just
answers one can give to this question, in Benjamin there is a precise issue of method. If
we believe in historical materialism then the struggle of our oppressed ancestors must be
redeemed along with the fights of today. The messianic mission in Benjamin may be
theological but it is not religious. Against the Judaic tradition, there is the simple fact
that this redemption is to be carried by us. There is no god involved in the matter. And
that “us” is a collectivity composed of oppressed humanity; this is very much a
democratic enterprise.
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The first thing to notice regarding the third thesis is its comprehensive view. As I
have argued before, Benjamin’s attention to minutiae does not take place by itself but is
to be dialectically inscribed in history. There is an attempt at once at universal history
and particular history at the same time. It is redemption as conceived in thesis two that
provides for the dialectical configuration of history. It is not a coincidence that thesis
four begins with a direct reference to class struggle and Marx’s influence on Benjamin’s
conception of history. Thesis three ends with the following sentence: “Each moment it
has lived [redeemed mankind] becomes citation a I’ordre du jour—and that day is
judgment day.”88
Thesis four comes right after this sentence, and it begins with a telling quote of
Hegel: “Seek for food and clothing first, then the kingdom of God shall be added unto
you.” Redemption as messianic and utopian possibility gives place to the struggle for
social justice. Without the reference it would be difficult to guess that Hegel was the
author of this quotation. Benjamin presents in dialectical fashion the philosopher par
excellence of German idealism making a most simple materialist point. For, “it is not in
the form of spoils which fall to the victor that the latter [spiritual things] make their
OQ
presence felt in the class struggle.”
The force of historical insight that the redemptive humanity possesses “constantly
call in question every victory, past and present, of the rulers” And this force is mediated
not by the antagonism of the class struggle alone, but “they manifest themselves in this
88
Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt trans.
Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 254.
8y
Walter Benjamin, “Theses,” 254.
75
struggle as courage, humor, cunning and fortitude .”90 These are expressions of those
seeking food and clothing, the class struggle for Benjamin goes beyond the economic
apparatus of society; it also takes place at the psychic and emotional level. This is in
itself a dialectic of the idealistic with the material in the historical class struggle. It is
also important to point out that Marx here is not just an influence as the English
translation renders the text. In both the German and French versions by Benjamin
himself the reference to Marx is not regarding influence but something stronger, hr the
French translation the thesis reads “Thistorien forme para la pensee de Karl Marx”.
Hence, it is not a question of mere influence, but of forme. The closest English term,
although it could be misleading, would be “schooled” in the thought of Karl Marx. Class
struggle is the site of dialectical mediation between the material and the psychic and
spiritual. It is the last battle site between the dominant classes and the underdog. If there
is an emphasis on issues, which classical Marxism seldom touches (courage, cunning,
fortitude), it is because Benjamin sees the struggle from the viewpoint of the oppressed.
Domination not only reflected in the ownership of the means of production and the power
of the state, but also domination of everyday life. In order to understand the general
principles of exploitation, domination and oppression in their universal character one
must see their expression in the fleeting moment of a single life. This point is clearly
illustrated in the first two sentences of thesis six, when Benjamin argues that “to
articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it the way it really was
(Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.”
n
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Thesis six begins with a straightforward attack on historicism. If there is a danger
in historicism, it lies in the uncritical assumption of the status quo. This is the
overpowering conformism that Benjamin refers to in this thesis: “in every era the attempt
must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to
overpower it.” “ One should also notice the renewing critique that is present here. Every
generation, irrespective of their revolutionary past or emancipated present must not rest
on the arms of conformism. The danger of “becoming a tool of the ruling classes” must
be always met with the historical materialist’s critical stand, the firm belief “that even the
dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins” This, one has seen every time counter-
revolutionaries either erase the history of the revolution or claim its heroes for
themselves. When power is on one’s side and historicism is one’s method the inevitable
result is empathy with the victor. An “empathy whose origin is the indolence of the
heart, acedia, which despairs of grasping and holding the genuine historical image as it
flares up briefly .”
93
This indolence of the heart as Benjamin sees it in thesis VII
characterizes both historicists and conquerors, the spoils of history that follows the
conquest become cultural treasures: “According to traditional practice the spoils are
carried along in the procession. They are called cultural treasures, and the historical
materialist views them with cautions detachment. For without exception, the cultural
treasures he surveys have an origin which he cannot contemplate without horror.” This
horror is the result of the barbarism of conquest. The dialectic of catastrophe and triumph
finds expression in Benjamin’s well-known phrase in thesis seven: “There is no
document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.” And
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the barbaric moment that is present in the dialectical mediation survives in the historical
record because “barbarism taints also the manner in which is was transmitted from one
owner to another .”94 Moreover the barbarism also survives in the modes of transmission
and therefore in the practice of conquest. This is why “a historical materialist therefore
dissociates himself from it as far as possible .”95 She traces the genealogy of the cultural
treasures and expresses the dialectic behind history by regarding “as his task to brush
history against the grain .”
96
To brush history against the grain carries at least two major propositions present
throughout Benjamin’s work. The first is explicitly dialectical, and the second is an
implicit solidarity with those vanquished by the victors, the dominant class. This
solidarity becomes explicit in Thesis eight where Benjamin argues that "the tradition of
the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the
exception but the rule.” That is to say, oppression, despotism, fascist tendencies and the
like, rather than being the exception are the rule. And because the ‘state of exception' as
the rule is most closely experienced by those who are its victims, the experience of the
everyday life is highly important for Benjamin. For if we are to understand the
implications of the ‘state of exception’ for both the individual and the collective, then
“we must attain a concept of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall
clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will
improve our position in the struggle against Fascism .”
97
Notice that attaining the
necessary historical materialist and dialectical conception of history and bringing about
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the real state of emergency only improves the fight against the dominant political order
(at the time Benjamin was concerned with Fascism). This is something fundamental that
differentiates Benjamin from classical Marxist interpretations of the development of
history seen through the antagonistic class struggle and the rupture between the relations
of production and the forces of production. Benjamin is consciously regarding the
contingency of the political and the lack of guarantees that usually comes along with
politics. At the time he thought that “one reason Fascism has a chance is that in the name
of progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm.” He is referring to both leftist social
democrats and liberals. From the classical Marxist conception, the idea of progress finds
expression in the class struggle and the inevitability of capitalism’s demise because of its
internal contradictions. From the liberal perspective, and this is true today, the prospects
of developing a liberal democracy with its accompanying free markets can defeat any
political agenda that stands in its way. Hence, rather than trusting progress Benjamin
proposes an active engagement with history and politics that turns upside down the view
of history that produces amazement with the fact that “the things we are experiencing are
‘still’ possible .”
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Another important aspect to Benjamin’s epistemology of history is
presented in Thesis nine. This is where Benjamin introduces Paul Klee’s painting
“Angelus Novus.”
One of the most common interpretative positions regarding Benjamin's reading of
Klee’s ‘angel of history’ is to straight forwardly identify Benjamin and the historian with
the angel. This identification is misleading. Rolf Tiedemann, one of the most important
4X
Walter Benjamin, “Theses,” 257.
79
scholars ol Benjamin's work has also followed this interpretative move." Commenting
on Scholem's biblical interpretation of Benjamin’s ninth thesis, Tiedemann points out
that “the angel described by Benjamin fails in his mission to mankind .” 100 If one
identifies the angel with Benjamin and with the historian then the failure of the angel
becomes Benjamin’s failure. This position misses what I take to be Benjamin’s most
important point in thesis nine: humans can and must do what the angel is unable to do.
According to Tiedemann, the angel “although unable to help, he is also unable to avert
his gaze from what is hurled in front of his feet. But this is how mankind experiences the
horror of its own history. If anything still propels humanity onward, it is the memory of
the lost paradise. This utopian strength is an impulse which has not yet expired .” 101 This
is a nostalgic interpretation, and despite the accusations of Benjamin being a melancholic,
he never had any historical or political conception of a lost paradise. The point here has
to be seen as a secular one rather than messianic, because as mentioned earlier the point
is to engage humanity and not to blame divinity or the angelical. The messianic is
contained within the language of paradise but not in the image of the angel. Tiedemann
reads ’paradise’ as the language of Jewish Messianism: “for Jewish Messianism the ’very
ancient’ is also not at all the real past, but something transformed and exalted by a dream:
1 02
the radiance and utopia has been cast upon it.”
The angel’s view has four defining characteristics that are antithetical to
Benjamin and the historian. The angel’s view is unideminsional, undialectical, divine and
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static. In contrast, Benjamin’s and the historical materialist’s view is constellational,
dialectical, human and fluid.
In thesis ten Benjamin compares what he is proposing on the theses with manner
in which education took place in monasteries. According to Benjamin “The things which
monastic discipline assigns to friars for meditation were designed to turn them away from
the world and its affairs .” 103 The first impression one gets from the sentence is that
Benjamin is advocating a detachment from the events of the world. However, the
meaning of this sentence is completely the opposite of such an interpretation. Benjamin
wants a detachment but not from the world as it is, but from the way in which we have
been looking at it historically and politically. Benjamin exemplifies the proposal in
reference to the struggle against fascism. He argues that, “At the moment when the
politicians in whom the opponents of fascism had placed their hopes are prostrate and
confirm their defeat by betraying their own cause, these observations are intended to
disentangle the political wordlings from the snares in which the traitors have entrapped
them .” 104 The detachment Benjamin seeks is from the road that betrays the cause of
freedom. His rage in thesis ten is against the Stalinist’s betrayal to the fight against
fascism by signing the non-aggression pact with Hitler. Moreover, Benjamin is
condemning any and all communists who agreed and celebrated the Stalinist position.
Benjamin is certainly not condemning Marxism or communism but the particular actions
of a communist government. He is dissenting and denouncing the political and historical
conception behind these actions. Immediately afterwards in thesis eleven, Benjamin
denounces what at the time could have been seen as allies of the revolutionary agenda:
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Social Democracy. If we keep in mind thesis ten and ring it together with “the
conformism which has been part and parcel of Social Democracy” we can see that for
Benjamin as long as there is an attachment to the faith in progress, a believe in the
restructuring of society without a radical break with the politics that accompanies such
belief, there can be no redemption. 11 ' The failure of the communism that betrayed the
fight against fascism and the failure of the Social Democrats with their conformism relied
in “moving with the current” rather than against it; rather than brushing history against
the grain
.
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Benjamin devotes thesis twelve to the importance of the struggles past
generations have fought and to chastise Social Democrats for promoting the erasure of
the past. Certainly not any struggle will do for Benjamin but that of the “oppressed class
itself’ for it is the “depository of historical knowledge .” 107 The dialectic of past and
present through the image of class struggle goes unnoticed by Social Democrats because
they “assign to the working class the role of the redeemer of future generations...” The
forgetfulness of Social Democracy is the result of their undialectical view of history, and
their belief in progress whose base is ‘empty time’. Benjamin makes this clear in thesis
thirteen. In opposition to homogeneous empty time, Benjamin presents “time filled by
the presence of the now [jetztzeit].” Benjamin’s conception of the Now-time serves as
a nodal point to his notion of historical materialism. Now-time connects thesis fourteen,
fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen. Once Benjamin establishes in thesis fourteen
that “history is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but
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time filled by the presence of the now,” he moves directly to establish on thesis fifteen
that popular and democratic revolutions take place by and through the explosion of filled
time. Jetztzeit is the time when history understood as a lineal progression of mankind
blows-up into pieces, hence, “the awareness that they about to make the continuum of
history explode is the characteristic of the revolutionary classes at the moment of their
action .”
109
Now-time is a theoretical, historical and political monad. It is not time as
transition or passing, but as a standstill, a moment of consciousness. While “historicism
gives the ‘eternal’ image of the past” thus presenting past and present as continuous
progress; “historical materialism supplies a unique experience of the past” one in which
the condensed moment for and of action opens up as awakened consciousness. And as
thesis seventeen shows, this moment as condensed possibility is to be apprehended only
through constellational thinking. Thus, “thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts,
but their arrest as well, where thinking suddenly stops in a constellation 110 pregnant with
tensions; it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad .” 111 In
thesis eighteen, Benjamin refers to the Now-time as messianic time. Again, we should
understand this in a secular or profane way. This becomes clear in thesis eighteen-B,
when Benjamin opposes the time of the soothsayer from the time for Jews. The main
difference lies in the prohibition for Jews to look into matters of the future, while for
soothsayers this would be their trade. However, it is significant that according to
Benjamin neither soothsayers nor Jews experience time as “either homologous or empty.”
Then, why bring in the difference between soothsayers and Jews if they do not share
historicism ’s time? The answer lies in the passive subject underlying both soothsayers
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and Jews. In the case of the soothsayers, the subject who wants to look into his future is
essentially passive. The interest in one s future supposes that the future is something that
will happen, not something over which you may have some control. In the case of the
Jews, there is a prohibition to look into these matters, but as Benjamin points out, this
does not mean their time is neither homogeneous nor empty because “for every second of
time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter .” 112 However, this also
renders the Jews as a passive subject. It is only by secularizing messianic time that this
changes. Herein lies the theoretical and political necessity of Jewish messianism in
Benjamin. The secularization of soothsaying changes nothing theoretically or politically
in their underlying assumption. However, the secularization of Jewish time creates a
subject that instead of awaiting passively for the Messiah endeavors to bring about the
explosion of Now-time thus creating possibilities with revolutionary potential.
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CHAPTER 3
LACLAU: EMPTY SIGNIFIERS AND HEGEMONY
Post-Marxism
Political Theory, as any other discipline, is an evolving enterprise. However, most of
the interesting developments in the field usually come from perspectives outside the
mainstream discourse of the discipline. As we know from Kuhn, a paradigmatic change in
any discipline occurs when the effects of differing perspectives begin to undermine
established ideas regarding the methods and ideas of a particular field of study. Political
Theory has been a contested terrain of ideas, both paradigmatic and particular, since the
study of politics caught the attention of Western thought. The approach to politics and history
from the theoretical perspective of Walter Benjamin, which I discussed in the first part of the
dissertation, is one of those differing perspectives. The two approaches, by Ernesto Laclau
and Slavoj Zizek, comprising the second part of the dissertation also belong to alternative
approaches to the study of politics. In this chapter I will discuss Ernesto Laclau’ s political
thought as it takes form first through his theory of hegemony as articulated in Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy and then his articulation of this theory through the study of populism in his
latest work On Populist Reason. Before delving into Laclau' s theory some preliminary
comments are due regarding the status of the study of politics, as seeing by the ‘post-Marxist”
approach.
Post-Marxism, as exemplified by Ernesto Laclau, sees the struggle for hegemony in the
political sphere as a recurrent, and defining, feature of politics .
1
The way in which the parties
1
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in this struggle act, the purposes that they have and the ideological articulations in their social
and political discourse are problems the scholar interested in the study of politics must face.
Scholars have approached these issues from a variety of perspectives ranging from the school
of realism to Foucaultian post-structuralism. However, for the post-Marxist approach the
fundamental problem with both political science and political theory is that the conceptions
of the social have been based upon an intelligibility that reduces its distinct moments to the
interiority of closed paradigms. These usually give an account of society as a founding
totality of its partial processes. This approach tries to apprehend the multiformity of the
social through systems of mediation which posit the conception of the social order as an
underlying principle and thus establishes a search for the essence in the social. This
essentialism, it is argued, results in the structuring of the political and the social as a total
cognitive theoretical entity. The problem then posited by ‘ post-Marxism’ is that the latter
epistemological stance fails to understand a fundamental asymmetry in the social. This
asymmetry consists of a growing proliferation of differences, i.e., a surplus of meaning in the
social. This surplus of meaning is what creates social and political practices which closed
paradigms fail to recognize and thus classify them as irregularities within the system,
exceptions, sometimes not worthy of attention insofar as they fall outside the terms of the
model used to explain political phenomena. Thus, ‘post-Marxism’ constitutes itself, mainly
through the work of Laclau, as an approach that recognizes and takes into account this
surplus of meaning. And such recognition understands discursive structures not merely as a
contemplative or cognitive entity but as an articulatory practice which constitutes and
organizes social relations. It is within this theoretical milieu that we locate the work of
Laclau. His theoretical framework is articulated primarily through the deployment of two
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fundamental categories: empty signifies and hegemony. A discussion of these is essential to
asses Laclau’s political theory.
Laclau’s Empty Signifiers
To arrive at an understanding of the empty signifiers, we would benefit by revisiting
the concept of sigmfier through the eyes of Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of modem
linguistics. Saussure viewed language as a system of signs. Each sign is composed of two
aspects; its form, sound or image, that is the sigmfier; and its meaning, the signified. When
we say the word “fish” immediately a concept comes into our mind. After the production of
the noise, i.e. set of sounds, made when we say the word “fish” we experience an immediate
link in our minds. This link is precisely that of the set of sounds with the concept, and this
union is what constitutes the sign. Strictly speaking, the signifier is the set of sounds “fish”,
that initiates the sign process. The sigmfier fish consist of three phonemes, and if we change
any of those phonemes, a different sign is initiated. Language is a system because, for
example, we can construct a chart of phonemes and show how the phonological,
grammatical and lexical components of it are relational. However, for our purposes the most
important characteristic of the phonemes is that they differ.
According to Saussure when we say “fish”, in order for communication to take place
what we have to get across is that we are not saying, “dish” or “wish”. Thus the system at the
level of the signifier is a system of difference. The signified is the concept half of the sign.
There are two interesting things about it. First, that in order to talk about the signified we
have to use signifiers. In order to discuss language you must use language, obviously, but this
means that you cannot get outside the sign. Therefore language is a closed system. Second, it
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is interesting that although the “marriage” between the signifier and the signified is so tight
in our minds, the actual relationship has no essential basis. There are no essential reasons
why the cold-blooded thing that swims should be evoked by the set of sound “fish” and not
an other. Therefore, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is an arbitrary
relation. There is no essential relationship between the set of sounds and the concept they
express. So we have that language is a system of difference with no fixed terms.
Now the question of empty signifiers arises. What is an empty signifier? Simply put
an empty signifier if a signifier without a signified. After the discussion on the sign it seems
to us that the logical conclusion we should arrive at would be that it is not possible to have a
signifier detached from a signified, because the reason of being of the signifiers is to signify
something, and if there is nothing to signify, the signifier will become non-sense. However,
Ernesto Laclau challenges this possibility arguing that there are empty signifiers and that
they accomplish a very important function for the understanding of politics.
Laclau argues that if we can achieve something that is “internal to signification as such” by
subverting the sign, then an empty signifier is possible. The author rejects two possible
answers or objections that will arise immediately. The first possibility is that the signifier is
“equivocal” because it attaches different signifieds to the same signifier, but being equivocal
is not being empty. The second possibility is that the signified cannot be fully fixed to the
signifier, in this case the signifier is not empty but ambiguous. However ambiguity opens the
way to get to the empty signifier. The author tell us that the only possibility for a stream of
sounds being detached from any particular signified while still remaining a signifier is if,
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through the subversion of the sign which the possibility of an empty signifier involves,
something is achieved which is internal to signification as such
.
2
Let us explore the matter of how, by the subversion of the sign “something is
achieved which is internal to signification as such”. We learned from Saussure that language
is both: a closed system and a system of difference. The notion of something closed
presupposes a notion of totality. If there is not a notion of totality we would not be able to
distinguish any system. The possibility of identifying a system comes only through
exclusion. We know of something because it is not something else, because it excludes that
which is not within. In this case that which is excluding something is a system. Thus we
have, as Saussure pointed out, that language is a system of differences. Signification is
possible because of the differentiation that is involved in the process. Now this differentiation
is systemic, it is differentiation within a system. And we can acknowledge the system
because of that which it excludes. Thus, exclusion presupposes a boundary, that which is
excluded is beyond the boundaries of the system, i.e., beyond its limits. Here a paradox
arises: “[w]hat constitutes the condition of possibility of a signifying system -its limits- is
also what constitutes its condition of impossibility- a blockage of the continuous expansion
of the process of signification.”
According to Laclau this logic of exclusion has some necessary effects and these
effects are what make empty signifiers possible and necessary for a non-essentialist
understanding of politics. Let us examine the effects of the logic of exclusion.
According to Laclau the first effect of this exclusionary logic is that the basis or ground of
the system is a negative ground. Therefore no system can have a positive ground and that
2
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which signifies the system as such is negativity: It is only in so far as there is a radical
impossibility of a system as pure presence, beyond all exclusions, that actual systems (in the
plural) can exist. Now, if the systematicity of the system is a direct result of the exclusionary
limit, it is only that exclusion that grounds the system as such. This point is essential because
it results from it that the system cannot signify itself in terms of any positive signified.
But a system constituted through radical exclusion interrupts this play of the differential
logic: what is excluded from the system, far from being something positive, is the simple
principle of positivity- pure being. This already announces the possibility of an empty
signifier- that is a signifier of the pure cancellation of all difference
.
4
Thus, that which is beyond the limits of the system is negativity in reference to the
system. Actually, it has to be something that threatens the system. For the system to be
signified as such it has to be signified by negativity because positive signification would blur
the limits of the system and then there will be no differentiation at all. Moreover, positive
signification would cancel the possibility of the system since if there is no differentiation the
constitution of a systemic identity would not be possible at all. But then if what is excluded,
that which threatens the system is pure negativity, the system itself will be pure positivity.
Thus, how is it possible that a system, which is a system of difference (and difference is
constituted by negativity by the process of negating or rejecting something that is not ‘you”,
i.e., by constituting the identity of X establishing the difference with Y, being Y something
that negates X), how is it possible that this system can be pure positivity-pure being? The
answer Laclau give us is that differences within the system, since the system is closed, cancel
themselves by a relation of equivalence.
4
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However, this logic of equivalence is not something that results in unmediated form.
By this I mean that just the mere presence of differences within a system does not mean that
these differences are going to disappear. The logic of equivalence works when there is
something common that is underlying those differences. For instance, let us say that in the
one hand we have a system and that in the other hand we have certain number of struggles.
Each of these struggles has its own dynamic. Thus, there is no necessary relation between
one struggle and another. How does the logic of equivalence work in this hypothetical
situation? Let me address this question briefly.
Each struggle, being fought against the system, can be understood as a differential
logic. This means that the struggle is being held against the system because of a differential
relation. What we have here is that the system is in some way negating the subjects that
constitute the struggle (if there is no negation, then there would be no struggle at all, since
that would mean that the system is satisfying the demands of the struggling part). However,
the negation from the system to one particular struggle has no necessary relation with the
negation towards some other struggle. Thus that which is common to all the struggles, that
which is underlying all struggles is their opposition to the system. The equivalential relation
arises and the differences cancel one another as long as they are used to expose that
commonality, that which is identical, i.e., the opposition to the system. Now, the fact that the
underlying commonality is something negative and not positive might appear dubious. Why
the underlying commonality cannot be something positive? Because if it would be a positive
thing it could be expressed in a direct way and thus it would not required an equivalential
relation. However, it must be clear that a relation of total equivalence is not possible, neither
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is possible a relation of absolute differentiation. It is in this terrain of impossibility that
discursive articulations takes place.
Now, let us move to the question of the empty signifier, having in mind that the role
of the logic of equivalence is to produce effects of totality which are capable of constructing
limits, in this case to the system in question.
Here we have that the empty signifier is that which points to the presence of the limits
of the system. The empty signifier is not attached to any signified because the process of
signification is not contained in a logic of difference but what is trying to be signified is the
radical exclusion, the condition of possibility of the system. In other words what we have is
the subversion of the process of signification. Why? Because the process of signification
requires that the constitution of the sign is done by differentiation from another sign and what
Laclau is trying to signify is neither difference nor is inscribed in the logic of difference, but
is the condition of difference itself. As he argues in Emancipations):
Two points have to be stressed here. The first is that the being or systematicy of the
system which is represented through the empty signifiers is not a being which has not
been actually realized, but one which is constitutively unreachable, for whatever
systemic effects that would exist will be the result, as we have seen, of the unstable
compromise between equivalence and difference. That is, we are faced with a
constitutive lack, with an impossible object which, as in Kant, shows itself through
the impossibility of its adequate representation. . . . there can be empty signifiers
within the field of signification because any system of signification is structured
around an empty place resulting from the impossibility of producing an object which,
none the less, is required by the systematicity of the system .
5
It must be clear then that the category of empty signifier implies that what is going to
constitute at certain moment, or better said what is going to take the function ol an empty
5 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s), 38-39.
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signifier is going to present itself as a representation of an absence. This is, that is going to
try to till a “Lack" (in the Lacanian sense ).
6
It is very important to stress two points here regarding what we can call the
function of the empty signifier. The first is that of re-presentation, the second is that of
“filling" a Lack. It is here in these two ‘functions’ or aspects of the empty signifier that the
relevance of hegemony becomes clear. The attempt to fill the absence, that is the lack, is an
attempt to hegemonize. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy;, Laclau presents an important
distinction between the concept of “element’ and the concept of “moment”. An element is
“any difference that is not discursively articulated” and moments are “the differential
positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse .”7 Thus, one of the conditions
for hegemony is a process by which an element becomes a moment, i.e. a differential
position is discursively articulated. However this is a condition and does not constitute a
hegemonic articulation by itself. The fact that an element becomes a moment is not sufficient
for a hegemonic relation. But let us be more specific here in order to clarify this logic.
b As we learned from Lacan, this Lack is originary. Let’s clarify the matter before we move on.
Human experience is drawn by Lacan in three orders: the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. The Symbolic
,
the order of representation, of social convention, of language represents and structures the two others. The
Real is the preverbal reality of the subject, characterized by a series of desired objects not clearly distinguished
from the self, and not fully understood as other, for example, mother’s breast, gaze, voice etc. The Imaginary is
the order of experience characterized by identity and duality, by the apprehension of the identity between the
self and the other, of one’s self as other in the initial phase of the mirror stage, where the child sees for the first
time his own reflection in a mirror. However, the mirror stage becomes as well the entry of the subject into the
Symbolic order as he learns to identify himself as the “you” spoken by the Other, his “I” being determined by
the Other.
The Symbolic order is characterized by opposition, each word in a language deriving its signification
from not being what the others are (here Lacan follows Saussure). Thus the subject “I” must similarly
distinguish itself with relation to the other “you” and is thus simultaneously opposed to and subjugated by the
other. We have that the subject is the effect of certain structure present in the social order that precedes him. It
is through language that the relations of this social order are constituted.
For Lacan the subject is obligated by the law of the father to renounce to the enjoyment of the Thing.
The Thing is a concept that remits us to the pure Real, it is previous of all symbolization. It is an absolute
mythical object lost for ever and we only have imaginary representations of it. Thus, this Lack is originary.
7
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First, let us assume that we have a polarization of the political space. Let’s say that on
the one hand we have the system and on the other hand we have a set of signifiers, for
instance, struggles against the system
8
. Here the notion of the Lack emerges. When an
element becomes a moment and also presents itself as a sutured totality, then we have a
hegemonic relation. However, we must have present in our minds that when an element has
been able to present itself as a sutured totality, as filling the Lack and has acquired
hegemony, that element has suffered a split in order to fill that Lack. This is so because of the
following: an element has what we can call an individual meaning, that is, it has a
particularity. The split comes when that element has acquired a ‘universal signification’. It
assumes the role of universal signification because it is presenting itself as “carrier” of all the
interests (or better said of a majority of the interests) of the movements involved in social
struggles. It is a split because the element would still retain some of its individual meaning,
some of its particularity. Paradoxically, perhaps, through hegemonization, the element begins
to lose this particularity, it start to become empty insofar as it is trying to become universal
and thus to signify the equivalence among the other signifiers. Here the issue of
representation arises.
Laclau points out that “it is the essence of the process of representation that the
representative has to contribute to the identity of the represented.”
4
Thus, in this contribution,
if the representation is one of universality, we have the paradoxical situation in which in
order to represent a totality, that element which is acting as representative has to give up
some of its particular identity. Therefore, the more the representative has to renounce to its
8Here the next step is the introduction by Laclau of the Lacanian notion of the Lack. In this point my tendency
is to think that the structural incompleteness that this notion of the Lack carries is something required by the
terms of the theory. In other words I do not see how this Lack is logically deduced from the terms of the theory.
9
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particular identity in order to represent a larger more universal totality, the emptier it
becomes. This process of emptiness takes place when an extension in the chain of
equivalence occurs. What happens is that we have a progressive emergence of other
signifiers which can, for example, constitute new demands or new interests that are not being
represented by that which is “filling the lack'’. Thus, we can see that there is a paradoxical
move: on the one hand it tries to fill the lack and assume a universal function, on the other
hand, by filling this ‘absence’, this ‘emptiness’, it becomes empty itself. We can see that the
movement from particularism to umversalism is on the one hand necessary for a hegemonic
operation, but on the other hand is constitutively inadequate precisely because of the
inadequacy of the particular of presenting itself as the “incarnation” of the universal.
Nevertheless, this inadequacy is precisely what “guarantees” (if such thing is possible) that
“no empire lasts forever”. The inadequacy of the particular to present itself as the universal
means that the possibility of other particularity presenting itself as the universal is always
open, thus contestation is always ongoing and the battle for this representation is a battle to
hegemonize. 10 Laclau tell us that the universal is incommensurable with the particular, but
cannot, however, exist without the latter. How is this relation possible? My answer is that this
paradox cannot be solved, but that its non-solution is the very precondition of democracy.
The solution of the paradox would imply that a particular body had been found, which would
be the true body of the universal. But in that case, the universal would have found its
necessary location, and democracy would be impossible. If democracy is possible, it is
10 The problem, as we will see later in the discussion of populism, is that Laclau considers this as something
intrinsically democratic regardless of the political content of this battle.
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because the universal has no necessary content; different groups, instead, compete between
themselves to temporarily give to their particularisms a function of universal representation".
Nevertheless, the transformation by which elements become moments is never complete.
The status of the elements is that of a floating signifier", incapable of being wholly
articulated to a discursive chain’" 3 the field of hegemony is then “that of articulatory
practices, that is a field where the ‘elements’ have to crystallized into ‘moments’.” 14
Populism
Laclau stipulates in the opening sentences of his latest work that the main issue his
theoretical approach is concerned with is the formation of collective political identities. 15
Populism is the coda for Laclau' s approach to collective identity, contrary to the usual
referents to the phenomena of populism that either ascribe to it a pejorative character and
considers it a rigid concept to describe mass behavior or dismiss it as an anti-democratic
phenomena, plagued by fascist tendencies. If Laclau takes populism seriously within the
field of political theory, it is because he thinks that “in the dismissal of populism far more is
involved than the relegation of the peripheral set of phenomena to the margin of social
explanation. What is involved in such a disdainful rejection is ... the dismissal of politics
"Laclau, Emancipation(s), 35
12
It is important to point out that a floating signifier is not the same as an empty signifier. A floating signifier is
a signifier that either an underdetermination or an overdetermination of signifieds prevents it from being fully
fixed. We can have the situation of ,for example, two discursive chains trying to signify one signifier for their
respective discursive articulations, whatever these are.
"Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 113.
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tout court.”'
6
Moreover, rather than descriptive or normative forms defining or describing
populism clearly and concisely, for Laclau populism “has no referential unity because it is
ascribed not to a delimitable phenomena but to a social logic whose effects cut across many
phenomena.’' Hence, one can say that following this description populism is for Laclau a
monad full of ambiguous and contingent signification. And populism as a monad is “quite
simple, a way of constructing the political .” 17
Populism as a way of constructing the political becomes a social logic rather than an
specific political phenomena. For Laclau however every attempt to define populism has
suffered from a fundamental impasse. The definitions of populism have either lacked
descriptive features which are present in populist phenomena, or present normative features
that are absent from actual populist phenomena. Laclau sees this deadlock as intrinsic to
political theory and not only present in the struggle of populism. According to Laclau “the
impasse that Political Theory experiences in relation to populism is far from accidental, for it
is rooted in the limitation of the ontological tools currently available to political analysis;
../populism’, as the locus of a theoretical stumbling block, reflects some of the limits
inherent in the ways in which Political Theory has approached the question of how social
18
agents ‘totalize’ the ensemble of their political experience.”
Laclau begins his attempt to provide a different approach to the study of politics (via
populism) by assuming that the vagueness “of populist discourses” is a consequence of social
reality and thus this characteristic deems populism a “performative act
.’’
19
Another important
characteristic that has been used to degrade the populist discourse is to criticize it as a
16
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simplistic discourse because it replaces a complex set ot differences and determinations by a
starck dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise.” According to Laclau. this is
the “very condition of political action.”20 The logic of simplification is understood by Laclau
as “a necessary ingredient of politics tout court,”21
If populism serves Laclau as a political phenomenon that exemplifies (sometimes it
actually is) the necessary logic of the political it does so because of the necessity of Laclau’s
theory of hegemony. The problem here as we shall see later is that in order for something to
become political it must adhere to the theoretical logic rather than the other way around. Let
us see how it is that populism conforms according to Laclau to his theoretical framework for
explaining social and political phenomena. Laclau sees classes as a “democratic demand”
any demand made by a group which is related to a single issue (health, housing, pay, etc.).
So long as a demand does not enter into an equivalential relation to other demands it is a
“democratic” one. As soon as a demand enters into a relation with other demands and this
relation is articulated through the logic of equivalence, such demands are called “popular
demands” by Laclau. Hence, the articulation of populism takes place when three
preconditions are met: “(1) the formation of an internal antagonistic frontier separating the
‘people' from power; and (2) an equivalential articulation of demands making the emergence
of the ‘people’ possible” and finally “the unification of the various demands—whose
equivalence, up to that point, had not gone beyond a feeling of vague solidarity—into a
stable system of signification.”'"
20 As we will see at the end of the chapter, this is Laclau’s own signification of the political; for it is necessary
to his political theory of hegemony.
21
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The first condition for the constitution of populism thus takes place when a
democratic demand is not satisfied by the demanded and it moves to a more comprehensive
series of frustrated demands. If an equivalential relation is constituted throughout this series,
then we have according to Laclau, popular demands. Another condition for populism is
that there has to be a radical break within the social theory. That is to say the ‘people’ of
populism must be positioned antagonistically within the social order. If there is no
antagonism then the demands can be to some degree absorbed by the system. In most cases
such system is the state. It is important to notice that for Laclau it is not sufficient that the
equivalential relation between “democratic” demands take place in order to form “popular”
demands. What is absolutely necessary is the equivalential link becomes popular identity as
such. For Laclau “it is only that moment of crystallization that constitutes the ‘people’ of
populism.”"' There is a delicate balance that has to be achieved in this procedure. The
delicacy is related to what we can call a proportional relation between the equivalence among
democratic demands and the strength of the equivalential link that sustains the constitution of
the ‘people’ as such. The stronger is the identity of the equivalential link, that is of the
‘people’ as such, the weaker becomes the ‘democratic’ demands. The possibility of
hegemony depends on the balance achieved by this relation, because “there is no hegemony
without constructing a popular identity out of a plurality of democratic demands .”
24
Nevertheless, the constitution of a popular identity is split from the beginning. This is so
given the role popular identity has to play. Identity as such is a particular demand but in
order to achieve an equivalential link is has to signify a variety of demands. That is, it has to
achieve universality within the discourse in which such identity is inscribed. Laclau' s theory
23
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of hegemony and the constitution of the political are essentially parasitic or, at least, the
relations that take place in the formation of hegemony are. If a particular demand that cannot
be absorbed by the demanded power wants to go further is has to enter into equivalential
relations with other demands in the same situation. Entering such relation implies that there
is something lost in the force of the particular demand, since it has to become more flexible
to be integrated into a larger agenda. So while it looses force, it stays alive as a demand.
That demand which became the equivalential link as such, that is became representative of
the whole series of the demands, feeds off the strength of these demands, but in order to do
so it has to become universal and in doing so it looses strength in itself. In short, “popular
identity becomes increasingly full from an extensional point of view, for it represents an even
larger chain of demands; but it becomes intentionally poorer, for it has to dispossess itself of
particularistic contents in order to embrace social demands which are quite heterogeneous .”25
The operation by which the crystallization of the equivalential chain takes place through the
universalization of the demand which becomes hegemonic in the process of signification is
only possible insofar as the ‘content’ or signified of the hegemonic signifier is ‘empty’.
The hegemonic operation by which the signifier taking the role of representative of
the ‘popular’ is grounded in “the performative dimension of naming.” As we discussed
earlier the hegemonic operation involves the performance of an ‘empty signifier.’ Naming is
the central function of the ‘empty signifier’ in the hegemonic operation. But naming in
Laclau’s theory is the performance of a structure without content. This is why naming is the
operation of the ‘empty signifier’, because the signifier is not going to express any content
that preceded its hegemonic operation. The operation of naming functions here as the
25
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famous point the caption for Lacan. It is a quilting moment. Since the logic of ‘empty
signifiers achieves something that is internal to signification, this means that the operation of
naming is in essence the signification of a void. Thus, Laclau asks “what form does the
representative of emptiness take?... The totalization of the popular camp—the discursive
crystallization of a moment of fullness/emptiness—can take place only if a partial content
takes up the representation of a universality with which is incommensurable .”27 In this
operation, “the unity of the equivalential ensemble, of the irreducibly new collective will in
which particular equivalences crystallize, depends entirely on the social productivity of a
name. That productivity derives exclusively from the operation of the name as a pure
signifier—that is to say, not expressing any conceptual unity that precedes it ...”28
Now, it is important to notice that the theoretical articulation of Laclau’ s theory of
hegemony and its concomitant notion of populism have relied so far in a very polarized and
simplistic language. That is, when Laclau talks about ‘democratic demands’ he assumes that
there is no antagonism between demands in order to enter into an equivalential relation.
Politically speaking this is seldom the case. Laclau tries to deal with this issue, for he is not
unaware of it. However, another assumption he makes is that the system in front of which the
equivalential chain is formed is completely stable, unchanging and in complete antagonistic
relation to the chain of equivalence. That is, the regime these demands are confronting is
assumed to be completely oppressive. This is also rarely the case in contemporary politics.
Laclau responds to this objection that ‘empty signifies’ is a theoretical device which helps
distinguish analytically extreme relations. Actual hegemonic articulations occur by the
crystallization of what he calls ‘floating signifiers’. The difference between these two
21
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categories is structural. For Laclau, the first [empty signifiers] concerns the construction of
a popular identity once the presence of a stable frontier [an oppressive regime] is taken for
granted; the second [floating signifier] tries conceptually to apprehend the logic of
displacement of that frontier. In practice, however, the distance between the two is not that
great. Neither situation is possible, that is complete emptiness nor permanent
displacement. They are to be conceived as “partial dimensions—and so as analytically
distinguishable—in any process of hegemonic construction of the ‘people’.”
The second problem facing Laclau’ s theory is that his logic of equivalence
presupposes that the particularity of the democratic demands, because of their opposition to a
system, do not have conflicting interests among themselves. However, Laclau does try to
solve this issue although less radically. That is to say, rather than assuming antagonism
among the democratic demands in the chain of equivalences, he chooses to deal with this
theoretical problem presenting a situation where “a demand cannot be incorporated into the
equivalential chain because it clashes with the particularistic aims of demands which area
already links in that chain.” In this case, the situation presented by such a demand implies
that since it is antagonistic to the system of power and it also is antagonistic to the chain of
equivalence, such demand lacks a common space. Laclau exemplifies this situation by
recalling Hegel’s philosophy of history. The demand “is the presence of the ‘peoples without
history,’ entirely outside historicity” in Hegel's schema .
31
The radicality of this type of
demand means that “the break involved in this kind of exclusion is more radical than the one
that is inherent in the antagonistic one, while antagonism presupposes some sort of discursive
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inscription, the kind of outside that I am now discussing presupposes exteriority not just to
something within space of representation, but to the space of representation as such. I will
call this type of exteriority social heterogeneity .” 32 For Laclau this exteriority in Marx is
represented by the lumpenproletariat. According to Laclau, this is impossible to be
represented dialectically because it falls outside difference
.
33
For Laclau the theoretical framework that the theory of hegemony establishes has
important implications for the categories of Political Theory as such. The two categories
Laclau sees affected in the discourse of Political Theory are representation and democracy.
Laclau understands the issue of representation under democratic conditions as a process that
involves a transit going both ways: from represented to representative and from
representative to represented. The nature of representation tries to achieve transparency from
the will of the represented to the representative but it never does so successfully. This is not
a historical contingent feature of the representative but inscribed in the very nature of the
process. According to Laclau one could argue that although representation is always a two
way process, it is in the movement from represented to representative that one finds the
highest degree of democracy. For Laclau “this argument, however, does not take into
account the nature of the will to the represented .”
34
There are cases where the will of the
represented is constituted through the very process of representation and thus the will does
not precede the process. In such case, rather than transmitting a will, the representative
provides “a point of identification which constitute as historical actors, the sectors that he is
32
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addressing.” ' This case is what Laclau considers crucial to any discussion of
representation. When the will is constituted by the very process of representation it means
that the identity of those represented is weak and that it becomes fortified rather than
expressed through representation. The most serious implication of this view is that the will
of the represented (in this case, the will of the ‘people') is constituted by the very process of
re presentation and since Laclau considers the second formula of representation crucial (from
representative to represented) that will, will depend much more on the leader or
representative than on those represented. It is clear that what Laclau does is to inscribe the
process of representation within the logic of hegemony as seen in the formation of ‘empty
signifiers,’ their equivalential force in the emergence of a ‘people’. Drawing the practically
identical process involved in both issues (that of hegemony and that of representation) Laclau
asserts:
The constitution of a ‘people’ requires an internal complexity which is given by the
plurality of the demands that form the equivalential chain. This is the dimension of
radical heterogeneity, because nothing in those demands, individually considered,
announces a ‘manifest destiny’ by which they should tend to coalesce into a kind of
unity—nothing in them anticipates that they should constitute a chain. This is what
makes the homogenizing moment of the empty signifier necessary. Without this
moment, there would be no equivalential chain, so the homogenizing function of the
empty signifiers constitutes the chain and, at the same time, represents it. But this
double function is no other than the two sides of the representative process that we
have detected. The conclusion is clear: any popular identity has an inner structure
36
which is essentially representative.'
Thus, according to Laclau, the significance this has for political theory lies in the fact
that most theorists “conceive the will of the ‘people’ as something that was constituted before
representation .”
37 Various important political theories suffer from this illusion. Laclau
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argues that this is what happened with the aggregative model of democracy (Schumpetter,
Downs) which reduced the 'people' to a pluralism of interest and values; and with the
deliberative model (Rawls, Habermas) which found in either justice as fairness or in
dialogxal procedures the basis for a rational consensus wTich eliminated all opacity from the
representation process ."
38 More importantly, Laclau’s model is not an instance of Political
Theory giving an account of populism. While populism is “the terrain of a primary
undecidability between the hegemonic function of the empty signifier and the equivalence of
particularistic demands" the theory as such achieves a level of generality applicable to any
political theory. This is so because Laclau believes populism to be “a paradigmatic case,
because it is the one which reveals representation for what it is: the primary terrain of
constitution of social objectivity .”39 Laclau discusses his theory’s repercussion for
democracy through Claude Lefort. This wall render Laclau’s notion of democracy
problematic. Let us see how it is that hegemony and representation affect democracy.
According to Lefort, the emergence of modem democracy has its roots in the
transformation of the symbol of the king as the depository of political pow'er to the
destabilization of that imaginary. Once the symbolic imaginary of the king as a locus of
power is questioned, then “the locus of power becomes an empty place .”40 As a result of
this displacement, there is an opening of the political field which is subject to historical
contingency in the exercise of power. Nevertheless, in order to retain the stability of society,
this “phenomenon implies an institutionalization of conflict ."
41
For Lefort, the most
important point is that “democracy is institutionalized and sustained by the dissolution of the
38
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markers certainty thus inaugurating "a history in which people experience a fundamental
indeterminacy as to the basis of power, law and knowledge, and so as to the basis of relations
between self and other, at every level of social life .”42 As Laclau sees it, the problem with
Lefort's view is that once the displacement of power occurs, which is both the result and the
basis for democracy, there is a strong possibility for totalitarianism to emerge. For Laclau,
this dispersion and its rearticulation do not necessarily entail the emergence of
totalitarianism. As we have seen Laclau sees the articulation of populism as open to different
hegemonic articulations one of which he argues is democracy. For Laclau, “the construction
of a chain of equivalences out of a dispersion, of fragmented demands, and their unification
around popular positions operating as empty signifiers, is not totalitarian but the very
condition for the construction of a collective will, in many cases, can be profoundly
democratic .”43 The main problem Laclau has with Lefort’s notion of democracy is that there
is no distinction between the principle of democracy as power in the hands of the people and
the symbolic framework within which such notion takes place. This is due to the fact that
Lefort only has liberal regimes in mind and therefore obfuscates the distinction between
liberalism and democracy. To clarify this gap Laclau reaches to the work of Chantal Mouffe
(no surprise there!). Rather than (as Lefort does) identifying with an empty place of power
resulting from the displacement of the king, Mouffe distinguishes between the regime and the
symbolic framework. For Mouffe, on the one hand we have “democracy as a form of rule,
that is, the principle of sovereignty of the people; and on the other side, the symbolic
framework within which this democratic rule is exercised .”
44
This symbolic space is open
for both Laclau and Mouffe. Democratic societies “would have symbolic limits to determine
42
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who can occupy the place of power .”45 What Laclau, Mouffe, and Lefort miss is that if it
were only for symbolic limits the problem would be one of mere discourse and imagination.
What they never mention or consider is the structural limits to the achievement of power. It
is here where democratic struggle truly lies. The linguistic and rhetorical approach Laclau
gives to political theory is, despite his actual ‘examples,’ a-historical. There are always
contingencies to the possibilities of political conflict and historical formation. But many of
these contingencies are structured within a particular distribution of resources and
institutional arrangements. This is the point that Laclau and Mouffe have always missed.
Laclau thrives on the fact that the articulation of liberalism and democracy is not historically
necessary but contingent. This is entirely true. From this fact he correctly deduces that
“other contingent articulations are also possible, so that there are forms of democracy outside
the liberal symbolic framework .”46 This is certainly also true, however, from this Laclau
points that “the problem of democracy, seen in its true universality, becomes than of the
plurality of frameworks which make the emergence of a ‘people’ possible .”47 Here is where
Laclau fails since by positing through the theory of hegemony the problem of articulation as
an issue of identity Laclau dismisses issues of structural inequalities, institutional obstacles,
economic and political disadvantages. All which are the issues that actually frame the
possibilities of democracy and which, at the same time, are the targets of democratic
upheavals. Another problem that Laclau’ s notion of democracy presents is that since he
understands the discursive emergence of the people through the logic of equivalence, then
any group hegemonizing the chain of equivalence will be deem democratic. This is the result
of his own theory of signification which lacks any political content and is only informed by a
45
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linguistic and theoretical formalism. He believes that his Gramscian theory of hegemony is
profoundly democratic because it involves launching new collective subjects into the
historical arena.”
48
Under this empty and formalistic rubric, if a large group of the KKK
were to achieve hegemony over a political struggle within the southern states thus
constituting themselves as a “new collective subject” this is somehow democratic. But what
is most baffling here is that Laclau invokes Mouffe’ s criticism of Rawls and Habermas’
theories. According to Mouffe, the main problem with these two contemporary theories is
that their failure “to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating
with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural
rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases, they are
abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices
that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very
question of what are the conditions of existence of a democratic subject.”49 This is
absolutely true, but it is also Laclau’ s and Mouffe’ s failure. The difference is that rather than
a rationalistic approach theirs is purely formalistic. Seldom if ever have they considered the
actual material conditions of existence of any subject. On the contrary, Laclau and Mouffe'
s
approach is predicated on the exclusion of any discussion of the social economic or political
content of the phenomena directly explored, i.e. populism and democracy. One of the few
‘case studies’ Laclau refers to is that of France in the 1880s and the rise of General
Boulanger. What is interesting in Laclau’s discussion of his case is that it is not a discussion
at all of “the conditions of existence of a democratic subject” as he and Mouffe supposedly
advocate. His approach stays on the level of generality for this is the only level in which his
48
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theory can account for anything. Laclau’s approach to the historical consists of sketching
"out the main events.” Thus, Boulanger “was a brilliant officer with a clear republican
orientation... He became War Minister 1886, and both his army reforms and his republican
image soon gave him immense popularity... He won a series of landslide electoral victories
which culminated on 27 January 1889 when, after a resounding electoral triumph, the
multitude demanded that he marched on the Elysse and seize power.” Although having the
support, Boulanger did not take the opportunity and the government took him to court.
Finally, “he escaped to Brussels and for two years went between Belgium and London before
committing suicide in 1891.” 50 Now, where are the conditions of existence here? Where is
the political equivalent of the subject who is outside of history and whom constitutes the
whole paradigmatic universe of democratic subjectivity? These are nowhere to be found, not
because a lack of historical knowledge from the part of Laclau, but because it is a necessity
of his theoretical framework to leave these issues at the level of generality. Once this has
been established the move is imminent: “many aspects of Boulanger’s episode are important
for our theoretical purposes. First, the heterogeneity and marginality vis a vis the established
system of forces which supported him... Secondly, Boulanger’s support was concentrated
mainly in the urban centers... [cutting] across most social strata... Thirdly, the idea of
extraparlamentary intervention... Fourthly, the only thing that kept all these heterogeneous
forces together was a common devotion to Boulanger and his undeniable charisma.”
51 And
these four characteristics of course “reproduce, almost point by point, the defining
dimensions of populism which we have established in the theoretical part of this book.
~ As
we can see from this example, and from all of our discussion regarding Laclau’s theory, for
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the political to take place there always has to be some kind of hegemonic operation. This
misses the whole point of particularity. In order to see the structural conditions and
possibilities from the vantage of every day life there is no necessity of hegemony to take
place. The constitutive character of excluded subjects and their dialectical relation to the
constitution of society cannot be apprehended by Laclau’s theory. Since his refusal of
dialectic and its substitution with hegemony erases the possibility of apprehension outside its
theoretical framework. This is the result of trying to apply his theory to any social context
rather than thinking from the political situations to its theoretical implication.
110
CHAPTER 4
ON SLAVOJ ZIZEK AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH TO
POLITICS
For the last sixty years or so, political theory has been influenced by
psychoanalytic theory. Both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory have shed
light on a number of directions within the field of political theory. Flowever, as any
other great intellectual tradition, its effects vary from time to time as well as from
space to space. Debates arise everywhere and they depend on which part of the
theory’s body the “speaker" (be it a political theorist, a literary critic, etc) emphasizes.
In recent European and North American social theory, the tendency has been to
emphasize the affinities of Lacanian theory with the general field of “post-
structuralism”, specifically with deconstruction. Slavoj Zizek, whose perspective on
the political is the focus of this chapter, has produced a variety of provocative and
original work using Lacanian psychoanalysis as his theoretical tool for the
understanding of many political phenomena. For instance Zizek’s conception of
nationalism as the eruption of enjoyment in the social field puts into work
psychoanalytic theory for the understanding of politics. I find Zizek’s approach very
interesting and innovative because it breaks with traditional understandings of
politics .
1
I want to take a look at Zizek’s main works and how he deploys a
psychoanalytic approach to various contemporary political phenomena.
1
For instance, his principal argument regarding nationalism is that the eruption of ethnic conflicts is
based upon constructions of different “thefts of enjoyment". What we find in his argument is that
difference is always constructed as something negative; for instance, he would argue that the path
which modem racism has followed is one where the racist constructs the other as a thief, one who not
only happens to be threatening my identity, but who also wants to steal my enjoyment.
Ill
It is interesting to note that Zizek's first important work in English, The
Sublime Object of Ideology, was introduced to the Anglo-Saxon world by Ernesto
Laclau. At the time Laclau saw Zizek's work as a contribution to the study of politics
that will further the agenda of post Marxism. As with every other discourse with
which Laclau has had any relation, he was able to frame it only through his own
theoretical agenda. According to Laclau, Zizek’s work belongs to the Slovenian
Lacanian School. He identifies several trades distinguishing the Slovenian Lacaman
School from other approaches to politics. Firstly, he sees Lacan’s notion of point
decapiton as the main ideological operation in the theorization of the political field
and the mechanisms of ideology behind it. Secondly, Laclau identifies the notion of
fantasy as the main conceptual tool around which a theory of the subject emerges in
the political field. Laclau sees that for Zizek the notion of fantasy “becomes an
imaginary scenario concealing the fundamental split of ‘antagonism’ around which
the social field is structured.” Thirdly, the constitution of the ideological field is
achieved through a process of identification. And finally, Laclau understands that the
main operative concept in the Lacanian School is enjoyment; for it “enables us to
understand the logic of exclusion operating in discourses” essentially political . 3
Another important contribution was the School's challenges of classical readings of
Hegel such as the presumed panlogicism or that Hegel’s system of thought “leads to
the abolition of all differences in the final mediation by Reason .”
4
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Drawing points of encounter between Zizek’s and his own, Laclau equalizes
the use of the Lacanian real by Zizek with his own notion of the “constitutive
character ol antagonism .’ 5 Laclau also sees two other important points of
convergence in Zizek s work and his own. One is what Laclau considers to be
Zizek’s main thesis that "the category of the subject cannot be reduced to ‘subject
positions’ since before subjectivation the subject is the subject of a lack .”
6
Besides
sharing this point, Laclau also sees Zizek as standing besides him on the debate
between the descriptivists and the anti-descriptivists. They are anti-descriptivists
insofar as they argue that “the name refers to the object by means of what they call ‘a
primary baptism' in which the name continues to refer to the object even if all the
descriptive features of the object at the time of its baptism have disappeared.” But
then “what is in the object, beyond its descriptive features that constitutes its
identity?” For Laclau, and he quotes Zizek arguing that what one finds “is the
retroactive effect of naming itself: it is the name itself, the signifier, which supports
*7
the identity of the object.” Laclau, following his own agenda, asks what happens if
this signifier is empty? And of course, the answer is that naming is “the discursive
o
construction of the object itself.” We know the rest of the story from chapter three.
But is this how politics operate in Zizek? This chapter will attempt to present a more
complex and politically productive reading of Zizek’s work. Although Zizek began
his entrance to the Anglo-Saxon world with an engagement with Laclau and Mouffe,
5
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determinism by identifying class as the true site of antagonism. It is interesting to note that since 1989
Laclau has become increasingly ontological while Zizek has paid increasing attention to contemporary
political events
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as we shall see, he remained at the end too political for the post-Marxist duo, as their
last encounter shows . 9
Zizek begins The Sublime Object ofIdeology by pointing out the exclusion of
Lacan in contemporary theories of subjectivities particularly those of the political
nature. His initial target is Jurgen Habermas and what bothers Zizek is precisely
Habermas exclusion of Lacan and his substitution with Foucault. Moreover, the
refusal of Habermas to deal with Lacan does not come unaccompanied. According to
Zizek, Habermas ignores not only Lacan but also Althusser. This theoretical
ensemble presents four distinct ethical positions with their collorary notions of the
subject. Firstly, we have Habermas ethical position invoking the idea of an unbroken
communication. This is an ethics of ‘clarity’ where the cardinal point is the
transparency of communication as an ideal of the universal feature of the public
sphere. The resulting subject of Habennasian communicative ethics is one of
transcendental reflection. Secondly, we have Foucault’s presumably as the anti-
Habermas. For Foucault is essentially against the universal ideal of ethics. Zizek
sees Foucault’s position as an “aesthetization of ethics” where the core is that of
“self mastery” of the subject . 10 There are no universal by which to adhere and thus
the subject is all alone in his attempt to harmonize itself with the antagonistic forces
within himself and outside in society. Although the Habennasian and Foucaultian
ethical stances seem to stand against each other, Zizek sees them as “two sides of the
same coin” insofar as they both try to achieve a kind of complete mastery of the
subject. It is Althusser who challenges this possibility tout court. The problem
9
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Althusser poses is that for him the ideal of the possible end of ideology is an
ideological idea par excellence .” 11 But Habermas’ and Foucault’s propositions
present their ethics of the subject as non-ideological while for Althusser the subject is
produced by a structural mechanisms which are producing the effects of subject as
ideological misrecognition .” 12 And as Zizek understands the Althusserian position is
that one must “acknowledges this misrecognition as unavoidable—that is, we must
accept a certain delusion as a condition of our historical activity, of assuming a role as
agents of the historical process .” 13 Zizek calls this perspective and “ethics of
alienation in the symbolic ‘process without subject ’.” 14 However, for Zizek the most
productive theory of subjectivity comes with Lacan. The Lacanian ethic is called by
Zizek an ethics of “separation.” The separation here takes place between the Real
and its symbolization. This separations marks a surplus which is impossible to
integrate in any theory of subjectivity, it is a “kernel resisting symbolic integration
—
dissolution .”
15
Zizek credits Laclau and Mouffe for having identified this logic of the
impossible kernel of the Real and its failed symbolization through the logic of
antagonism. However, contrary to Laclau and Mouffe, who disdain Hegel as unable
to acknowledge the fundamental antagonism of society, Zizek embraces Hegel's
dialectics as the only model that can apprehend the fundamental deadlock of society.
Then, for Zizek Hegel’s dialectics “far from being a story of its progressive
overcoming, dialectics is for Hegel a systematic notation of the failure of all such
attempts
—
‘absolute knowledge’ denotes a subjective position which finally accepts
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‘contradiction’ as an internal condition of every identity .” 16 Thus. Zizek’s approach
is a mediation between Lacaman psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics. Lacanian
psychoanalysis not only recognizes the irreducibility of the plurality of struggles, but
moreover demonstrates “how their articulation into a series of equivalences depends
always on the radical contingency of the social-historical process: it enables us to
grasp this plurality itself as a multitude of responses to the same impossible—real
kernel .”
17
Zizek’s articulation takes from Freud the fact that “the human psychic
apparatus is subordinated to a blind automatism of repetition beyond pleasure
—
seeking, self-preservation accordance between man and his milieu;” and it takes from
Hegel the idea that man is “an animal extorted by an insatiable parasite (logos,
reason, language).” For Zizek then we have to deal with this double exertion to
create a form of life “modus vivendi” in accordance with this human condition. The
attempts to overcome or abolish this condition have always resulted in historical
disaster. The human condition thus is one of antagonism and in the drive of creating
a human subject as a harmonious being, as a “New Man without antagonistic
tension,” humanity not only has denied his condition but it has at the same time open
the path to totalitarianism .
19
Zizek sees the human condition as essentially traumatic. It is traumatic
because of the radical antagonism that inhabits us. On the one hand, there is an
aspiration to achieve a balance with nature. This drive to achieve a balance only
leads to disaster since this aspiration of the return to nature is not only impossible but
16
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more importantly dangerous. This danger lies in the fact that the notion of the
balance with nature presupposes a natural order and the search for this balanced order
takes us to identify the obstacles for this achievement. This search brings all kinds of
exclusions of that which intervenes, which does not belong to the “order of nature;”
to “our” totality. On the other hand, we have the insatiability of our desire. This
insatiability is at the same time confronted with the chaotic differences of our
pleasures. What will characterize the playing out of these conditions in any socio-
historical situation will depend on the symptoms that are revealed or characteristic of
an epoch.
According to Zizek one of these symptoms was invented by Marx. Zizek
reveals a homology between Marx’s interpretative procedure and that of Freud. The
fundamental question Zizek poses is “why work assumed the form of the value of
commodity” instead of other form?” Then using the homology between Freud and
Marx Zizek turns Freud's question to dreams into Marx’s questions of the fetish of
commodity. He states that “the theoretical intelligence of the form of dreams does
not consist in penetrating from the manifest content to its ‘hidden kernel’ to the latent
dream-thoughts; it consists in the answer to the question: why have latent dream-
thoughts assumed such a form, why were they transcoded into the form of a
dream?” Then Zizek extrapolates these questions to the problematic of the work as
the form of the value of a commodity. According to Zizek “the real problem is not to
penetrate to the ‘hidden kernel’ of the commodity—the determination of its value by
the quantity of work consumed in its production—but to explain why work assumed
the form of the value of a commodity, why it can affirm its social character in the
2l)
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commodity form ot its product .”' 1 Zizek introduces the concept of ideology to this
problematic following Alfred Sohn-Rethel. The main contribution Sohn-Rethel made
to the theory of ideology was to point out that individuals in the act of commodity
exchange are not aware of the “social effectivity” of this exchange. They are not
aware of the logic of this action for if they were aware then the act of exchange would
cease. According to Sohn-Rethel “this non-knowledge of the reality is part of its very
essence” so according to Zizek the process is possible only because of the
unawareness of the individuals taking part in the act of exchange. Thus the concept
of ideology is introduced: “ideological is a social reality whose very existence implies
the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence .”22
The result of this notion of ideology is an incompatibility between the
fetishism of commodity and the fetishism of the relation between men. Zizek states
that if a fetishism of commodity occurs then the relations between men are not
fetishized. This is because “what we have here are relations between ‘free’ people,
each following his or her proper egoistic interest.” But, what is the relation here
between freedom and fetishism? It seems that for Zizek this is an inverse relation. At
a first glance, if we think of the classical example of a King’s identity with relation to
his subjects, one could say this is a fetishistic relationship. This would be so because
the subjects assume an identity based on the notion of that the King is already King in
himself, and not because he is constituted as King by his relation to his subjects. So
the property of King is in itself natural, like the ‘natural’ use value a commodity has
in itself which constitutes the fetishism of commodity. Why then is the fetishism of
21
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commodity in a capitalist society incompatible with the fetishism of the relationship
between men? Following Lacan and his theory of the mirror stage, an individual
acquires its identity through the reflection in what it seems another person; and the
fetishistic character will be the effect that X individual constitutes its identity when
reflected on the other (Y) and thereby establishing a difference. This difference is
based on the fetishistic notion that Y is a unity in itself; a unity that is not the same as
X, independent of X relation to him or her. Thus the King is King in itself and not
because his relation to his subjects: “as if the determination of being-a-King where a
‘natural’ property of the person of a King .”23 For Zizek, then the two modes of
fetishism, that of commodity and that of man, are mutually exclusive: “we cannot say
that in societies in which production for the market predominates it is with man as
with commodity. Precisely the opposite is true: commodity fetishism occurs in
capitalist society but in capitalism relations between men are definitely not fetishized.
I believe here Zizek is mistaken. For instance, we may have a situation between the
factory worker and his supervisor in which the worker may see the “superiority” of
his supervisor in a fetishistic manner, and at the same time, have a fetishistic notion
of commodity. Such a situation would not exclude this same subject following an
egoistic interest (an increasing salary, a reduction of responsibilities in his job). As a
free person who entered this relation with his superior in a contra. This would
constitute a fetishized relation between men in a society in which commodity
fetishism reigns. Nonetheless, the logic of ideology, as Zizek understands it, would
not suffer from this distinction.
23
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The relation between the logic of ideology and the emergence of a symptom
takes place to the retroactive construction of meaning. In this sense, the symptom is a
“return of the repressed" since its meaning is constructed retroactively
.
24
What this
implies is that the ‘unity’ or integrity of the subject, rather than being an essence, is
constructed. However, one always needs to think that the Other possesses it (whatever
this ‘it’ may be in any particular case); and that one is just discovering this
“wholeness” an elaborating it as knowledge. What is a stake is here is of course
misrecognition as such. Insofar as Zizek stipulates ‘the symptom' as a retroactive
construction of meaning taking place with the encounter with the return of the
repressed then misrecognition is a fundamental element to both history and truth. To
history insofar as we are always “rewriting history, retroactively giving elements their
symbolic weight by including them in new textures .”25 And to truth insofar as the
‘error’ of misrecognition is part of Truth. This is Zizek’ s Hegelianism at work, since
here “‘truth’ itself becomes true only ... by mediation of--the error .”26 The point of
misrecognition here is to make explicit that rather than the qualities of fullness or
unity one ascribes to the Other, the Other is as split, misrecognized, and symptomatic
as one is. But insofar as misrecognition has the productive effect of achieving truth
through mediation, rather than being a negative o erratic process, it possesses in itself
a positive ontological dimension.
The essential characteristic one thinks the Other possesses, not only functions
as an error of misrecognition but it has a structure of what Zizek calls “the sublime
object of ideology.” Zizek defines the sublime object of ideology as “a positive
24
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material object elevated to the status of the impossible Thing .”27 However, it is not
any object that achieves the status of sublime. This object is the one that precisely
marks the limits of the dialectics of misrecognition because it represents that which
resists integration into the symbolic order. The interesting thing here is that this
which resists symbolic integration is not necessarily an absolute object but rather is
the surplus of any object. This is what Zizek means by the “impossible real kernel,”
that which is in the object more than itself—the surplus of any object X. This is
designated by Lacan as the object petit a. What is politically interesting here is that
for Zizek the inversion of this logic is what produces a fundamental fantasy in the
social order ending always in the exclusion of a political scapegoat. The example par
excellence is the exclusion of ‘the Jew:’
the logic of this inversion producing a surplus could be make clear a propos of
anti-Semitism: at first, ‘Jew’ appears as a signifier connoting a cluster of supposedly
‘effective properties’ (intriguing spirit, greedy for gain, and so on), but this is not yet
anti-Semitism proper. To achieve that, we must invert the relation and say: they are
like that (greedy, intriguing...) because they are Jews... ’Jew’ in ‘because they are
Jews’ does not connote a series of effective properties, it refers to that unattainable X,
to what is ‘in Jew more than Jew’ and what Nazism tried so desperately to seize,
measure, change into a positive property enabling us to identify Jews in an objective-
scientific way . 28
27
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In the latter example the function of 'the Jew' in anti-Semitic ideology
consists in the discursive practice by which “an ideological edifice gains consistency
from organizing its heterogeneous “raw material' into a coherent narrative, the entity
called the Jew is a device enabling us to unify in a single large narrative the
experiences of economic crises, “moral decadence”, and loss of values, political
frustration and national humiliation and so on."~ 9 This operation by which the
“Jew" is seen or perceived as a substantial positive entity and not as the
materialization of a purely, formal, textual operation is precisely a purely formal
inversion. However, there is something else to this formal operation for it to acquire
enough substantiality to be perceived as an individual or as a group of individuals of
flesh and blood. That, which enables us to see it in its substantiality which cannot be
simply deconstructed or hegemonized, is the psychoanalytic notion of enjoyment.
Zizek elaborates this notion through the discussion of nationalism.
If we take a look at his theoretical understanding of the nationalist phenomena
this will also shed light on the notion of politics Zizek posits.
Slavoj Zizek begins his journey towards a psychoanalytic explanation of the
rise of nationalism by pointing out that there is an element which gives a community
cohesion and holds it together. This element cannot be reduced to those values held to
be representative of and distinctive to one’s national identity. Zizek refers to this
element as “a Thing”, as “enjoyment incarnated” and our relationship to this
enjoyment. Thus, when we argue (or at least we think) that our national identity is
29
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being threatened by the Other, what is being threatened is “the Nation qua Thing .”30
But what is precisely that Thing? What constitutes the “Thing”? How can we
recognize it? Where is it present? Where is not? Zizek tell us that “if we are asked
how can we recognize the presence of this Thing, the only consistent answer is that
the Thing is present in that elusive entity called “our way of life.” All we can do is
enumerate disconnected fragments of the way our community organizes its feasts, its
rituals of mating, its initiation ceremonies, in short, all the details by which it is made
visible-the unique way a community organizes its enjoyment.”31
However, for Zizek the Thing cannot be reduced to that set of practices that
constitute our way of life, to that embodiment of our enjoyment. The belief in the
Thing “has a reflexive structure” which the author compares to that of the Holy spirit
in Christianity. In this reflexive structure there is an act of faith which does not need
confirmation that the Thing is within us (the community of believers). The
mechanism of this reflexivity is very simple although its consequences are extremely
important. Two examples can shed light on the way in which this “reflexive
structure” works. One is used by Zizek in The Sublime Object of Ideology’ and it
regards toilet paper:
Our hypothetical starting point is that there is an abundance of toilet
paper on the market. But suddenly a rumor starts to circulate that there
is a shortage of toilet paper- because of this rumor, people frantically
begin to buy it, and of course the result is that there is a real shortage
of toilet paper . 32
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Another example can be taken from a real situation that happened in 1989,
when hurricane Hugo passed right through the middle of Puerto Rico. In the island
almost every meal is accompanied by rice. Therefore, rice is always in abundance and
can be bought at any comer store. Nevertheless when the hurricane was announced,
the belief that we were going to mn out of rice emerged. Despite the fact that people
were advised not to overload their closets with rice because of the obvious fact that
there was enough and because if the rice is not used within a few weeks it gets bad,
people started buying ridiculous amounts of rice (among other things) and as a result
the grocery stores actually ran out of rice.
What is most important here for us is that the subject who believes does not
have to exist. The mere believe in her existence is enough to create certain effects. In
other words the person who thinks that we are going to mn out of rice or toilet paper
does not have to exist to create certain effects. Paradoxically in a situation like the
one mentioned above, the right way to proceed is the “irrational” way. One who acts
rationally ends up being the victim of irrationality. For instance, when the hurricane
passed over Puerto Rico and the “rice crisis” emerged I convinced my family that
thinking that we would ran out of rice was ridiculous. If we would buy more than the
usual amount of rice we have always bought by the time that we would have
consumed the first bag of rice the others would be bad and useless. Logically
speaking my argument was impeccable. Ironically, three weeks later I found myself
eating beef stew with bread.
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Thus, the point is that The Thing' is here as long as my belief in the Other’s
belief exists, as long as “it means something to people .”33 What we can see here is
that the Thing seems to be the result of discursive practices; I believe in the others’
belief; it is here as long as it means something to us. It is here where Zizek introduces
again a psychoanalytic approach to his analysis. According to Zizek, in
psychoanalysis;
(t)he pure discursive effect [the discursive practice of believing in the
Thing] does not have enough “substance” to compel the attraction
proper to a Cause [this being the Thing itself, the Nation qua Thing]-
and the Lacanian term for the strange ‘substance’ which must be added
so that a Cause obtains its positive ontological consistency, the only
substance acknowledged by psychoanalysis is ofcourse enjoyment . 34
We can say that there is a nation when we see its enjoyment incarnated in
social practices (festivals, rituals, etc.) and the existence of this nation will last as
long as these practices are transmitted from generation to generation. This enjoyment
is not only a pure discursive construction, but a fact of something that exists . 35
Arguing against a deconstructionist approach to the nation, the author states that “to
emphasize in a ‘deconstructionist’ mode the Nation is not a biological or
33
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transhistorical fact but a contingent discursive construction, an overdetermined result
of textual practices, is thus misleading: such an emphasis overlooks the remainder of
something real, a non-discursive kernel of enjoyment which must be present for the
Nation qua discursive entity-effect to achieve its ontological consistency .”36
Therefore, it is clear that tor Zizek the Nation is not onlv a pure discursive
construction. Nevertheless, this does not means that he is rejecting the discursive
character of the Nation, but that in order to construct a discourse of the Nation there
must be something substantive on which to build the discourse. This substantive thing
for a national discourse to emerge is the Lacanian notion of enjoyment. Therefore, the
nation is the way we articulate and organize through social practices our enjoyment;
and nationalism “thus presents a privilege domain of the eruption of enjoyment into
the social field .”
37
However, we must be clear that for Lacan the subject is obligated by the law
(of the Father) to renounce to the enjoyment of the Thing; the Thing, a concept which
refers to the pure real, is prior to all symbolization. It is an absolute mythical object
lost forever (because of the imaginary castration) and we only have imaginary
representations of it. With the imaginary castration, the enjoyment of the thing, the
originary enjoyment is lost forever. Instead of the ureal” enjoyment of the Thing,
there will be the promise of a phallic enjoyment which depends on the order of
30
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language. Thus enjoyment will be possible only through the symbolic order
.
38 Now
let’s move to see the way in which conflict, in the nationalistic sense, emerges.
The source of conflict is always antagonism and, in the case of nationalism, is
antagonism with the “other”. This “other” is not any “other”, but specifically the one
who threatens the way in which I enjoy my nation. Thus, the problem is that the other
appears to us as a threat to our enjoyment; it appears as trying to steal the enjoyment
of the Thing. However, according to Zizek, here lies a paradox since “our Thing is
conceived as something inaccessible to the other and at the same time threatened by
him .”39
The theory of the "theft of enjoyment” becomes more complex when, as
proposed by Jacques-Alain Miller, the Other is within me and the hatred toward the
other is the hatred of myself:
Why does the Other remain Other? What is the cause for our hatred of
him, for our hatred of him in his very being? It is hatred of the
enjoyment of the Other. This would be the most general formula of the
modem racism we are witnessing today: a hatred of the particular way
the Other enjoys.
. . . The question of tolerance or intolerance is not at
38
Before we move on I want to clarify the Lacanian distinction of the orders of human experience.
Human experience is drawn by Lacan in three orders: the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. The
Symbolic
,
the order of representation, of social convention, of language represents and structures the
two others. The Real is the preverbal reality of the subject, characterized by a series of desire objects
not clearly distinguished from the self, and not fully understood as other, for example, mother’s breast,
gaze, voice, etc. The Imaginary is the order of experience characterized by identity and duality, by the
apprehension of the identity between the self and the other, of one’s self as other in the initial phase of
the mirror stage, where the child sees for the first time his own reflection in a mirror. However, the
mirror stage becomes as well the entry of the subject into the Symbolic order as he learns to identify
himself as the “you” spoken by the Other, his “I” being determined by the Other.
The Symbolic order is characterized by opposition, each word in a language deriving its
signification from not being what the others are (here Lacan follows Saussure). Thus the subject “I”
must similarly distinguish itself with relation to the other “you” and is thus simultaneously opposed to
and subjugated by the other. We have that the subject is the effect of certain structure present in the
social order that precedes him. It is through language that the relations of this social order are
constituted. An excellent discussion on this matter can be found in Nestor Braunstein, Goce, (Mexico:
Siglo XXI, 1990)
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all concerned with the subject of science and its human rights. It is
located on the level of tolerance or intolerance toward the enjoyment
of the Other, the Other as he who essentially steals my own enjoyment.
We know, of course, that the fundamental status of the object is to be
always already snatched away by the Other. It is precisely this theft of
enjoyment that we write down in shorthand as minus Phi, the mathem
of castration. The problem is apparently unsolvable as the Other is the
Other in my interior. The root of racism is thus hatred of my own
enjoyment. There is no other enjoyment but my own. If the Other is in
me, occupying the place of extimacy, then the hatred is also my own .40
Perhaps a good example to illustrate Jacques Alain Miller’s quote would be
the situation Dominicans and Cubans sometimes confront in Puerto Rico. Both
Cubans and Dominicans have been in Puerto Rico for various generations and we still
find the same racist accusations against them over and over. ‘The Dominicans come
here to steal the jobs that belong to us. They have no education, they are stupid and
are willing to do anything for a cheap pay. The Cubans come here to take over the
businesses that we are supposed to have. All they care about is money and nothing
else. They do not know how to speak proper Spanish, you can barely understand
them. If they would not be here, we would be doing much better. My son is
unemployed while those dulls are becoming rich’, etc, etc. The list of accusations
and insults is unbelievable. Needless to say, the prejudice goes the other way around.
Everyone constructs their story narrating how the other does not allow them to
prosper, to ‘live the way we want’. The crucial point is that “we” are not “them”, that
there is a line that separates us.
Thus, the logic of the “theft of enjoyment” is that which the Other has that
threatens us is not in them but within ourselves; is our own inner antagonism. “What
we gain by transposing the perception of inherent inner antagonism into the
40 Quoted in Zizek, Tarrying
,
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fascination with the Other.
. . is the fantasy-organization of desire. The Lacanian
thesis that enjoyment is ultimately always enjoyment of the other, i.e., enjoyment
supposed, imputed to the Other, and that, conversely, the hatred of the Other’s
enjoyment is always the hatred of one’s own enjoyment...” The point here is that we
cannot articulate and organize our enjoyment if there is no Other. We constitute our
enjoyment and recognize its characteristics only when there is something outside that
is opposed to it, but in that same opposition, which constitutes something that we
cannot achieve, we enjoy it because it fascinates us. Thus, according to Zizek, “it is
not sufficient to point out how the racist's Other presents a threat to our identity. We
should rather inverse this proposition: the fascinating image of the Other gives a body
to our own innermost split, to what is "in us more than ourselves’ and thus prevents us
from achieving full identity with ourselves .”41
We derive pleasure by fantasizing about the Other’s enjoyment, but this is an
antagonistic relation within ourselves since we are aware of the inaccessibility of our
enjoyment to the Other, our inaccessibility to the Other’s enjoyment, and the
necessity of our Thing being threatened by the Other (in spite of the paradox of the
inaccessibility of our Thing to them). This inner antagonism prevents us from
achieving full identity with ourselves. In Lacanian terms it prevents us from filling
the Lack. Moreover an achievement of a full identity is impossible. It is impossible
because a full identity or a state of completeness never existed. Indeed, since we have
an impossibility of being in that state of completeness, this also means that the
character of identities is always contingent, i.e., it can never be fully fixed. Moreover,
41
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according to Zizek, there is also the impossibility of the disappearance of both
antagonisms. First, the antagonistic relation of identity and difference by which we
constitute ourselves through a differentiation with the Other; and second, the inner
antagonism which is an ambivalent relationship by which the Other’s enjoyment
fascinates us because in it we represent to ourselves our innermost relationship
toward enjoyment .”42 Then, because of this representation “the hatred of the Other is
the hatred of our own excess of enjoyment .”43 The notion of the impossibility of a
state of completeness comes from the Lacanian concept of the “Lack”. As we know,
this Lack is an originary Lack; a state of completeness never existed, thus it can never
be achieved. What we do is always try to fill that lack, but the paradox is that
whatever signifier tries to fill the lack, it’s going to be inadequate and thus the
impossibility of a full-fledged fixed identity. Here what we should explain is how
Lacan re-read Freud’s Oedipus complex.
In a retrospective theoretical move the subject (re)constructs a state of
“original unity”, a moment in the human condition where we were supposed to be in a
state of fullness. This theoretical move is taken in order to account for something that
is lacking ‘now’ in the subject. It is an attempt to construct a story where we lose our
alleged completeness. It’s a discursive articulation which tries to tell how we lost that
thing which allowed us to be totally happy. However, Lacan teaches us that this
“originary unity” never existed, that what is originary is not the unity, but on the
contrary, what is originary is the Lack. The story goes as follows. In the beginning,
49
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the child (of either sex) is in bliss. There is no distinction between child and
environment and in particular between the child and the source of nourishment, the
bottle or the breast. The world has no categories for the young child: it is not divided.
The sense of self in the child is absolutely synonymous and completely identified
with his or her universe. The self and the others are one. And this at-one-ness is
blissful. This state is called by Lacan 7 imaginaire '. And as the term suggests, this
state is an imaginary one. However this state ends and psychoanalysis provides a
theoretical explanation for the end of it. Lacan calls the event that symbolizes for him
the end of the bliss the mirror phase. He says that at some point the child sees him or
herself in the mirror, and sees that being represented out there in the glass, suddenly,
is the self. With this comes the realization that there is an inside and outside, that T
exist objectively to others; ‘I' am now only another being, and no longer everything.
And at once the plenitude of the imaginaire vanishes; the unitary self that contains
everything is replaced by a sense of separateness from the world. This split is
associated with two things; first with the entry into language and secondly with the
voice of the father. It is language that names the world into existence that creates
categories by which we separate the world. Once the child has acquired language and
realized the multiplicity of things then the original unity is lost. Not only lost: it
becomes unimaginable, because it is outside language. Once we begin to think in
language, we cannot imagine what it is not to have it: it is unspeakable; it is
unconscious. So we have not only lost something wonderful, something important,
but also we do not know, we cannot possibly know, what it is that we have lost.
44
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For Lacan the entry into language, the entry into separateness, that splits up
the world and deprives us for ever of original unity, is a castration, and it is associated
with the father. With the castration the enjoyment of the Thing is lost forever and thus
enjoyment will be only possible through the symbolic order and the field of language.
This is why the process of filling the lack caused by castration is always an ongoinu
process, its fulfillment is like a telos.
Zizek offers us as a “case study”: the Slovene example where the Serbians,
Bosnians etc, are accused of depriving the Slovenes of their enjoyment and vice
versa. The interesting point is the way in which hatred of the other ends up being the
hatred of my own excess of enjoyment:
Slovenes are being deprived of their enjoyment by “Southerners”
because of their proverbial laziness, Balkan corruption, dirty and noisy
enjoyment, and because they demand bottomless economic support,
stealing from the Slovenes their precious accumulation of wealth by
means of which Slovenia should otherwise have already caught up
with Western Europe. The Slovenes, on the other hand, allegedly rob
the Serbs because of Slovenian unnatural diligence, stiffness, and
selfish calculation .
45
The example becomes more interesting when Zizek asserts that the root of both cases
are in the hatred of their respective enjoyment:
in both cases, these fantasies are clearly rooted in hatred of one's own
enjoyment. Slovenes, for example, repress their own enjoyment by means of
obsessional activity, and it is this very enjoyment which returns in the real, in
the figure of the dirty and easy-going “Southerner .”46
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Besides dealing with nationalism, Zizek' s most contemporaneous intervention
on politics have dealt with three specific events: the attacks on the World Trade
Center, the invasion of Iraq, and more recently, the French riots. Regarding the attack
on the Twin Towers, we all remember his initial reaction which later became the title
of his book Welcome to the Desert of the Real (a phrase he took from the movie The
Matrix). The phrase signifies a continuation of Zizek’s use of Lacan’s notion of the
Real: that which resists integration into the symbolic order. According to Zizek, the
twentieth century has been characterized as a historical moment when, as supposed to
nineteenth century attempts to bring utopian projects, the goal has been to achieve
direct access to the Thing. That is the twentieth century has aimed “at directly
realizing the longed/for New Order .’'47 This logic of the Real also has what we could
call a ‘side effect.' On the one hand, these attempts to achieve a direct political
experience can have disastrous consequences for “the Real in its extreme violence” is
“the price to be paid for peeling off the deceptive layers of reality.”48 On the other
hand, we have ‘postmodern’ inversion of the passion for the Real. This postmodern
invention consists of getting at the essence of the thing without confronting its
consequences. The best example of this logic can be found into today’s market where
“we find whole series of products deprived of their malignant properties: coffee
without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol...” etc .
49
This logic also
finds its political expression; an instance of such expression is “the Colin Powell
doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side of course) as warfare without
warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the act of expert administration,
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that is, as politics without politics.”50 The way in which the confrontation of these
two logics have been dealt with in the US has resulted in the ideological manipulation
of the images of disaster, by making reality virtual. The way in which the networks
dealt with the collapse of the Twin Towers as with the coverage of war is exemplary
here, for its purpose is to still mark a distance between ‘Us’ and the Other. As Zizek
points out, almost every single TV drama (such as NYPD Blue or Law and Order
)
nowadays comes with a disclaimer regarding the depiction of violent images and
there unsuitability for children. This warning is also common in news coverage of
catastrophes that have taken place in the Third World. Zizek’ s argument is that this
kind of depiction along with its warning is always about the other and what happens
out there. He points out that in both the coverage of the WTC attack and war
conflicts involving the US one never finds the same kind of images as when the
coverage is of the other. Thus regarding the WTC:
while the number of victims—3,000—is repeated all the time, it is surprising how
little of the actual carnage we see—no dismembered bodies, no blood, no desperate
faces of dying people... in clear contrast to reportings on Third World catastrophes,
where the whole point is to produce a scoop of some gruesome detail: Somalis dying
of hunger, raped Bosnian women, men a their throats cut” and this difference points
to “the distance which separates Us from them, from their reality... the real horror
happens there
,
not here..
5]
What this separation between the postmodern account of the semblance of
reality and attempts to grasp an essence points to is to the supposed “border which
50
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separates the digitalized First World from the Third World ‘desert of the Real’.”52
For Zizek this opposition is as false as the attitude of both Liberals and Conservatives
towards the identification of Islam with terrorism. This falsity has several
consequences. Firstly, they all fail to take into consideration any “explanation which
evokes social circumstances” and dismiss them “as covert justification of terror.”53
Secondly, the disclaimers from Bush to Sharon and every political pundit referring to
Islam as a religion of peace, as “a great spiritual force which cannot be blamed for the
terrorist crimes,” is an ideological gesture par excellence. The reason for this is
because these gestures function as rhetorical devices intent on avoiding “to grasp the
political dynamics which made to the September 1 1 attacks.”54 Samuel Huntintong’s
thesis on the clash of civilizations also errs on the same score as the liberal tolerant
attitude:
are not all real life clashes clearly related to global capitalism? The Muslim
‘fundamentalist' target is not only global capitalism corrosive impact on social
life, but also the corrupt ‘traditionalist’ regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
so on. The most horrifying slaughters (Bosnia and Kosovo, Southern Sudan,
etc.) the shadow of other interest is easily discernible. A proper dose of
‘economic reductionism’ would therefore be appropriate here: “instead of
endless analyses of how Islamic ‘fundamentalist’ is intolerant towards our
Liberal societies, and other clash of civilization topics, we should refocus our
attention on the economic background to the conflict—the clash of economic
interest, and of the geopolitical interest of the United States itself (how to
retain privileged links with Israel and with conservative Arabs regimes like
those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). 55
The hypocrisy of these perspectives is exemplified by the contradiction of US
foreign policy: while claiming as its mission to bring democracy to the oppressed in
Arab countries it has strong ties with “countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, deeply
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conservative monarchies but American economic allies, fully integrated into Western
capitalism.”56
For Zizek September 1 1 constitutes a missed opportunity for the United States
where it could have “realized what kind of the world it was part of”57 And rather
than reasserting “its traditional ideological commitment” they should have seen that
“the only way to ensure that it will not happen here again is to prevent it from
happening anywhere else.”58 This of course does not mean endorsing a global
hegemony of American style liberalism but on the contrary it means refusing the
choice ‘liberalism or terrorism' tout court. For Zizek “the position to adopt is to
accept the necessity of the fight against terrorism, but to redefine and expand its terms
so it that will also include (some) American and other Western power’s acts: the
choice between Bush and Bin Laden is not our choice; they are both ‘Them’ against
Us. The fact that global capitalism is a totality means that it is the dialectical of itself
and of its other, of the forces which resisted it on ‘fundamentalist’ ideological
grounds.”
59
This dialectical perspective is one of Zizek’ s most characteristic features.
On many contemporary political conflicts, he identifies the two usually opposed sides
of a matter and argues for the falsity of these oppositions. At the same time Zizek
always argues that the radical act per se is on where the actual coordinates of the
situation are changed completely. Generally speaking, Zizek sees the current global
political coordinates as follows:
today the populist Right acts, sets the pace, determines the problematic of the
political struggle, and the Liberal center is reduced to a ‘reactive force:’ it
ultimately limits itself to reacting to the populist Right initiative, either
opposing them radically from an impotent leftist posturing, or translating them
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into the acceptable Liberal language (‘while rejecting the populist hatred of
the immigrants, we have to admit they are addressing issues which really
moves people, so we should take care of the problem, introduce tougher
immigration and anticrime measures ...’).60
In other words, the current political horizon comes down to the choice
between Liberalism and Fundamentalism. This choice can disguised itself in other
forms but the bottom lime is that for Zizek this choice is false and must be refused
every time one encounters it. Zizek asks “is the choice today really between Liberal
democracy and fundamentalism, for its derivations (like modernization vs. resistance
to it)? The only way to account for the complexity and the strange twists of today’s
global situation is to insist that the true choice is the one between capitalism and its
Other ...”61 Zizek has argued for a double movement. On the one hand, he has
always advocated the refusal of choice between supposedly antagonistic
confrontations. What he is interested in is the conditions of possibility under which
the struggles take place and that which we take for granted: the very coordinates
themselves. As he has argued a propos the notion of the Real in this sense:
what interests me is not the common foundation for this struggle, but the
central traumatic point or background which sustains the field of struggle...
For example, in today’s politics, I claim the Real would be the function of
depoliticised capitalism, in the sense that you can talk about multiple
identities, coalitions, whatever but this repoliticising of the private sphere is
ft')
paid for in the depoliticising of the sphere of the economy.
The only remedy Zizek sees as having any possibilities against the current
political constellation is an act that would change the very coordinates of the
situations. There are two kinds of political actions involved here. One refers to
60
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particular strategic decisions in every day politics. These actions are usually the
‘reformist’ or ‘accomodationist’ kind. For Zizek the fatal error the Left has
committed consists of assuming this kind of politics as the ultimate horizon of their
political possibilities. These compromises have resulted in the eradication of any
kind of emancipatory possibility. Hence, leftist projects and agendas nowadays look
as follows:
ruthlessly pursuing the path of giving away, of accommodating itself, of
making the 'necessary compromises’ with the declared enemy... by
reconciling opposites, that is, reconciling its own position with that of the
declared opponent: it stands for socialism, but can fully endorse economic
Tatcherism, it sands for science but can fully endorse the rule of the multitude
of opinions; it stands for true popular democracy, but can also play the game
of politics as spectacle and electoral spin; it stands for principled fidelity, but
can be totally pragmatic. ..
63
The other kind of politics, what we can call the sphere of the political proper,
involves a political act whose radicality lies on the leap into the impossible. The truly
political moment for Zizek is the instance in which
the opposition between ‘crazy’ destructive gestures and strategic political
decision momentarily breaks down... The point is not simply that, once we
are thoroughly engaged in a political project, we are ready to put everything at
stake for it, including our lives; but, more importantly, that only such an
'impossible ’ gesture ofpure expenditure can change the very coordinates of
what is strategically possible within a historical constellation M
What is missing in Zizek’s argument is the proper space for the articulation of
the political. The main problem here is Zizek’s own disavowal of democracy as the
space and practice for the political. Since he identifies democracy as always already
liberal-democracy, Zizek understands democratic practice as essentially intertwined
with liberal economics and politics. Moreover, he refuses any conception of
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democracy that tries to understand it as an autonomous an anti-liberal practice. There
is an essential tension between some of the examples that for Zizek characterize truly
political acts and his understanding of democracy. For instance, Zizek draws an
analogy between the Canudos of Mario Vargas Llosa’s La Guerra del Fin del Mundo
and today’s Brazilian favelas. Vargas Llosa’s Canudos are what we could call a
classic Benjaminian community. Its social composition encompasses the wretched of
earth: beggars, prostitutes, bandits, etc. Socially, this community lacked any notion
or practice of liberalism: there is no money, no property, no taxes, and no marriage.
Zizek identifies the space where this composition takes place as a “liberated
territory.” Moreover he argues that “the liberated territory of Canudos in Bahia will
remain forever the model of a space of emancipation, of an alternative community
which completely negates the existing space of the state”65 This kind of community,
as shortly lived as it is, shows a “will to accomplish the ‘leaps of faith' and step
outside the global circuit .”
66
Zizek identifies the fleeting character with the response
of liberal democracy to these threats to power. In his conflation, Zizek argues that
today those who invoke democracy (as a master signifier) only call for the
postponement of action. He argues that “democracy qua ideology functions
principally as the space of a virtual alternative: the very prospect of a change in
power, the looming possibility of this change, make us endure the existing power
relations—that is to say, these existing relations are stabilized, rendered tolerable, by
the false opening .”67 The problem again is that rather to pointing to the tension and
actual antagonism between liberalism and democracy, Zizek sees them as co-
dependant: democracy becomes the formalistic procedure which presents any change
65
Slavoj Zizek, Iraq
,
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m the liberal regime. This becomes clear in his approach to the anti-globalization
movement. He argues that the oppositional logic of the anti-globalization movement
is not enough because it does not “problematize the self-evident reference to ‘freedom
and democracy/ Therein resides the ultimate Leninist lesson for today:
paradoxically, it is only in this way, by problematizing democracy—by making it
clear how Liberal democracy a priori, in its very notion... cannot survive without
capitalist private property—that we can become effectively anti-capitalist .”68 What
Zizek never mentions precisely because his notion of democracy as liberalism does
not allow him to is that every single example he identifies with the truly political act
has been democracy at its best. In a political act (and he shares this point with Alain
Badiou) “you do not choose what you will do, you do what you must .”69 Some of
these events are, of course, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, etc. but
since Zizek understands that “today, democracy is above all about formal legalism
—
the unconditional adherence to a set of formal rules that guarantee societies’
antagonisms are fully absorbed into the political arena,” he cannot identity any
revolutionary event as democratic .
70
Here, the perfect antidote is Sheldon S. Wolin.
Wolin provides a concept of democracy that allows to both understand democracy as
contrary to liberalism and see the essentially democratic character of what Zizek calls
‘the political act.’ More importantly, Wolin's conception of participatory democracy
is finely attuned to the kind of relation between history and politics we endorse with
Walter Benjamin.
68
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If we take a look at Wolin's inaugural editoral for the journal democracy
,
it
becomes evident that all the features Zizek identifies with liberal democracy, Wolin
on the other hand sees as stubbornly anti-democratic. Those features, which were
becoming more and more pronounced in the US where precisely diminishing the
democratic character of society. Explaining why the journal was entitled simply
democracy
,
Wolin states:
The reasons for beginning this journal now and calling it democracy come
down to what, in our view, is the most significant political fact about
contemporary American life: the steady transformation of America into an
antidemocratic society. Every one of the country's primary institutions—the
business corporation, the government bureaucracy, the trade union, the
research and education industries, the mass propaganda and entertainment
media, and the health and welfare system—is antidemocratic in spirit, design,
and operation. Each is hierarchical in structure, authority oriented, opposed in
principle to equal participation, unaccountable to the citizenry, elitist and
managerial, and disposed to concentrate increasing power in the hands of the
few and to reduce political life to administration
.
71
The issues Wolin refers to as affecting the democratic character of American
society he will later refer to them as ‘politics.’ The force behind democracy’s
resistance and confrontation of these issues is what he later concluded was ‘the
political.' For politics will always remain in the continuity and relative stability of
the social. The most commonly experienced things and directly affecting citizens,
such as education, welfare, health, in short, “every one of the country’s primary
institutions” are the stuff of politics. Insofar as they remain within the normal
parameters of social discontents and expectations, politics is what takes the energies
of engaged and affected citizens. Moreover, as long as one remains within this
relatively stable sphere, one is what we might call the ‘being of politics.’ In contrast,
71 Quoted in Nicholas Xenos, “Momentary Democracy” in Aryeh Botwinick and William E. Connolly,
ed. Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes ofthe Political (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001), 26.
141
Wolin thought of ‘the political' as that which is episodic and rare . 72 If the political is
an expression of the public to promote and protect the well being of the collectivity,
such expression takes form differently from ordinary politics. Politics, being
continuous and ceaseless takes form within the boundaries of the structures of power
and administration inherent in a regime. Thus, in American as well as most European
countries, politics take form essentially as liberal politics. Zizek’s mistake consists of
identifying these politics with democracy. For Wolin, the political (and democracy
belongs to the political), being episodic and rare, and tending against the containing
essence of iberalism, always goes against the grain. The essence of democracy comes
from its origins: “democracy was born in transgressive acts .”73 This transgressive
character is the essence of any revolutionary movement. It relies on the political
potential of any ordinary citizen of becoming a ‘political being’ rather than the being
of politics. This political potential cannot be attached to any particular regime, which
is not to say that “democracy is without forms” but rather to suggest that “there is no
single form that democracy takes .”74 In this sense, and contrary to what Zizek
identifies, democracy as such is anti-systemic. This is why Wolin understands, for
instance, the constitutional character of American society as always in tension with
democratic forces. For Wolin, the constitution serves to regulate the amount of
democracy experienced in society.
In contrast to this understanding of democracy, Zizek’s flawed conception
becomes evident, particularly in his latest intervention regarding the French riots of
72
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2005. 5 In Zizek’s account of the riots, he historicizes them by criticizing the parallel
made by commentators between today’s France and the France of May 1968. For
Zizek, this parallel suffers from a fundamental political mistake. During the protests
of May 1968, the protestors had a clear vision of the aggravating policies of capital
and the state on workers and the changes that were necessary in order for the situation
to change. In contrast to this, Zizek argues “what strikes the eye with regard to May
1968 is the total absence of any positive utopian prospect among the protestors: if
May 1968 was a revolt with a utopian vision, the recent revolt was just an outburst
with no pretense to any kind of positive vision...”76 What is dismaying about Zizek’s
approach is the reason he attributes to the chaotic character of the riots. Since they
have no stated political project, since they are just acting out of disgruntled
youngsters, then these events are simply meaningless. According to Zizek “what is
most difficult to accept is precisely their utmost meaninglessness: more than a form
of protest, they are a passage a l ’acte which bears witness not only to the impotence
of the perpetrators, but, even more, to the lack of what Fredric Jameson called
“cognitive mapping”, to their inability to locate the experience of their situation into
a meaningful whole.”77 Thus, this would render the French situation into a classical
Marxist problem of false consciousness. And apparently it is nothing more than this
because according to Zizek there are other choices. Today’s problem is “not that of
the forced choice (I am free to choose on condition that I make the right choice) but
the opposite one: the choice is effectively free and, for this very reason, is
experienced as utterly more frustrating” Zizek never asks the actual democratic
75 The riots were set in motion by the deaths of two young boys, Bouna Traore and Ziad Benna,
electrocuted, while running from the police, in a subway station in the suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois on
October 27, 2005.
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questions which Wolin's notion would force us to ask: was there ever any access to
defining the choices?, has there been any participation on the definition of the
agenda?, is the French government including the protesting community in their
attempt to solve the situation? These questions are irrelevant for Zizek because he
believes that “there is no guarantee that the democratic politicization of crucial
decisions, the active involvement of thousands of concerned individuals, will
necessarily improve the quality and accuracy of decisions and thus effectively lessen
the risks... Once this conception is deployed the conclusion is not surprising, hi a
classical vanguardist way Zizek ends up endorsing the notion that one should rely on
the judgment of those who know. For Zizek, before the anxiety caused by not
knowing what to do with the supposedly free choices “one is tempted to evoke here
the answer of a devote Catholic to the reproach of the atheist liberal that they,
Catholics, are so stupid as to believe in the infallibility of the Pope: “We, Catholics, at
least believe in the infallibility of ONE and only one person; does democracy not rely
on a much more risky notion that the majority of the people, i.e. millions of them, are
infallible?”
79
In the end, Zizek wants to have it both ways. On the one hand, the
problem with today’s Homo Sacer is that they have no utopian political project, that
they suffer from a classic case of false consciousness. This lumpen subject does not
know what to do. On the other hand, if there is any revolutionary potential nowadays
this potential lies precisely on them. Today “the slum dwellers are the counter class
to the other newly emerging class, the so-called symbolic class (managers, journalists
and PR people, academics, artists, etc.) ... what we should be looking for are the
signs of the new forms of social awareness that will emerge from the slum
78
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collectives: they will be the germs of the future .”80 I believe what Zizek probably
meant to say was that these subjects are the ‘seeds’ not the ‘germs,’ but the slip of the
pen is quite revealing. Insofar as they lack ‘social awareness’ (an euphemisms for
lalse consciousness, if there ever was any) they will remain ‘germs.’ Rather than
taking this path, we should endorse the democratic path. This is not an easy path but
it is certainly better that what Zizek ended up endorsing in a recent piece: “We all
know the pop-psychological notion of 'passive-aggressive behavior,’ usually applied
to a house wife who instead of actively opposing her husband, passively sabotages
him... perhaps, one should assert this attitude of passive-aggressivity as a proper
radical political gesture ... the first truly critical (“aggressive,” violent) step is to
WITHDRAW into passivity, to refuse so participate ...”81
The democratic path may not provide absolute guarantees but it provides
power to the powerless. And if there is a claim to power we also know that with it
comes responsibility. This is unavoidable and any approach that lingers on the hope
of power without responsibility is as delusional as betting on liberalism without
poverty. The democratic path is best suited for today’s most disempowered
individuals (Agamben’s Homo Sacer, Balibar's sans papiers, Zizek’s slum dwellers)
because “participatory democracy lends itself to a politicizing of every day life .”82
Such politicizing reveals the injustices of the structures of power and opens the way
to confront them. And as so precisely put by Xenos: “This attribute is source of
strength, but it is also a danger. The strength resides in the ideals of the citizen as an
active and effective participant in public discourse and in the demands such an ideal
80
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places on the status quo. Such a citizen must be an autonomous agent but also an
equal among equals. Dependencies and inequalities that infringe upon one’s
capacities as a citizen are fair game for the critical implications of participatory
democracy, as is the political apathy characteristic of contemporary representative
democracies. The danger resides in the demands such a vision places on the citizens
it calls forth: demands of time invested in civic education, discussion and decision
making; the imperative of commitment that threaten to destroy any meaningful
separation of political life from the life of family, friends, relaxation and work”83
The only qualification one has to make is that the subject of this democratic
perspective cannot be only the citizen, but also the Benjaminian subject: the Homo
Sacer
,
the slum dweller, the sans papier
,
the refugee. If there is to be any meaningful
act nowadays it necessarily has to be the politicizing of these subjectivities. Only a
democratic perspective provides the mechanisms for this politicization.
s3
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDING REMARKS: OUTLINING A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF POLIYICS AND HISTORY
Overview
The first and second chapters of this dissertation focused on the theoretical
relation between dreams, history, and politics in the writings of Walter Benjamin,
paying particular attention to The Arcades Project. These chapters were meant as an
intervention in contemporary debates whose main concern is the articulation of a
historiography that takes into consideration the political climate of its discursive field.
Chapters three and tour aimed at presenting two self-understood leftists approaches to
politics. In these chapters I tried to present the limitations of these contemporary
approaches when compared to the possibilities that a Benjaminian project offers.
More generally, the dissertation seeks to formulate a politics that is attentive and
responsive to silenced voices insofar as these can be articulated historically. Hence, in
order for such historical articulation to take place the dissertation proposes a
philosophy of history that encompasses marginalized subjects. This attempts if is to
provide such philosophy of history it has to respect difference critically, and if it aims
to provide a political openness to depoliticized subjects, it must do so outside the
parameters of liberalism. Hence, I have argued only a dialectical approach to the
articulation of history and politics can sustain a critical history attentive to historical
otherness and a leftist politics that remains outside the sphere of liberalism.
In the first chapter we presented a discussion of the status of dreams and
dreaming in Freud and Benjamin. This chapter served as an exegetical account of the
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dream-work in Freud and a proposal to read Benjamin in Freudian categories.
Particular attention was paid to The Arcades Project where this topic is most salient
in Benjamin. I compare Benjamin and Freud regarding dreams and argued for a
Freudian reading of Benjamin's notion of dreams and at the same time a Benjaminian
reading of Freud’s notion of dreams. This served as the foundation upon which our
discussion of history in Benjamin was based.
The second chapter presented Benjamin’s notion of history as a progressive
alternative to study the relation between politics and history. In the chapter I argued
for Benjamin s conception of history as attentive to the politicophagic character of
liberalism. I discussed and elaborated on the Benjaminian notion of history as a
dream and the historian s labor as an interpretation of dreams. Some of the questions
addressed in this chapter were: what’s the difference between contemporary critiques
of historicism and Benjamin’s notion of history? Is there any progressive outcome
from Benjamin’s notion? What’s the importance of the critique of historicism from
our Benjaminian/Freudian perspective for contemporary historiography?
The third and fourth chapters served as two representative of critical
engagement with politics from a contemporary perspective. These works try to
provide an alternative account from liberal thinking about politics and history. In the
third chapter we engaged the work post-Marxist political theorist Ernesto Laclau. I
tried to showed that his main contribution to political theory, the deployment of the
theory of hegemony, rather than being a theory of political action, it is a theory of
why every action is ultimately doomed to failed because the inner antagonism of
anything political.
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In the fourth chapter we took on the work of Slavoj Zizek, one of today’s most
radical political thinkers. Throughout the chapter we agreed with many of Zizek’
s
political assessments and his dialectical approach to politics and history. However, I
tried to showed that what undermines Zizek’ s own innovative perspective is his
conflation of democracy with liberalism. In contrast, I presented some crucial
characteristic of a notion of democracy that would render Zizek’ s diagnosis of
contemporary political struggles in a more politically productive way.
Moving forward
In this last chapter I want to present a theoretical outline that will frame my
further research on the relation between politics and history. However, such
framework is interdisciplinary by the nature of it. Hence, it is necessary before
presenting this outline, to discuss a perspective that has made important contributions
to the debate on historiography and politics: postcolonial theory. I will discuss the
latest contribution to this debate by the most prominent of the postcolomal theorists:
Rajanit Guha.
Guha at the Limits of History
During the last two decades an intense debate on the state oh history has taken
place in Western academic circles as well as in South Asia and Latin America. One of
the most pervasive critiques to Western historiography has come from the field of
postcolonial studies. This is not a homogeneous field of study, nor can we classify
those who identify themselves as postcolonial intellectuals within rigid parameters.
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However, we can assert unequivocally that if there is something common to everyone
working under the banner of postcolomality is that they take as the fundamental site
of intellectual kinship the Subaltern Studies group. And as founding editor of
Subaltern Studies, Ranajit Guha stands as the group's most important intellectual
figure. The work of Guha began as a concern with South Asian historiography and its
elitism in the creation of India s history. Nevertheless, after more than twenty years
the scope of this perspective has widened enormously. This widening is what is of
theoretical interest, since we are no longer talking about a specific historico-political
problem with South Asian historiography, but more generally the discussion has
taken the status of general propositions in the philosophy of history. This
characteristic is best exemplified by Guha’s latest book History at the Limit of World-
History.
'
The task Guha embarks on is that of confronting “the philosophically certified
‘higher morality’ of World-history with its politics by asking some difficult questions
about the morality of colonizers claiming to be the authorized historians of lands and
peoples they themselves put under a colonial yoke.” Guha’s point is not merely that
of setting “he political record straight”, but rather he is more concerned with the
representation of the colonial past held in thrall by a narrowly defined politics of
statism.”" For him, “it is the inadequacy of historiography that has altered us to this
thralldom. Seen from the perspective of the colonized, that inadequacy is nothing
other than a measure of the dominance exercised by a mode of colonialist
knowledge.” He concludes this indictment with this forceful words: “sponsored and
1
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propagated by the Raj, it has had the effect of replacing the indigenous narratologies
of precolonial times by ones that are typically modern and Western .”3
For Guha, historians and academics have been so consumed by what he calls
‘colonialist knowledge’ that the paradigm of Western historiography, exemplified by
Hegel, absorbed Indian history and made it difficult to realize the necessity of getting
away from it, to challenge it and change it. This relation has proven so pervasive that,
Guha argues, “our critique has to look elsewhere, over the fence to say, to
neighboring field of knowledge for inspiration, and finds it in literature, which differs
significantly from historiography in dealing with historically.”4 This significant
difference resides mainly in the fact that literature’s dealings with historicality,
contrary to historiography, keep its narrative away from public affairs, or statism. He
resorts to an Indian poet's reflections (Rabindranath Tagore) on historicality for two
legitimate reasons. First, for the poet’s intellectual independence which “owes
nothing to the guild that has reduced the study of the past to a blinked colonialist
knowledge.” Second, because the poet’s wisdom “bom of the experience of living
dangerously close to the limit of language” helped him to recognize the limit of
World-history” and encouraged him to place “a call to historians for a creative
engagement with the past as a story of a man’s being in the everyday world .”5
In all these aspects Guha’s enterprise, as a response to the poet’s call, is
commendable. What troubles us here is that the resentment (understandable as it is)
colonialist knowledge has clearly created may have a perverted function, also creating
a blind spot, a myopic dysfunction in the new eyes of historicality. Running away
3
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from colonialist knowledge and the Hegelian concept of World-history that
accompanies it, is also for Guha an escape from a statism he sees as part of this
knowledge. The danger this marathon entails is that of running away from politic
altogether. For if the statism attached to Hegelian World-history silenced pre-colonial
Indian narratologies, I am afraid the political blindness of literary historicality renders
postcolonial historiography a perfect target for liberal capitalism.
Guha wants “to explore the space beyond World-history”; he wants to “think
World-history in terms of what is unthinkable within its boundaries.”6 These
boundaries have been set by Hegel’s philosophy and within them he established the
requirement of statehood in order for a people to have a history. Hence, India
regardless of its magnificent literature, its great spiritual achievements, its laws and
poetry, “nevertheless [Hegel writes], it still does not have a history.”7 Therefore,
Guha tells us “the Renaissance formula, ‘no writing, no history’, so popular with the
conquistadors, was updated by 1830... to read ‘no state, no history’.”8 Hegel’s claim
was, of course, factually wrong since by 1801 in Calcutta there was already a history
book of India written by a Bengali. Nevertheless, the force of this discourse shows
itself by the fact that for two hundred years this debate continues, and this “is itself
evidence of what so radical a statist doctrine like Hegel’s can do to perpetuate the fear
of strong, centralized states and totalitarianism.” Here, however, Guha complicates
the terms of the debate and tell us something that we must think critically. He argues
that “the implications of such statism for historiography and generally for our
understanding of history have not been part of that liberal concern. For the latter it is
6
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only the doctrinal threat to Western European democracy that is a political issue, but
not the exclusion of other peoples and continents from history .”9 Here Guha misses
an important distinction. We have to be careful about the intersection of these two
concerns. On the one hand whether liberal thought has been concerned or not with the
implications of Hegel's statism for both historiography and the making of a history
and, on the other hand, whether the liberal concern, insofar as the main political issue
goes, has been with the threats to Western European democracy and not with “the
exclusions of other peoples and continents from history” as Guha puts it. We must
acknowledge that this has changed. For we must disagree with his first statement
regarding the implications of statism for history precisely because we think this
concern has been considered exactly through the medium of Western European
democracy. To be precise, these two issues have been articulated through the study of
liberal democracy. And here the liberal part is what makes the whole difference. This
liberal part, when articulated as ‘the end of history’, attempts to take-in ‘the peoples
and continents’ previously excluded; taking them in via liberalism's version of
democracy. Guha’s rejection of Hegel’s World-history, even if we welcome it as a
theoretical enterprise that presents an alternative vision for a philosophy of history, at
the same time produces a blind-spot in the analysis, particularly when we politicize it
through the present state of affairs (U.S imperialist agenda claiming to bring
democracy to the rest of the world, especially the middle-east). For if we think, as
Guha does, that the problem of statism is not a concern of liberal thought, but that its
only concern is that of the threats to Western democracy, we fail to see how that
statism has actually become a concern precisely when its no longer a Western statism
9
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as in Hegel, but a different life-form of the state as in the middle-east, for instance.
Hence, the concern has become to give history to those without it, by bringing them
“up-to-speed”.
Guha discusses what he sees as the dividing line in Hegel's scheme between
World-history and Prehistory. The politics of that division comes as the separation
between the three European realms: Greek, Roman, and Germanic with China and
India left-out as Prehistory. Eventually these peoples and continents got history as
their “reward for subjugation to civilized Europe and World-history.” Moreover,
Guha argues that “one of the most outstanding achievements of British power in the
East was indeed the production and propagation of colonialist historiography. It was
cultivated on Prehistory’s vacant plots. What was sown for seed came directly out of
post-Enlightenment European and particularly English historical literature packaged
for use in Indian schools and Universities. The product was history written by Indians
themselves in faithful imitation of the Western statist model .” 10 Hence, the problem
for Guha is that India got history insofar as it was inscribed by colonial knowledge in
World-history. His intention is thus to “recover the historicality discarded as
Prehistory .”
11
The model here can be drawn as follows: World-history is encircled
and the history it provides is those of the nation-states of Europe. The circle that
encircles this view is what Guha refers to as the limit of World history. Outside this
limit what we find is Prehistory. In Prehistory we get historicality, but not history.
This scheme also corresponds paradigmatically to two different traditions. World-
history’s narratology issues from the perspective and initiative of the narrator. In
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short, this is history from above. Prehistory enjoys a different paradigmatic
narratology. In South Asia the narrative issues from the initiative of the listener
.
12
Hence, this is a perspective that contributes to a historiography from below. The
modality of the narrative in each case also belongs to two different universes. One the
one hand World-history's legitimacy is the immediacy of experience as reveal in the
two most representative discourse of this genre: the novel and historiography. There
is a tension between the past and the narrative of experience. And according to Guha
this tension in historiography is resolved by circumspectively breaking away from the
past, and recovering it through memory for the use of the state . 13 However, the role of
memory here is “protective rather than nurturing. In other words, it is not for memory
to hold the past in its womb and let time work on it slowly and creatively until it is
ready to be bom again in repetition”, but to preserve the past only insofar as is a
record of the state’s development. On the other hand the narrative of Prehistory takes
Itihasa as its genre. “Itihasa
,
true to etymology, has the past as its essence. But it is a
past anchored to no experience in particular” this produces a sense of wonder for the
audience as a guiding principle to telling the story. This sense of wonder provides
Itihasa with the peculiar characteristic of telling the everyday life with an unusual
sense of discovery and meaningfulness. Nevertheless, “the battle of paradigms was
won for the West. Experience triumphed over wonder, World-history over itihasa.
The consequence for storytelling was not only a shift from the listener’s initiative to
12
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the narrator's, or from public provenance to one that was private. More significantly,
the story, as history, was dislodged from civil society and relocated in the state .” 14
What Guha proposes is the historically of literature as developed by the
Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore. Tagore’s essays, writes Guha, “stand for an original
vision distanced... from the colonialist historiography propagated by the Raj and the
ideologues of imperialism... [and] the narrowly sectarian Hindu view of the past ...” 15
According to Guha, Tagore left behind an early inclination towards nationalism in
favor of a “strong anti-imperialist, secular, and liberal-democratic interpretation of
Indian history. Tagore positions himself, basically, against historians, for he
always found it “difficult to put up with the pedantic historian when he tries to force
me out of the centre of my creativity as a poet .” 17 Tagore is certainly not opposed to
history as such, but to the way history has been written. He is “pleading for a different
approach to it. The history he tries to tell is that of his becoming a poet. Tagore
does it by recalling three experiences as a child, three lived moments . 19 There is an
inversion of perspective here, because these experiences are not to be understood as
the Western narrative of experience criticized by Guha for they do not count in the
order of actualization or factual reality. That is, “countable, measurable, quantifiable
generally speaking, they have no use for possibility in order to actualize [which is
what the state looks for and recreates].” Hence, according to Guha, “what we have
14
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here is entirely future-oriented. As such, it requires no evidence of actualization, nor
even of a beginning, but simply the recognition of something yet to be .”20 Tagore
insists “on keeping narrative and event apart as a measure of the distinction between
public and creative perception.”21 In conclusion, the following assessment fhnctions
as Tagore's indictment (and Guha’s shares it): “Far from being the site of a Hegelian
“conjunction” between what happens in the past and what is written about it, itihas
stands here for a line of demarcation between the two. Tagore insists on noticing that
line, indeed on highlighting it, not in order to promote the cause of the ahistoncal or
the unhistorical, but to demonstrate how history has been impoverished by
historiography’s preoccupation with the public and the average to the exclusion of the
individual and the creative .”22 However, I think this has to be seen dialectically, as
well as the history that Tagore tries to tell of his becoming a poet.
This story, although beautifully told in many ways, runs the risk of been
regarded as autobiography rather than history. This is of course through an optic both
Guha and Tagore reject. However, the problem that still persists, and they are unable
to tackle, is that in order to have a sense of larger justice and solidarity in history we
must inscribe these processes in larger ones (the social formations of capitalism for
instance). Only this can give us a sense of structural problems or reasons that also
contributes to placing the peoples without history where they are- without history. For
this is not only a problem of the philosophy of history that produce the discourse of
Prehistory and the historical accounts that excluded them, but is also a problem
regarding the roots of that account politically and philosophically speaking. From this
20
Ranajit Guha, History, 78.
21
Ranajit Guha, History, 88
22
Ranajit Guha, History, 89.
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perspective these histories have to be ‘historicized’ to use Fredric Jameson's old
imperative. The issue of course is how to tell these histories from bellow without
reproducing the old version of World-history, thus respecting and acknowledging as
legitimate their historiography, but at the same time locating them as outcomes of
processes of political and economic hegemony.
Regarding the preoccupation Tagore and Guha share on the issue of the
historian's preoccupation with the public as the state’s official history or as Hegel’s
statism, we also need to see it from a different, also I believe, dialectical perspective.
Here the public has to be seen as the relations of power and domination vis a vis the
public as democratic power. That is, we need to rescue that which is political about
the historian’s preoccupation with the public in order to abandon statism. If we
abandon the public tout court
,
we risk abandoning that which matters most: real
democratic empowerment outside the boundaries of liberalism. Now, Guha pointed
out an important aspect of Tagore’s preoccupation: the exclusion of the individual
and the creative. This is, we might say, the other side of the coin of the dialectic. For
what Tagore has in mind here are two important things” (1) “everyday contentment
and misery” (2) the “solidarities of a shared world.” Here I believe is where
Benjamin was most illuminating, as I have tried to show in this dissertation.
23
Ranajit Guha, History
,
92-93.
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Outline Towards a Theoretical Framework
There are two main axis (no pun intended with the “axis” of evil!) to the
analytical framework; one honzontal the other diagonal. In the horizontal axis we
have Politics on one stream and History bellow it. On the diagonal axis we have two
modalities of politics and history. One modality I call performative and the other
modality I would like to call redemptive or transformative.
Now let me explain briefly what each axis with its accompanying modality
entails. By a performative politics I understand a discourse framed within the
coordinates of contemporary liberalism. In terms of the economy what we get here is
the existing free market capitalism with its collapsing apparatus of the welfare state
trying to absorb the injustices and inequalities produced by capital. Any attempt at
reform, critique, or counter-hegemonic strategy takes place within the existing socio-
economic structure. This contemporary articulation of politics and the economy
renders any attempt or critique that touches such socio-economic structure as
illegitimate, criminal, and nowadays, even terrorist. The space for action and thought
within this framework is performative. I want to make clear that this does not mean
that it’s meaningless or unproductive. There is mobility within these coordinates:
social, political and economic mobility. The problem is that such mobility is
constrained by the systemic principles of capital, and by the boundaries of liberalism.
Most of today’s claims of social justice take place within these coordinates: liberal
feminism, multicultural claims, racial justice claims, and gay rights among others.
The preferred vocabulary of these politics is the vocabulary of tolerance and
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inclusion, but always within established parameters. The place for democracy here is
constrained to electoral politics and sometimes local decisions. Where democracy is
not allowed is in the economy, for it would entail a complete restructuring of the
political economy.
The other modality of politics, what I call transformative/redemptive opens
the space closed by the performative. The coordinates of a transformative politics are
those of radical democracy (in Sheldon Wolin' s sense). In this conception of
democracy the space for this transformative agency is the space of the political, rather
than just the space of politics. The political here is an expression of the public in
order to protect and promote the well being of society as a collectivity: the well being
always understood as equality. Politics is understood by Wolin as a process of
struggle and contestation over access to public resources. As we mentioned in chapter
four the temporality of politics is continuous and ceaseless. The political is not a
constant expression, but an episodic one and therefore takes place not on a continuous
basis but on a contingent and momentary one. For Wolin, and I follow him on this
score also, democracy belongs to the political. Furthermore, I belief that in politics we
do not find democracy but only democratic mechanisms. That is why in the
performative politics we do not have democracy but only electoral politics and other
democratic mechanisms. Performative politics gives a lot to the people; it gives a
voice, a vote, a space, representation. That is, it gives anything except POWER. The
transformative politics is about power and democracy as an exercise of that power in
all aspects concerning the well being of the collective. Hence, the conception of the
economy here is a political one, thus we are talking about democratization of the
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economy. This of course involves deep structural changes; changes that a
performative politics would not permit.
Now, we have two modalities of history. As with politics, one of them
corresponds to the performative and the other to the transformative/redemptive
history. The performative kind is from the liberal standpoint the most progressive we
get, and the postcolonial conception falls within this category. The ‘postcolonial
studies’ discursive agenda champions alternative narratives of history. The main
claim of historical injustice is expressed in terms of the failure to recognize the
cultural particularity and worth of the ‘Other’, and its right of inclusion to the
historical narrative. The proposal of postcolonial history is concerned with “writing
difference inside the history of modernity” and while they’re at it, “fighting the
assimilation of its narratives inside the European political imaginary .”24 The main
focus is on the discontinuity of subaltern narratives with relation to official history. It
aims to deconstruct official history and modem historiography in order to show how
they configure both hegemonic relations as well as marginal experiences. One of the
major complaints is that dominant historiography “with its emphasis on the state as
the central problem of insurgency, deprives the rebel from recognition as a historical
subject in its own right .”25 One of the most important critiques of this project is
against historicism, in particular one identified as the Western Marxist conception of
the political, where if there is no presence of a highly develop cultural bourgeoisie,
24 Monica Espinosa-Arango, “Dentro de la Historia: Un Debate Sobre Representacion Historica,
Poscolonialidad y Protestas Indigenas”, 22, in Carlos Pabon (ed.) El Pasado del Presente: Debates
Historiograficos Contemporaneos, San Juan: Ediciones Vertigo, 2004.
25 Mdnica Espinosa-Arango, “Dentro de la Historia,” 24.
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such predicament is considered "pre-political” in terms of its stage of development
.
26
The project is also presented as a way of transcending liberalism, and its historical
narratives.
There are three mam problems with this modality. First that it does not
questions the underlying (maybe unconscious) matrix upon which it is based, that is
the master/slave dialectic. Second, it is not aware of the transferential support the
narrative has with dominant liberal politics, which sustains subjugation (political,
social and economic). Finally, it produces a fetishistic attachment to otherness,
making very difficult to engage in a critical dialogue with such given otherness . 27
Transformative/redemptive history operates in a different matrix. First, it aims
to break, unmask and reveal what Michel Ralph Trouillot has called the silencing of
history. It pays particular attention to the minutiae of history in order to dislocate
hegemonic narratives. It uncovers the constitutive and dialectical character of history,
the underside of modernity. It aims to destabilize the master/slave schema of grand
history. There are two main aspects that are important to transformative/redemptive
history. These are highly important since the case could be made that performative
history can be “deconstructive”, although I don’t believe so. One is the awareness and
critical assessment of the transferential relation of history with liberalism. Such
awareness (we can call it the politicization of history) allows the acting and thinking
outside of the parameters of liberalism. The other important aspect is the critical
26
See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000). For an altogether different (in style and
content) appreciation of Marxism(s) contribution to history and to the discipline of cultural studies
where the postcolonial project is most present see Terry Eagleton, After Theory (New York: Basic
Books, 2003)
27 We have to remember that otherness does not always present itself as a claim of social, political,
economic or historical justice. There is also otherness that is anti-democratic, racist, misogynistic and
very much in-tune with capital.
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approach to otherness, an approach that is vigilant of fetishistic identification with
otherness and also ol breaking one's defenses against the Other, by beginning to
acknowledge them rather than repress them. 2 * In short, this is a history that
destabilizes the liberal historical agenda not only because it points to the fissures of
grand narratives of victory, but moreover it points to the fissures in one’s own history.
In psychoanalytic parlance the lack in the other is also a lack in me. As the
characteristics of the transformative matrix show, this project is essentially an
articulation of the Benjaminian approach and radical democracy.
2S The controversy over The Passion ofthe Christ is a case in point. Zizek’s approach is very helpful
for this issue. He has argued, that rather than chastising the movie for its anti-Semitic undertones, or
denying such an agenda; the approach should be the other way around. Not one that represses the
hostility and anti-Semitism behind the emplotment of the movie (Poncio Pilato was an anti-Semite
bastard, of incredible cruelty and historical sadism, and yet it comes out in Gibson’s portrayal as a
concerned and fair individual whose options were just been defined by the pressure of the situation),
but one that openly acknowledges such hostility and opens the possibility of working through them.
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